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ABSTRACT 
Mark D. Noble: Illuminating Democracy: Trends, Predictors, and Outcomes of Liberal 
Democracy 1972-2013 
(Under the direction of Kenneth Bollen) 
 
This dissertation examines recent trends in liberal democracy from 1972 to 2013 and 
addresses the current debate revolving around worldwide democratic stagnation. While some 
scholars claim that worldwide democracy is rather stable, this dissertation finds this to be a less 
than accurate statement. Going beneath worldwide trends to investigate differences in world 
regions as well as differences by income groups, several instances of democratic stagnation and 
decline are found that go against the perspective of democratic stability. Viewing 1972 to 2013 
as a consistent period belies several sub-periods where the growth of liberal democracy differed 
quite markedly. Building on insights from a latent growth curve modeling perspective and the 
insights of these distinct sub-periods of growth, a piecewise empirical model is found to describe 
these recent trends better than existing models. This model, however, illustrates that common 
predictors of liberal democracy from several important sociological perspectives including 
modernization theory, dependency/ world-systems theory, world polity theory, as well as other 
global factors do not tell us much about the spread of liberal democracy around the world since 
the mid-2000s to today. Thus, our current theories cannot illuminate why liberal democracy is 
currently stagnating across the world. Finally, this dissertation investigates if liberal democracy 
matters for population health and empirically tests the previously identified distributive process. 
Utilizing structural equation modeling to test the direct and indirect effects of liberal democracy 
iv 
on health, the evidence is consistent with the distributive effect. In addition, another potential 
mechanism mediated by gender equality is found that offers additional insight into this 
distributive effect. Beyond these mechanisms there is no evidence that liberal democracy impacts 
health directly. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
There are numerous reasons why it is important to study the recent trends, causes, and 
consequences of liberal democracy today. After the breakup of the former Soviet Union, liberal 
democracy was championed as the world’s gold standard in terms of types of political regimes. 
Fukuyama made even stronger comments on liberal democracy’s place in the post-Cold War 
world. “What we may be witnessing is not just the end of the Cold War, or the passing of a 
particular period of postwar history, but the end of history as such: that is, the end point of 
mankind's ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the 
final form of human government.” (Fukuyama 1989:1). The United Nations has ideals such as 
democratic rule, respect for political liberties, and equality embedded into its Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights. Other highly influential international organizations such as the 
World Bank and the IMF have liberal democracy promotion embedded into key international 
policies (Hobson 2009: 384) and frequently make aid packages that are often contingent on 
countries making greater overtures toward democracy (Brown 2005). Indeed, these overtures 
toward liberal democracy are not a thing of a bygone era. In the recently released 2017 
Development and Humanitarian Assistance Budget request made by the United States Agency 
for International Development (USAID) 2.3 billion dollars is earmarked for promoting 
democracy abroad. “This assistance will help USAID establish and strengthen inclusive and 
accountable democracies to advance freedom, dignity and development” (USAID 2016). Even 
international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) promote liberal democratic ideals abroad, 
especially American ones, and have had a large impact on the global stage (Schofer et al. 2012).   
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The attention on liberal democracy does not stop there. There are vibrant research 
programs in comparative politics and political sociology that speaks to the importance of liberal 
democracy in today’s world. Significant research examines the causes of democratization 
(Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson, and Yared 2009; Barro 1999; Bollen 1979, 1983; Fish 2002; 
Huntington 1991; Mainwaring and Perez-Linan 2005; Muller 1995; Przeworski et al. 1996, 
Woodberry 2012), democracy’s diffusion (Wejnert 2014, Huntington 1991, Kurzman 1999), and 
a variety of democracy’s consequences. These consequences include health outcomes such as 
infant mortality (Shandra et al. 2004) and HIV (Shircliff and Shandra 2011), to name just a few. 
In summary, a better understanding of liberal democracy is vital because there is international 
consensus on the importance of liberal democracy as key international governmental 
organizations (IGOs), national governments, and INGOs all seek to promote democracy on the 
worldwide stage.  
This dissertation will take a three-pronged approach. First, it will examine the trends of 
liberal democracy over time. Following that it will carefully examine the cause of liberal 
democracy investigating key perspectives found to be relevant from prior research. 
Subsequently, I will look at the outcomes of democracy by focusing on a key population health 
outcome. Thus, the goal of this dissertation is three-fold as it focuses on the recent trends, the 
causes, and the consequences of liberal democracy in the world from 1972 to 2013.  
Decades of research on liberal democracy often has produced disparate results. It is hard 
to pinpoint what leads researchers to different conclusions but they often stem from differences 
in sample composition, in the conceptual and operational definition of liberal democracy utilized, 
the methodologies employed (and the assumptions which underlie these methods), and the range 
of dates analyzed (Burkhart and Lewis-Beck 1994). This dissertation will attempt to avoid many 
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of these problems and truly speak to global trends in liberal democracy by including as many 
countries as possible in the analyses, clearly stating the conceptual definition of liberal 
democracy and operationalizing it in a matching manner, utilizing a newly updated indicator of 
liberal democracy that accounts for measurement error, bringing new methodological techniques 
to the question that allows the researcher to impose modeling assumptions rather than being 
straight-jacketed by them, and will investigate liberal democracy over 40 years from 1972 to 
2013. All of this will be explained in chapter two. An additional goal will be to examine recent 
worldwide trends and also disaggregate these trends by income group and world region. There is 
likely to be substantial variation by world region in the recent experience with liberal democracy. 
In addition, as one of the longest standing findings in this literature is the close association of 
liberal democracy with industrialization, it is likely that trends will also vary by income group. 
This chapter will carefully examine if these differences exist. The second chapter culminates 
with an exploration of the best-fitting unconditional model of liberal democracy throughout this 
time period. Once this task is complete the stage will be set to add predictors to the model in 
chapter three. 
Chapter three will predict the recent trends in liberal democracy identified in chapter two. 
This task starts by examining several prominent theories of social change and development and 
how they relate to the expansion of liberal democracy around the world. Three prominent 
sociological theories of social change will be engaged: modernization theory, world 
systems/dependency theory, and world polity theory. In addition, I will also look at the influence 
of global factors as well as other predictors that have been used to predict democracy in the 
literature.  
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Modernization Theory 
The modernization school of thought (known as modernization theory) was formed in the 
United States in the 1950s to evaluate the prospects for development in the Third World. Under-
development in the Third World was seen as a consequence of traditional values, psychological 
and cultural traits (Lerner 1958; Inkeles and Smith 1974). Early Modernization theorists have 
posited that modernization causes changes within the social and economic landscape of 
developing countries, making them fertile grounds for democracy and democratic transition: 
(Deutsch 1961, Lerner 1958, Lipset 1959).   
Dependency Theory/World Systems Theory 
Dependency theory formed in reaction to modernization theory, taking issue with how 
modernization theory places the blame for underdevelopment on internal deficient characteristics 
of developing nations. A state’s underdevelopment, then is not the consequence of the nation 
itself but rather is due to the disadvantaged position that a state has with the world capitalist 
economic system (Petras 1981).  
World Polity Theory 
World polity theory is a theory of the global system that seeks to explain global social 
change as a result of the diffusion of universal cultural scripts containing Western ideas, norms, 
and policies. It investigates the global level and how it creates or impacts social structures at 
national and even local levels (Holzer et al. 2015:1). World polity theory can be considered, in 
some ways, a more contemporary take on modernization. Both are theories of convergence, 
positing that countries will become more similar over time. Modernization theory posits that 
when poorer countries adopt western models of economic growth, they will catch up to 
developed countries. World polity theory also anticipates convergence. However, the 
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convergence is not a result of the acceptance of western models of economic development, but is 
driven by the existence of a common world culture that plays a key role in how governments and 
societies are structured. 
Global & International Factors  
Beyond these theories this dissertation will also incorporate other global processes that 
have been recently shown to be intimately tied to modernization process. One such global 
process identified here was impact that Protestant missionaries had on shaping the countries 
where they worked. Historically, missionaries have had a significant role in propagating modern 
innovations, such as increased literacy and education for the masses and religious liberty (the so-
called missionary roots of liberal democracy) (Woodberry 2012). These processes were initiated 
simply as a means to convert natives to Protestantism as well as laying the foundation for liberal 
democracy. 
These different factors, along with some other prominent causes, will be integrated into 
the model developed in chapter three to predict liberal democracy from 1972 to 2013. In addition 
to estimating the effects of these variables on liberal democracy throughout the period the 
modeling technique employed will allow for these effects to vary over time. This will give an 
indication if these explanations are found to have consistent effects over time or if they change 
over time and will help to better assess what we know about recent trends. 
Chapter four will shift the focus from the causes of liberal democracy to its consequences 
and evaluate how it predicts population health. In doing so it will use an indicator that has 
seldom been examined in this literature yet represents one of the best overall population health 
indicators, maternal mortality. It will engage existing demographic accounts as to why women 
die in childbirth and seek ways to integrate the effects of liberal democracy into these existing 
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explanations. Two important debates will be engaged in this chapter. First, the literature 
hypothesizes that liberal democracy influences health via its distributive effects. These effects 
are indirect and have not been explicitly tested as such in previous research. Second, there is 
debate revolving whether liberal democracy has contemporaneous effects on population health or 
if there is a stock or cumulative effect.  
Methods  
This dissertation will employ a variety of related modeling techniques to answer the 
questions described above, yet they are all related. A general structural equation modeling 
framework is the main underlying theme that relates all of these techniques together. In the 
examination of trends in chapter two, several different growth curve models are modeled within 
this framework to search for the model which best summarizes these recent trends. The final 
model identified, an autoregressive model, can be viewed as a special case of a structural 
equation model (SEM). This autoregressive model lends itself to incorporating time varying and 
time invariant predictors in chapter three. In chapter four classic SEMs are utilized to evaluate 
the short and long-term effects of liberal democracy on health as well as the indirect nature as to 
how these effects operate. 
Contributions 
This dissertation contributes to our understanding of liberal democracy in several ways. 
In chapter two it describes recent trends in liberal democracy from 1972 to 2013 at the 
worldwide level and engages recent arguments in the literature as to the nature of these trends. It 
brings to the debate new evidence from a disaggregated analysis of trends by world regions and 
income groups that helps to clarify the current state of liberal democracy in the world. In 
addition, it uncovers a new descriptive model that describes the recent trend in liberal democracy 
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quite well. It leaves to the third chapter how to integrate this descriptive model with theoretical 
predictors to predict recent trends.   
Chapter three seeks to see how well our current theories do at predicting these recent 
trends. In doing so it makes a methodological contribution by utilizing a new modeling technique 
that has yet to be applied to this research question. This technique allows me to relax a common 
assumption made in most longitudinal studies of liberal democracy and uncover that the effects 
of some of the most prominent predictors of liberal democracy may not be consistently 
experienced throughout the entire period under examination. This methodological contribution 
leads to new insights about the causes of liberal democracy and points to where there is a void in 
our current state of knowledge. As such, it invites follow-up analyses seeking to address the 
short-comings of the current state of the literature. 
Chapter four seeks to see why liberal democracy matters by investigating the short- and 
long-term consequences of liberal democracy as well as its direct and indirect effects on 
population health. Though this analysis I explicitly model the theorized causal pathways that 
have thus far only been speculated in the literature. By placing what we know about maternal 
mortality and liberal democracy in the same structural equation model (SEM) I am able to 
evaluate the current theorized distributive effect of liberal democracy on health but also uncover 
another mechanism on how it affects rates of maternal mortality. In addition, I am able to 
empirically test whether or not other nondistributive effects that have recently been theorized are 
likely.  
Organization of the Dissertation 
As stated above, the next chapter turns to an analysis of liberal democracy’s recent trends 
from 1972 to 2013. The third chapter will then seek to predict these recent trends utilizing 
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predictors from several key theoretical perspectives in sociology (modernization theory, world 
systems/dependency theory, world polity theory) as well as other prominent explanations. 
Chapter four will turn to the outcomes of liberal democracy for population health and well-being 
and specifically examine the consequences of liberal democracy for maternal mortality. Finally, 
chapter five will summarize the key findings from each of the chapters and offer more general 
contributions of this research as well limitations, policy recommendations, and avenues for 
future research.  
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CHAPTER 2: TRENDS IN LIBERAL DEMOCRACY FROM 1972 TO 2013: STABILITY 
OR STAGNATION? 
Introduction 
A greater understanding of liberal democracy and its recent trends is important for a 
variety of reasons. Since the end of the Cold War, liberal democracy clearly represents the 
international world’s gold standard in terms of types of political regimes. As some have argued, 
(Chan 2002; Fukuyama 1989, 1992) with the close of the Cold War and the fall of the Berlin 
Wall, liberal democracy has triumphed over the two most important ideological alternatives of 
fascism and communism. As such, the form of government at the end of history would not be 
communism as Marx predicted but rather liberal democracy “What we may be witnessing is not 
just the end of the Cold War, or the passing of a particular period of postwar history, but the end 
of history as such: that is, the end point of mankind's ideological evolution and the 
universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government.” 
(Fukuyama 1989:1). Amartya Sen concurs that liberal democracy as a type of political model is 
favorable, “While democracy is not yet universally practiced, nor indeed uniformly accepted, in 
the general climate of world opinion, democratic governance has now achieved the status of 
being taken as generally right” (Sen 1999:5).  
This is not to say that liberal democracy is the only form of government today; 
democracy does have its challengers. The China model, for example, is highly influential in the 
developing world, especially in East Asia and more recently in Africa (Jacques 2012). The 
possibility exists that, with increasing linkages between the developing world and the Chinese, 
10 
these countries could take on features of the Chinese model. Another threat to liberal democracy 
is posed by radical Islam and its negative reaction toward Western reformers and the principles 
of liberal democracy (Ball et al. 2014). However, Fukuyama (2014) dismisses current alternative 
models to liberal democracy today including the Islamic, Russian, and Chinese models, and 
continues to argue that liberal democracy is the final form of government. He does concede that, 
although liberal democracy faces challenges from within (e.g., rising inequality, corruption, etc.), 
it is still the best form of government (2014). Indeed, while liberal democracy has threats and 
produces contradictions, it still has ideologically won the day and is highly influential in the 
international development world.  
Second and relatedly, trends in liberal democracy around the world demand attention 
because the United States (U.S.) and other western states devote a lot of resources to spreading 
democracy around the globe (e.g., Iraq and Afghanistan). Democracy promotion is deeply 
institutionalized in the policies of the U.S., the European Union (EU), the United Nations (UN), 
and other international organizations. It is estimated that over 1.8 billion dollars are used 
annually in the name of democracy promotion (Coppedge et al. 2011). There are several reasons 
why democracy promotion is seen as favorable. Two specific reasons have been invoked by the 
U.S. in defense of its activist foreign policy. First, democracy promotion also promotes world 
peace; this rationale is founded in the democratic peace theory - the idea that democracies do not 
go to war with each other (Maoz and Russett 1993).  Second, democracy promotion is seen as a 
counter-measure to combat anti-American terrorism. For instance, democracy promotion was a 
cornerstone of U.S. foreign policy under George W. Bush (Epstein, Serafino, and Miko 2007). 
Even recent backlashes against the promotion of democracy have not led to a diminished role for 
its promotion in U.S. foreign policy.  
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Third, the promotion of the principles of liberal democracy is not just the domain of 
national governments. The United Nations and other international organizations have an agenda 
of liberal democracy promotion embedded in their international policies (Hobson 2009: 384). 
This can be seen in supra-national developmental agencies such as the World Bank and the IMF 
when they make aid packages contingent on countries making greater overtures toward 
democracy (Brown 2005). Further, ideals such as democratic rule, respect for political liberties, 
and equality are intimately linked in the UN’s Universal Declaration of Human Rights, as 
expressed in article 21(3), “The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of 
government; this will shall be expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall be by 
universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secrete vote or by equivalent free voting 
procedures” (UN 1948). In the 2000s the UN’s former Commission on Human Rights passed 
several important resolutions that placed democratic consolidation at the forefront of its efforts 
(resolution 2000/47) and in 2002 proclaimed that democracy should include several key elements 
such as freedom of expression and opinion and freedom of association, amongst others. Further, 
international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) also promote liberal democratic ideals 
abroad, especially American ones, and have had a large impact on the global stage (Schofer et al. 
2012).   
The proliferation of vibrant research programs in comparative politics and political 
sociology speaks to the importance of liberal democracy in today’s world.  Significant research 
examines the causes of democratization (Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson, and Yared 2009; Barro 
1999; Bollen 1979, 1983; Fish 2002; Huntington 1991; Mainwaring and Perez-Linan 2005; 
Muller 1995; Przeworski et al. 1996, Woodberry 2012), democracy’s diffusion (Wejnert 2014, 
Huntington 1991, Kurzman 1999), and a variety of democracy’s consequences. These 
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consequences include economic outcomes (Boix 2003; Przeworski et al. 2000), income 
inequality (Bollen and Jackman 1985; Muller 1988), the democratic peace (Enterline and Greig 
2005; Maoz and Russett 1993), infant mortality (Shandra et al. 2004), and HIV (Shircliff and 
Shandra 2011), to cite just a few.  
In summary, a better understanding of liberal democracy is vital because it is the major 
form of government today.  Indeed, some argue that it represents the final evolution of 
government. The invocation of the ideal of democracy lends legitimacy to governments; the 
promotion of democracy around the world represents an enormous outlay of public and private 
resources; ideals such as democratic rule, respect for political liberties, and equality are 
embedded in international norms. As a result, there is a vibrant research program examining the 
causes and consequences of liberal democracy.  
The purpose of this chapter is to investigate recent trends in worldwide liberal 
democracy. In doing so, this study will examine several prominent theories of social change and 
development and how they relate to the expansion of liberal democracy around the world. I will 
start with a short description1 of three prominent theories: modernization theory, world 
systems/dependency theory, and world polity theory. After the introduction to each of these 
theories, I will describe what we would expect to occur in liberal democracy trends if each 
theory were accurate. Following this I will describe how recent trends have been described by 
other social scientists. Then I will more formally define liberal democracy and introduce and 
compare different indicators that have been developed to measure it, evaluating recent trends 
using each of these indicators. A descriptive analysis follows, examining overall worldwide 
                                                     
1 The main focus of this chapter is on the description of recent trends in liberal democracy. In the chapter that follows I 
will use these theoretical perspectives to predict recent trends. As the topic of the next chapter is predictions, a more 
thorough literature review on these theories will be presented at that time. 
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trends, as well as how these trends vary for different regional and income groupings of countries. 
This leads to the development of a formal model of liberal democracy from 1972 to 2013 that 
accounts for recent trends. In doing so, I will evaluate several different types of models within a 
longitudinal structural equation model (SEM) framework to uncover the one that best fits the 
observed data. I will also undertake several sensitivity analyses to verify the robustness of my 
results. Finally, I will offer conclusions and compare my results to those of other social scientists 
studying recent trends in liberal democracy. 
What do Modernization Theory, World Systems Theory, and World Polity Theory Predict 
for Recent Worldwide Trends in Liberal Democracy? 
 This section describes three prominent theories of social change:  modernization theory, 
world systems/dependency theory, and world polity theory.  Then, for each of these theoretical 
perspectives, this study will examine what would be expected to occur in liberal democracy 
trends if each theory were true. These theories are presented in roughly the same chronological 
order in which they were developed in the literature. 
Modernization Theory and Liberal Democracy 
Modernization theory generally states that (1) development is an evolutionary process in 
which states progress  from underdeveloped to modern, developed societies; (2)  the different 
stages in this evolutionary process need, for the functional maintenance of society, different 
patterns of social differentiation and a reformulation of cultural and structural elements; (3) 
developing countries will eventually take on the characteristics of the already developed 
countries in Western Europe and North America when they reach the last stage of development; 
and (4) the process will cause a discarding of traditional cultures and structures that are 
incongruent with modern life and they will be replaced with modern ones (Deutsch 1961, Lerner 
1958, Lipset 1959). 
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Early Modernization theorists have posited that modernization causes changes within the 
social and economic landscape of developing countries that make them fertile grounds for 
democracy and democratic transition: (Deutsch 1961, Lerner 1958, Lipset 1959). The main idea 
is economic development leads from a traditional to a modern society and these become too 
complex and, therefore, to unwieldy to be maintained by authoritarian political regimes. The 
mechanisms of how this may happen differ depending on the shade of the modernization 
argument being put forth, but include increasing levels of education (Lipset 1959), the expansion 
of individual values congruent with political freedoms (Inglehart and Welzel 2005), the 
diversification of individual interests and increasing social ties (Dahl 1971, Rustow 1970),  new 
constellations of class power, such as the acquisition of increased power by a growing middle 
class (Moore 1966) or  a growing working class (Collier 1999; Rueschemeyer, Stephens, and 
Stephens 1992), growing economic inequality (Boix 2003; Acemoglu and Robinson 2006; Houle 
2009), and  the emergence of a civil society (i.e., those relations outside of the family, church, 
government, or businesses) (Cheibub and Vreeland 2011). 
Thus, it seems clear that modernization theory would predict that, as countries around the 
world continue to develop economically and socially, increasing levels of liberal democracy are 
expected as well. Thus, modernization predicts that liberal democracy moves in conjunction with 
economic development.  As a country develops economically, so do the advances in liberal 
democracy.  
Dependency/ World Systems Theory and Liberal Democracy 
Dependency theory is a theory of development and underdevelopment formed in reaction 
to modernization theory and taking issue with how modernization theory places the blame for 
underdevelopment on internal deficient characteristics of developing nations. The intellectual 
15 
innovation brought to this perspective is that, when seeking to explain nations’ development and 
underdevelopment, the unit of analysis is not the nation but rather the world-system - the 
capitalist economic system (Petras 1981). Events in any one place cannot be explained without 
considering the entire system as a whole. In order to understand local actions, such as political 
struggles in a particular nation, it is necessary to consider the entire world system and view this 
struggle from that perspective. Whereas modernization theory focused on the internal 
characteristics of nations, dependency theory posited that it was these external characteristics of 
the capitalist economic system that are useful for predicting liberal democracy. 
A large part of the explanation for why core countries were successful at developing (that 
is often overlooked by those in modernization school) is that the core countries that developed 
early enjoyed a structural advantage. The world system is comprised of three types of nations: 
core, semi-periphery, and periphery. Peripheral countries are at a structural disadvantage. They 
are not able to reap the benefits of the exploitation of other countries. As a result, the peripheral 
nations are seeking to develop politically even as they are being exploited by core countries for 
their resources, labor, and markets. This exploitation of the foreign capitalist system often has 
influential domestic partners (usually elites, such as large land-owners or merchants). These 
domestic partners align their interests with the core countries, resulting in processes that suppress 
a peripheral country’s development of liberal democracy. One line of argument made by world 
system theorists is that as the elites and merchants receive outside support from core countries, 
they have less of a need to rely on the support of the middle class within their own country. In 
essence, a mini world system plays out domestically in the periphery, where the middle class is 
exploited and their potential for political power undercut (Chase-Dunn 1975). Another line of 
argument reasons that instead of being suppressed by the elites, the commercial and industrial 
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middle class in peripheral nations instead become complicit in the system that upholds the 
exploitation of the peripheral nation. Regardless of the reasoning, the end result is the same, the 
middle class, seen by the modernization school as an important agent to the entire modernization 
process, do not fulfill the same role that they did in core countries that developed earlier. 
Thus, if world systems and dependency theories were true, we would suspect that the 
effects of the world system on liberal democracy might operate in two ways. First, the message 
of capitalism as the dominant economic model is without a doubt intimately tied to democracy; 
we would expect that, as this message is broadcast to the rest of the world, it would be a 
mutually re-enforcing message. However, the world system is, by definition, one in which the 
core countries will always have the advantage over the peripheral countries. Thus, despite the 
message of capitalist development and liberal democracy going hand in hand, it is likely that 
these may not turn into realities everywhere evenly around the world. It is quite likely that world 
system theory would say that semi-peripheral and peripheral countries may start to exhibit some 
of the trappings of liberal democracy, such as elections, but these countries will never be able to 
fully develop economically or politically because of their unequal relationship to the dominant 
countries in the world system. 
World Polity Theory and Liberal Democracy  
Based on sociological institutionalism, world polity/institutional theory/world society 
theory is a theory of the global system that seeks to explain global social change as a result of the 
diffusion of universal cultural scripts containing Western ideas, norms, and policies. It 
investigates how global forces create or impact social structures at national and even local levels 
(Holder et al. 2015:1). World polity theory is a response or corrective to modernization theory, 
world systems theory, and realism. Modernization theory has a hard time of dealing with the fact 
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that different nations at different locations in their march toward greater economic development 
still shared some striking similarities in terms of their governments and policies. World polity 
theory would explain these similarities not by saying that internal factors (or domestic socio-
economic conditions) matter most, but rather the existence of a common world culture plays a 
key role in how governments and societies are structured. 
If world polity theory were true, then we would anticipate that the global diffusion of 
democracy is taking place in countries that are more closely tied to the world system. The ties 
that are often thought to hold the most significance are those to IGOs and INGOs. These 
organizations are at once seen as carriers and manifestations of the world polity. As stated above, 
the United Nations and other international organizations have an agenda of liberal democracy 
promotion embedded in their international policies (Hobson 2009: 384). Thus, it makes sense 
that the more closely a nation is to the world polity, the greater the likelihood that it will enact 
and reproduce democratic policies and institutions. Thus, it seems clear that world polity 
theorists would predict that there would be expanding levels of liberal democracy around the 
world since the 1970s.  
In summary, these theories hold much for the prediction of liberal democracy. Both 
modernization theory and world polity theory would predict the inevitability that, over time, 
higher levels of liberal democracy will be achieved. Modernization theory argues that economic 
development and increases in liberal democracy will go hand-in-hand. World polity theory 
predicts that, as countries are more tied to the world system, they will incorporate the dominant 
cultural scripts containing Western ideas, norms, and policies. Liberal democracy is a part of this 
dominant cultural script. From 1972 to 2013 it would be hard to argue that the world did not 
become increasing industrialization and more interconnected. However, if world systems and 
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dependency theories were accurate, we would still suspect that the capitalism-liberal democracy 
link would be a mutually reinforcing message. However, these two may not come in tandem 
everywhere in the world.  Semi-peripheral and peripheral countries may start to exhibit some of 
the trappings of liberal democracy, such as elections, but these countries will never be able to 
fully develop economically or politically because of their unequal relationship to the dominant 
countries in the world system. Thus, we would suspect that non-core nations will show lower 
levels of political democracy, or at the least slow increases compared to core nations.  
How Recent Worldwide Trends in Democracy Have Been Described 
 The study of the spread of democracy has a rich history in the political science and 
sociology literature, and is perhaps most famously explained using the metaphor of waves and 
reverse waves (Huntington 1991). The spread of democracy was posited to occur in waves 
followed by periods of democratic reversal. Huntington conceptualized three waves and two 
reverse waves occurring since the beginning of the 19th century. Between 1828 and 1926, there 
was the first wave of democratization, characterized as a long, slow wave. From 1922 to 1942 a 
democratic reversal was characterized by the failure of some of these democracies. From 
approximately 1943 to 1964, the world experienced the second democratic wave, followed by its 
reverse wave from 1961 to 1975. This study will focus on the time period from the beginning of 
the third wave (originating in Portugal in 1974) to the present day. 
However, let me be clear from the outset that, regardless of the fact that Huntington’s 
thesis is influential, it may not be that useful to conceptualize democracy. First, it is unclear 
exactly what is meant by a wave. As Kurzman (1998) discusses there are at least three different 
ways that waves have been discussed in the literature. First, there are democratic waves defined 
by an increase in some measure of global democracy. This measure may be the global mean of 
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each county’s democracy score, increases in the number of democracies in the world, increases 
in the percent of all regimes that are democratic, or increases in the percent of the world’s people 
that live in a democracy. Clearly, some of these possibilities would rely on a continuous 
indicator of democracy, and others would rely on a dichotomous one, further confusing the issue. 
As discussed later, Huntington relies most often in his writing on a dichotomous indicator and 
finds fault with Bollen’s continuous operationalization of the concept (Huntington 1991:318). 
However, there are times in Huntington’s writings where he subscribes to a continuous definition 
by acknowledging the fact that there are “semidemocracies” (1991:12). Beyond that important 
issue and the confusion it creates for conceptualizing waves of democratization, Kurzman points 
to two other ways in which waves have been conceptualized. The first is when there are more 
transitions to democracy than democratic reversals during a certain period of time. The second is 
that a wave is really a “linked sets of transitions to democracy” (Kurzman 1998:42). By 
Kurzman’s count there have been eight waves of democracy while Huntington counts three.  
Observations that governments in this period that may nominally be called “democracies” 
are really hybrid regimes (Diamond 2002) even further confuse the issue of “waves of 
democratization”. Not fully autocratic or democratic, these regimes exhibit some middle area or 
“gray zone” where some components of democracy exist, such as elections, but other 
components such as personal freedoms (e.g., freedom of expression or organization) are lacking. 
The wave analogy just does not stand up to scrutiny where there exists a middle ground. Sure, 
there may be some sort of energy that spreads around the world or a particular region, bringing 
with it some components of liberal democracy, but all of these components do not always take 
root. The reality is that some regimes fall short of the ideal of liberal democracy and occupy 
some middling space. Despite apparently being against the continuous operationalization of 
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democracy, Huntington himself ascribes to it several times in his 1991 book, The Third Wave: 
Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century, apparently undermining his entire thesis. 
To summarize, the idea of the third wave of democratization does not seem that useful as 
an analogy to view worldwide trends in liberal democracy since 1972. According to Kurzman 
(1998) a wave can mean one of several different things. In addition, this analogy is too infused 
with the conceptualization of democracy as a dichotomy, one to which I do not subscribe, as will 
be stated below. In addition, the wave analogy implies that there is an ebb and flow that periods 
of democracy are followed by periods of non-democracy. While this has occurred, it certainly 
has not happened in all countries in the world. This study examines roughly the same time period 
that Huntington has identified as the third wave of democratization but I do not subscribe to this 
analogy. Further additional evidence will be provided below in the analysis of an alternative 
manner in which to view trends in liberal democracy during this time, as well as evidence 
demonstrating that this theoretical wave has not affected all regions of the world in the same 
manner, if at all. 
Recent Worldwide Trends in Democracy  
Due to the major democratic gains occurring toward the end of the 1980s and early 1990s 
(with the fall of the Berlin Wall, the dissolving of the Soviet Union, and a plethora of newly 
independent states) there is no surprise that a favorable opinion coalesced about the future of 
democracy. However, with the failure of the Arab Spring and recent anti-democratic 
developments in Russia and parts of Latin America, this optimism has been dampened. While it 
appears as if, ideologically, the concept of liberal democracy has won the day, it begs the 
question as to why descriptive reports by Freedom House and other recent assessments of liberal 
democracy do not coincide with these expectations. 
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If the concept of liberal democracy truly represents an “end of history” and the final form 
of government, then we might anticipate that there would be world-wide convergence of all 
countries, or at least a majority of countries, toward more democratic institutions. However, 
initial descriptive analysis suggests that this might not be the case. Even while the U.S. and other 
Western countries have tried to spread democracy around the world, it appears as if a prolonged 
and persistent period of democratic stagnation has occurred.  An examination of world-wide 
trends in political rights and civil liberties reveals that, over the last decade, not much 
improvement has taken place, in terms of the number of countries considered to be democracies. 
In fact, the most recent Freedom House annual report on democracy sums up the current crisis of 
democracy thusly, the “acceptance of democracy as the world’s dominant form of government—
and of an international system built on democratic ideals—is under greater threat than at any 
point in the last 25 years” (Freedom House 2015). While not all countries have experienced 
declines in terms of political rights and civil liberties, there is a noticeable attack on the 
supremacy of liberal democracy world-wide. 
In its 2015 Freedom in the World report, Freedom House examined levels of political 
rights and civil liberties worldwide. They discovered that, during 2014, 61 countries experienced 
declines, while only 33 countries experienced gains. This pattern of decline is pervasive and 
affects almost all regions of the world, excepting the Asia-Pacific region. In 2014, some large 
and influential countries, such as Azerbaijan, Egypt, Hungary, Kenya, Nigeria, Russia, Thailand, 
and Turkey, all regressed. 
In fact, it appears as if authoritarian governments may no longer feel the need to pay lip-
service to liberal democracy. According to Freedom House, even the language used by 
authoritarian governments is different than in recent years in regions where respect for human 
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rights and free elections are in jeopardy. Authoritarian regimes are “beginning to abandon the 
quasi-democratic camouflage that allowed them to prosper in the post-Cold War world” 
(Freedom House 2015:5). In 2014, this was especially true for Russia, with its annexation of 
Crimea, disregard for press freedoms, and repression of minorities, such as the LGBT 
community. “President Vladimir Putin has made his contempt for the values of liberal 
democracy unmistakably clear.” (Freedom House 2015:2).  For a brief moment in early 2014, 
when the eyes of the world were on Russia for the Sochi Winter Olympics, Putin seemed 
unabashed in continuing his hardline stance toward minorities, despite criticism and outrage 
from much of the rest of the world.  
As stated earlier, 2014 witnessed declines in several countries, not just Russia. The 
Egyptian government attempted to reverse gains resulting from the Arab Spring. The president of 
Turkey “consolidated power during the year and waged an increasingly aggressive campaign 
against democratic pluralism” (Freedom House 2015:2). Governments in Venezuela, Kenya, and 
China have used the rising threat of terrorism to repress minorities and imprison their opposition 
under the guise of controlling what they perceive as dissidents. 
This world-wide trend of simultaneous gains and reversals in democracy is evident when 
examining the continent of Africa. In the last five years, Africa has witnessed large increases in 
liberal democracy in some countries, with meaningful declines in others. The Ivory Coast, Niger, 
Madagascar, Senegal, and Zimbabwe have experienced some of the biggest gains in freedom 
around the world. Meanwhile, Burkina Faso, the Central African Republic, Gambia, Mali, and 
Uganda have been amongst the largest decliners. Governance problems in Uganda are illustrative 
of these democratic declines. Although corruption among top government officials is considered 
to be rampant, long-serving president Yoweri Museveni has remained in office since the 1986 
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military coup, and was “re-elected” in 2016. Personal freedom has been under attack, as 
exemplified by the harsh treatment of homosexuals.  
It should be noted that militaries are involved in the political sphere in African countries 
such as Uganda, Burkina Faso, Egypt, Ethiopia, Rwanda, and Zimbabwe, and, beyond Africa, in 
Thailand and Venezuela. This harkens back to an earlier time when many countries in the world 
were run by men in mufti. 
Based partly on the gloomy picture of the past decade portrayed in Freedom House’s 
annual reports and other writings, such as Diamond’s “Democracy’s Deepening Recession,” 
(2014) and “Facing Up to the Democratic Recession,” (2015) and Kurlantzick’s “The Great 
Democracy Meltdown” (2011), a new debate has emerged in the democratization literature. 
Specifically, are we starting to see the beginnings of a democratic rollback or the erosion of 
democracy worldwide? As of now, there has been little empirical analysis that has addressed this 
issue head-on at the worldwide level, thereby testing these assertions by Freedom House, 
Diamond, and Kurlantzick.  A recent exception is Levitsky and Way in the 2015 article entitled, 
“The Myth of Democratic Recession”. Based on their reading of the recent evidence, they do not 
conclude that democracy is in a recession. Instead, they paint the current decade long period of 
democratic stagnation in a positive light and call this “stability”. This study supported their claim 
utilizing the normalized scores of four measures of democracy, and concluded that these scores 
have remained level rather than indicating a decline.  Based on their empirical evidence this is 
one interpretation, but is it the only or even the best interpretation of the empirical data? Their 
claim is further examined in the following analysis.  
One major gap in the current debate is a failure to examine how liberal democracy varies 
among different countries in the world.  Levitsky and Way’s article (2015) fails to examine 
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potentially vast inequalities in worldwide trends in liberal democracy. For instance, if we take a 
disaggregated look at democratic trends by region, would all regions follow worldwide trends or 
would we see divergent trends? What if we look at the trends of democracy by level of 
development? These seem like odd omissions, especially when considering the known vast 
regional differences in the experience with liberal democracy over the last 40 years, and that 
entire theoretical perspectives such as modernization theory predict that countries at higher level 
of development tend to have higher levels of democracy. There is little doubt that a more 
nuanced analysis of regional trends, as well as analysis of how trends differ by level of income, 
is needed to compliment current literature focused only at the worldwide level.  Addressing this 
gap will be one of the unique contributions of the present study. 
Defining Liberal Democracy 
There is not a universally agreed upon definition of democracy that has found prominence in 
the literature. In fact, Collier and Levitsky (1977) identified over one hundred subtypes of the 
literature on democracy.   The different definitions of democracy can be placed on a continuum 
from minimalist definitions to more substantive ones. More minimalist definitions focus on the 
idea that democracy is equivalent to holding competitive elections. Minimal is then the “the 
smallest number of attributes that are still seen as producing a viable standard for democracy” 
(Collier and Levitsky 1997:433). Democracy is then reduced to a process that is use to decide 
who will run the government and fill legislative bodies. A classic example of a minimalist 
definition is offered by Schumpeter (1976).  "The democratic method is that institutional 
arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide 
by means of a competitive struggle for the people's vote” (Schumpeter 1947:269). These 
definitions do not include any measure of freedoms, political liberties, nor any mention about 
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who can participate (i.e., is there universal suffrage). Another important procedural definition of 
democracy is given by Huntington (1991) “democratic to the extent that its most powerful 
collective decision-makers are selected through fair, honest and periodic elections in which 
candidates clearly compete for votes and in which virtually all the adult population is eligible to 
vote” (7). Clearly, Huntington’s definition incorporating the concept of universal suffrage is 
located a little further up the continuum. 
At the other end of the continuum are the more maximalist definitions - those 
conceptualizations of democracy focused on substantive reduction of social inequality. Thus, 
civil rights and political liberties are not enough. In a maximalist conception of democracy, the 
government has to provide the mechanisms to ensure that all people have equal opportunity and 
resources to utilize these rights to the fullest. This conceptualization is not part of the mainstream 
work on democracy. 
Other conceptualizations of democracy fall somewhere between these two extremes and are 
often considered liberal democracies.  The concept of polyarchy probably falls somewhat shy of 
liberal democracy, but is close. For Dahl, a polyarchy is defined by the presence of particular 
government institutions, such as elected officials, free and fair elections, inclusive suffrage, and 
several rights and privileges associated with people, including the right to stand for public office, 
freedom of expression, the right to alternative information (not from the government), and the 
right to have associational autonomy. This definition of polyarchy obviously goes beyond 
elections and includes expanded civil liberties and political rights, with more than a hint of 
protecting people from an abusive state. I favor a similar conception of democracy as Dahl, 
called liberal democracy.  
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In order to clearly situate this study in the present literature, it will focus on liberal 
democracy. Following Bollen (1980, 1990, 1993, 2009), I offer a straight-forward yet 
sophisticated definition of liberal democracy as “the extent to which a political system allows 
political liberties and democratic rule” (Bollen 2009:369). Political liberties refer to concepts 
such as freedom of expression and the right for people to organize freely in either defense or 
opposition to the current government. Democratic governance refers to concepts such as free and 
fair elections and democratic participation in governmental affairs by either direct or indirect 
means (Bollen 2009:369).  Thus, this definition of liberal democracy is two-dimensional, 
consisting of democratic governance and political liberties. In the study of democracy (like many 
academic endeavors), there are debates over the meaning, conceptualization, and 
operationalization of key concepts; this need not present an insurmountable obstacle to the study 
of democratic trends over time. As such, this definition of liberal democracy is two-dimensional, 
clear, easily measured and will facilitate the investigation of trends in liberal democracy from 
1972 to present. 
Cross-national Measurement of Liberal Democracy 
There is a lack of consensus on how to best measure democracy, and subsumed in this 
debate is conflict over whether democracy is best measured by a dichotomous variable or 
captured by a continuous measure. The following section, discusses the cleavage between those 
who measure democracy as a binary variable as opposed to those supporting a continuous 
concept. Following this discussion, I will briefly review four of the most utilized measures of 
democracy and how they relate to this analysis.    
Initially, dichotomous measures of democracy were used in studies on the relationship 
between education and liberal democracy (e.g., Lipset 1960, Rostow 1960, Hewitt 1977, and 
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Muller 1988) because it was hard to gather more precise information on regimes. However, not 
all early studies utilized a dichotomous measure of democracy, and certainly the idea of 
continuous measures was well established early on in the literature (see Mulgan 1968). For 
example, Lerner (1958), used a continuous proxy for democracy, voter turnout, although the 
validity of this indicator is debatable (Bollen 1990:8). The major stumbling ground between 
those that subscribe to the binary indicator representing the presence or absence of democracy 
view democracy in minimalist terms—yet, as   explained below, this is not always the case.  
Binary or Continuous Measures of Democracy? 
Binary Measures  
This section briefly discusses the main proponents behind the use of binary indicators. It 
could be argued that binary measures of democracy are useful to answer some research questions 
regarding democracy (e.g., democratic transitions); however, they are not appropriate to assess 
recent trends in liberal democracy. Since the focus of this current research is on trends of liberal 
democracy, most of the discussion in this section centers on continuous (or nearly continuous) 
measures of democracy. The criticism of binary measures will be introduced in the discussion of 
continuous measures. This section also discusses a practical compromise offered by Collier and 
Adock (1999) as a way to move beyond this debate. Below that I will introduce the four 
continuous measures of liberal democracy, and identify the indicator chosen for use in this study.  
There are two main arguments made by the major proponents of binary measures of 
liberal democracy (Alvarez et al. 1996 aka Przeworski and colleges). One argument is made on 
behalf of validity and the other made on behalf of reliability. I will focus most of my emphasis 
on their first claim, as the second claim seems to have less weight if their first claim is incorrect 
(which I believe it is) and if one were to favor a continuous measure of democracy (which I do—
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Bollen’s Liberal Democracy Series I Indicator). The first claim, the validity issue, is that 
nondemocracies and democracies are two different types of regimes and, therefore, should not 
both be placed on a single scale (Alvarez et al. 1996:21-22).  
“The main difference between our approach and the alternatives is that we use a nominal 
classification, rather than a ratio scale. We believe that while some regimes are more 
democratic than others, unless offices are contested, they should not be considered 
democratic. The analogy with the proverbial pregnancy is thus that while democracy can 
be more or less advanced, one cannot be half-democratic: there is a natural zero point” 
(Alvarez et al. 1996:6). 
As is evident in the quote above, they view democracies and nondemocracies as two 
completely different types of regimes (as discussed above). It is also clear that the authors 
subscribe to a minimalist definition of democracy based on elections. However, it is also clear 
that they do not see a problem with using a graduated measure to compare democracies with 
each other. Thus, they view democracy simultaneously in terms of elections (the minimalist 
definition) and as a continuum (as some regimes can   be “more democratic than others”).  
Further evidence for this claim appears later in their article when, surprisingly, they state 
“[c]onceptually, our scale is close to those of Bollen (1980) …. Bollen used four indicators: 1) 
whether elections were fair, 2) whether the chief executive was elected, 3) whether the 
legislature was elected, and 4) whether the legislature was effective” (Alvarez et al. 1996:20). 
Yet, in that article, Bollen’s conception of political democracy (i.e. liberal democracy) is the 
same as it in subsequent works “…at a minimum, a measure of political democracy should 
include indicators of both political liberties and of popular sovereignty” (Bollen 1980:375). I do 
not see how Alvarez et al. can substantiate these two competing views of democracy. Further, 
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their view makes the assumption that transitions to democracy occur at one precipitous moment. 
This does not reflect the reality that many democratic transitions are incremental and often 
proceed in a way where democratic gains are made and then lost.  
Elkins (1999), in research examining the relationship between regime types and military 
conflict, tested the assertion of validity made by Alvarez et al. (1996). Elkins actually finds that 
treating democracy as a binary variable masks important findings. In addition, Coppedge (1997: 
181, 189-197) in research on the determinants of polyarchy, uncovers that the findings change 
depending on how a dichotomous measure is created. That is, changing the cut-points between 
nondemocracies and democracies has an impact on the empirical results. Thus, their claim that 
binary measures have superior validity when compared to continuous measures does not hold. 
The second assertion is that a binary indicator is inherently more reliable than a 
polychotomous indicator. They contend that this is the case even if the underlying concept of 
liberal democracy is conceptually continuous. Essentially this claim is made out of a concern for 
measurement error. Their argument rest on the assumption that a “finer scale generates smaller 
errors but more of them, a rougher scale generates larger errors but fewer of them. As I show in 
Appendix II, if errors of a larger magnitude are less likely, the dichotomous scale will have a 
lower expected error” (Alvarez et al. 1996:22). This claim appears rather shallow on its face. 
Nevertheless, Elkins (2000) provides an empirical test of this claim by comparing Alvarez et 
al.’s binary measure of democracy against a polychotomous measure of democracy and 
demonstrates that the binary measure actually has more measurement error than a 
polychotomous measure of democracy with five categories (see Elkins 2000:298-299). Elkins 
does qualify the results and concludes that this will not always be the case. However, it shows 
that the assumption that a dichotomous measure has less measurement error is incorrect. If we 
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are truly concerned with minimizing measurement error, one would be advised to look to 
Bollen’s indicator of liberal democracy, which explicitly accounts for measurement error in its 
construction.  
Another prominent proponent of using binary measures of democracy is Huntington 
(1991); however, his case is curious as he is on much shakier ground than Przeworksi and 
colleagues. During their rant against Bollen and Jackman’s (1989) criticism, they do make one 
important comment that gives us a little insight. “If we cannot classify some cases given our 
rules, all this means is that either we have bad rules or we have insufficient information to apply 
them” (Alvarez et al. 1996:21-22). I will concede that at least Alvarez et al. (1996) provides 
explicit coding rules and explains how they apply them to create the dichotomous measure of 
democracy—unlike Huntington. Furthermore, they do have procedures in place in their coding to 
deal with regimes that do not fit neatly into either the authoritarian or the democracy bin—unlike 
Huntington again. Huntington (1991) clearly conceptualizes liberal democracy in accordance to 
Dahl, yet curiously and rather obscurely operationalizes it as binary.  
“So defined, democracy involves the two dimensions-contestation and participation that 
Robert Dahl saw as critical to his realistic democracy or polyarchy. It also implies the 
existence of these civil and political freedoms to speak, publish, assemble, and organize 
that are necessary to political debate and the conduct of electoral campaigns” 
(Huntington 1993: 7). 
Again, it appears to be extremely odd to conceptualize a concept as continuous but 
measure it as binary. Further, Huntington acknowledges that there are intermediate cases 
(1991a:12) where regimes cannot be classified as either democratic or nondemocratic. He has 
subsequently found that “as formal democratic institutions are adopted by more and more diverse 
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societies, democracy itself is becoming more differentiated” (Huntington 1991a:12). As 
Huntington has written and is demonstrated by Diamond (1999: Table 2.4), these intermediate 
cases were on the rise in the 1990s. Thusly, it is relevant to ask whether it makes sense to treat 
democracy as a dichotomy given the reality of the world today. Overall, I find severe flaws in the 
case that measuring democracy as a binary variable is superior to measuring it in gradations or 
continuously. 
Continuous Measures  
The first and probably most important reason to use continuous measures of liberal 
democracy is driven by its conceptual definition. Although often overlooked, a quote from 
Mulgan (1968) is highly relevant to this modern debate on the measurement of democracy.   
“If we define ‘democracy’ as ‘political power exercised by the people’, it follows that 
there never has been and never can be a pure democracy. All we can say is that different 
states are democratic to a greater or less extent in various aspects of their political 
systems. The question of which states are to be called ‘democracies’ and which not 
becomes then a matter of an arbitrary cutting point, or rather a set of arbitrary cutting 
points, and is better ignored” (Mulgan 1968: 7). 
Mulgan’s view of democracy as an ideal is later echoed in the writing of Dahl (1971) as 
he differentiated between the democratic ideal and the real-life manifestations of regimes as 
polyarchies. Later Bollen and Jackman (1989) also implicitly subscribe to this democratic ideal 
as they argue for “the inherently continuous nature of the concept of political democracy” 
(Bollen and Jackman 1989: 612). Thus, the first and best reason to use a continuous measure of 
democracy is that it is the dominant conceptualization in the literature (despite those such as 
Alvarez et al. and Huntington). Thus, the use of a binary measure would necessarily leave out 
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important information because it is a more course level of measurement. The standard practice is 
to use the highest level of measurement when possible to avoid a loss of information. Placing 
many countries that have varying degrees of democracy into one category glosses over important 
differences between regimes potentially classified as democratic.  
A further critique of the binary measure cited by supporters of continuous measures is 
that if democracy is treated as a dichotomous variable, it is problematic to identify exactly when 
a country becomes democratic since the process of democratization is a gradual and uneven 
process (Bollen and Jackman 1989: 618). What determines the cut-off between democratic and 
non-democratic regimes? Empirical studies often use dates that can be questioned and/or 
challenged by other researchers (see Bollen and Jackman 1989: 616-619). Do we use the cutoff 
date as to when universal male suffrage is introduced or do we use something else?  
Diamond further echoes some of these concerns.  
“But democracy is in many ways a continuous variable. Its key components—such as 
freedom of multiple parties and candidates to campaign and contest; opposition access to 
mass media and campaign finance; inclusiveness of suffrage; fairness and neutrality of 
electoral administration; and the extent to which electoral victors have meaningful power 
to rule—vary on a continuum (as do other dimensions of the quality of democracy, such 
as civil liberties, rule of law, control of corruption, vigor of civil society, and so on)” 
(2015:143).  
Overall the case for using a continuous measure of democracy seems clear. Further, the 
case against it has been shown to not stand on firm conceptual nor empirical ground. However, 
there is another viewpoint in this debate that has not yet been acknowledged, and that is the 
practical argument presented by Collier and Adock (1999), as elaborated below. 
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A Practical Compromise? 
Although I fall into the camp of those who conceptualize democracy as existing along a 
continuum, I do see some value in a more practical approach offered by Collier and Adock 
(1999), suggesting a way to move beyond the argument. They champion a pragmatic approach to 
conceptualization and measurement in which the research question at hand drives how concepts 
are defined and measured. Thus, if one is interested in the relationship between liberal 
democracy and economic development, it would be imperative to use a continuous measure of 
democracy. If one is predicting the factors leading to democratic transitions than a dichotomous 
measure, however created, may be the most appropriate measure to use. However, one must 
realize that the conceptual definition of a democratic transition is distinct from the conception 
definition of the level of liberal democracy in a given year. Further, since liberal democracy is 
conceptually continuous, any attempt to measure a democratic transition would involve choices 
about where to create the cut-points of regime categories, and these choices can be questioned. 
Therefore, it would be necessary for the researcher to explicitly describe the coding rules guiding 
the categorization of regimes and to follow these coding rules for all cases in the analysis (with 
minimal exceptions to the coding rule and minimal cases that do not fall into either category). In 
addition, it would seem as if the burden of proof would have to be on the researcher to 
investigate alternative cut-points in sensitivity analyses to demonstrate that whatever coding 
rules guide the creation of the democracy/nondemocracy distinction do not impact the empirical 
results.  
The following section reviews four popular democracy indices, all continuous, and all 
commonly found in large-N, cross-national studies 
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Four Approximately Continuous Measures of Liberal Democracy 
Below I will describe four popular democracy indices commonly found in large-N, cross-
national studies. All of these measures are available on an annual basis, available for a large 
number of countries and approximate continuous variables that could be used to compare and 
contrast the trends of liberal democracy. I will discuss the conceptual definition and its 
measurement and explore some positive and negative aspects of each in turn. While these four 
measures only represent a small number of the potential measures of democracy, these currently 
represent some of the most popular ones used in recent research (Coppedge et al. 2011:248).  
Freedom House  
Freedom House does not have a direct measure of democracy.  However, it does have 
two country-level measures of civil liberties and political rights that often are used to assess the 
status of liberal democracy in countries on an annual basis (Coppedge et al. 2011:251). The 
methodology that underpins these two indexes is derived from the UN General Assembly’s 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948. “Freedom in the World operates from the 
assumption that freedom for all peoples is best achieved in liberal democratic societies” 
(Freedom House 2015:1). The origins of these two measures can be traced back to 1950 to 
Freedom House’s Balance Sheet of Freedom. However, its current form can be traced back to 
1972 and the efforts of Raymond Gastil; he rating 151 countries and 45 territories in terms of 
their political rights and civil liberties and used the resulting scores to place countries into three 
categories: Free, Partly Free, or Not Free. This information was made available in a bimonthly 
publication entitled Freedom at Issue. Later this publication evolved into the annual Freedom in 
the World report which, along with scores and categorizations, includes verbal descriptions of 
the political situation for each country in the world and several territories. Gastil remained the 
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driving force behind this effort until 1989, when a team of in-house analysts were used to 
produce these measures. A few years later the project expanded again, and outside experts and 
analysts began to be solicited to help produce this annual publication. For the year 2015 this 
group consisted of more than 60 analysts and approximately 30 advisors.  
These two measures have been produced annually since 1972 and for 2014 were 
available for 195 countries and an additional 15 territories. Efforts are undertaken to ensure 
backwards data compatibility to 1972 (Freedom House 2015:2). As stated above, Freedom 
House uses expert coders to produce annual measures of civil liberties and political rights for 
each country as part of its Freedom in the World report.  These two concepts are operationalized 
using a seven-point ordinal scale and are a bit abstract. Originally they are scored so one is most 
free and seven is least free. The civil liberties index is constructed from expert ratings of a 
country’s situation in several categories: freedom of expression, association and organizational 
rights, the rule of law, and personal autonomy and individual rights. To code each of these 
variables, expert coders were asked to evaluate ten questions on political rights comprising three 
subcategories: electoral process, political pluralism and participation, and the functioning of the 
government. For civil liberties, expert coders are given fifteen questions to evaluate comprising 
four subcategories for civil liberties: freedom of expression and beliefs, freedom of association, 
rule of law, and personal autonomy. Freedom House uses as coders a team of internal and 
external experts and advisers that assign the annual scores for each variable. Approximately 90 
analysts and advisers were involved in assigning the scores in 2014. These external analysts and 
advisers represent academies, think tanks, and human rights organizations. Country analysts 
provide scores based on the 25 questions (and supplemental questions) and then the scores are 
discussed at an annual meeting of Freedom House staff and advisors. “The final scores represent 
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the consensus of the analysts, advisers, and staff, and are intended to be comparable from year to 
year and across countries and regions” (Freedom House 2014). Beginning in 2006 Freedom 
House has also made available the individual component scores for both civil liberties and 
political rights. 
Although Freedom House does not produce a direct measure of democracy, it is common 
practice to combine these two measures by taking their mean value, and to use this as a measure 
of democracy (e.g. Burroway 2012, Shandra, Shandra, and London 2008, Shircliff and Shandra 
2011).  This results in a single measure of democracy with a range from one to seven; many 
researchers reverse the scale so that higher scores represent higher levels of liberal democracy. 
Freedom House computes a similar score by averaging both components, and then using the 
average of these to place countries into one of three categories: Free, Partly free, or Not Free.  
One significant criticism of the Freedom House indicator is that the organization is not 
transparent and does not release the background material that marshals evidence for their expert 
coding (Coppedge 2011:250). This is especially worrisome since the civil liberties indicator, in 
particular, has been shown to have substantial amounts of measurement error - up to22 percent 
(16 percent method and 6 percent random) according to Bollen (1993:1220). Coppedge et al. 
calls this coding bias, and the other information that informs the measures, “wild card elements” 
(2011:250). The political right index has been criticized for containing questions for its expert 
coders regarding issues such as corruption, lands rights, etc., that do not measure democracy 
even if they do measure freedom (Coppedge 2011: 248-9). Another critique is that often there are 
countries all scoring the same value on the political rights index, but differing in important ways 
in the quality of democracy (Coppedge 2011:249). Freedom House as an organization has long 
been seen as having a U.S. bias; it is a U.S.-based NGO that has been seen as too critical of 
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opponents of the U.S. and too sympathetic of dubious U.S.-supported regimes abroad. “It has 
expended substantial resources in criticizing the media for insufficient sympathy with U.S. 
foreign-policy ventures and excessively harsh criticism of U.S. client states” (Herman and 
Chomsky 1994:28).  
On the other hand, a significant positive aspect of their indicators for political rights and 
civil liberties is that they have face validity with conceptualizations of the dimensions of liberal 
democracy, as conceptualized by Bollen. Also, the civil rights and political liberties measures go 
back to 1972 and are available for almost all countries during this time span, providing excellent 
coverage. In addition, even though Freedom House has made some small changes to their 
methodology over time, data comparability remains a priority.  “Any changes to the 
methodology are introduced incrementally in order to ensure the comparability of the ratings 
from year to year” (Freedom House 2015:2). 
Polity IV 
The Polity IV project (Marshall, Gurr, and Jagger 2014) defines democracy as being 
comprised of three interdependent components: 1-the presence of institutions allowing citizens to 
express their preferences, 2-the presence of institutionalized constraints on the power of the chief 
executive, and 3-the protection of civil liberties in private and political life. Based on this 
definition, the Polity IV project includes a measure of democracy that is based on experts’ 
coding of qualitative data for the competitiveness of executive recruitment, the openness of 
executive recruitment, constraints on the chief executive, and the competitiveness of political 
participation. These four component variables are then combined using a weighting scheme that 
produces an indicator of democracy on an eleven-point scale, ranging from 0 to 10. There also is 
an autocracy variable that is based on five component variables and is additive. These five 
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component variables are competitiveness of executive recruitment, openness of executive 
recruitment, constraints on the chief executive, regulation of participation, and competitiveness 
of participation (Marshall, Gurr, and Jaggers 2014:14-15). Often researchers combine the 
democracy and autocracy indices to create one index of 21 points, the Polity2 variable. The scale 
the combined Polity2 variable is from -10 to +10. However, their combination is not ideal (even 
though it is suggested by the creators of the Polity IV data project - Marshall, Gurr, and Jaggers 
2014:16-17) because the original theory upon which the dataset was built did not see autocracy 
and democracy as endpoints on a continuous spectrum.  
“The original theory posits that autocratic and democratic authority are distinct patterns 
of authority, elements of which may co-exist in any particular regime context. The 
inclusion of this variable in the data series should not be seen as an acceptance of the 
counter-proposal that autocracy and democracy are alternatives or opposites in a unified 
authority spectrum, even though elements of this perspective may be implied in the 
original theory” (Marshall, Gurr, and Jaggers 2014:17) 
These reservations aside, according to Plümper and Neumayer, this is by far the most 
popular measure of democracy used in the literature (2010:206). 
Of course, there are criticisms of the Polity IV democracy index.  The index is based on 
subjective ratings, with minimal attention to measurement error. There is also a Western bias in 
the scoring. To illustrate this, the U.S. has been assigned a score of 10 every year since 1870, 
despite the fact that women were not allowed to vote until 1920 and government policies 
discriminated against African-Americans during much of this time. Similarly, Switzerland also 
has a perfect score since 1848, yet women were not allowed to vote until 1971. Further, some 
have found the scoring of some indicators, such as constraints on the chief executive, “not easy 
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to reproduce” (Alvarez et al. 1996: 20-21). Another negative aspect of the Polity2 variable is that 
it appears to be bimodal. Furthermore, around the values of 7 and 10, it appears to consist of an 
inordinate number of observations (Coppedge et al. 2011:249). Another issue associated with 
having a measure based on six underlying dimensions is that multiple countries can have the 
same score on democracy, even though these countries may possess quite different mixes of 
these variables. Although this Polity2 variable is supposed to be superior to its forerunner, Polity, 
because it codes for interregnum and affected transitions, it sometimes produces values that are 
invalid on its face (Plümper and Neumayer, 2010:207). 
Despite these criticisms, there are many positive aspects associated with the Polity2 
variable. Its most significant strength is its coverage; data is available for over 160 countries 
since 1800. In addition, it has been shown to have high correlations with other measures of 
democracy. In a previous version of the dataset in 1995, Jagger and Gurr examined the 
correlations between the democracy indicator and other popular indices including Gasiorowski 
(1993), Bollen (1980), Vanhanen (1990), and Freedom House (1973-1994), and found that there 
were high correlations ranging from 0.85-0.92. 
Vanhanen’s Polyarchy or Index of Democratization 
Vanhanen (2002) defines democracy as “a political system in which ideologically and 
socially different groups are legally entitled to compete for political power and in which 
institutional power holders are elected by the people and are responsible to the people” 
(Vanhanen 2000:252). Vanhanen, like Dahl (1971), conceptualizes democracy as consisting of 
two dimensions, competition and participation. For Vanhanen “because they are assumed to 
indicate two different dimensions of democratization, it is reasonable to argue that a combination 
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of them would be a more realistic indicator of democracy than either of them alone” (Vanhanen 
2000:255). 
The Index of Democratization (ID) originates from a 1971 study by Tatu Vanhanen. It 
measures these two theoretical dimensions of democracy using two quantitative indicators and, 
thusly, does not rely on subjective ratings that are prevalent in other measures of democracy. The 
first indicator, competition, is measured as the share of votes in parliamentary and/or presidential 
elections received by the smaller parties (Vanhanen 2002:8). Participation is the percentage of 
the total population that voted in the same election. The ID is then created by multiplying each 
indicator and then dividing by 100. In addition to this approximately continuous measure of 
liberal democracy, Vanhanen established a threshold for distinguishing democracies from non-
democracies:  30 percent for the competition component variable and 20 percent for the 
participation component variable (Vanhanen 2000). A country would have to exceed both of 
these thresholds to be considered democratic. 
In criticism of Vanhanen’s ID, since it only uses two indicators, there are potentially 
important aspects of democracy that are not considered in the index, such as political liberties. 
Although Vanhanen provides a clear conceptualization of polyarchy, it is unclear how well these 
two dimensions are captured by just two component indicators. In addition, it seems rather 
arbitrary that the voting score is based on the percent of the entire population. Thus, the age 
structure of the population is not considered when creating this score. Also, the aggregation rule 
could be questioned as to whether these two components should receive the same weight. Some 
argue that participation should be considered a distinct concept and is not part of liberal 
democracy (Bollen 1980:373-4). Another major weakness of this measure is the fact that it ends 
in 2000; examining recent trends with this indicator is impossible.  
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As with the Polity2 measure, the most positive aspect of Vanhanen’s ID is its scope and 
coverage, as it is available for most countries dating back to 1810. Furthermore, since the source 
of the data is quantitative and derived from several overlapping sources, it does avoid some of 
the subjective bias that is present in other indices of democracy. In addition, Vanhanen does 
provide the data for the competition and participation components, so alternative weighting and 
aggregation schemes can be examined by other researchers.  
Bollen’s Liberal Democracy Series I Indicator 
This section introduces the cross-national measure of liberal democracy used in this 
dissertation, Bollen’s Liberal Democracy Series I Indicator. Bollen conceptualizes liberal 
democracy as a two-dimensional concept with political liberties and democratic rule as its two 
dimensions. The original measurement model on which the Series I Indicator is based consists of 
a latent variable for each of these two dimensions. The eight observed variables that are part of 
this measurement model are derived from expert ratings of the political landscape within each 
country and originate from three sources: Sussman at Freedom House, Gastil at Freedom House, 
and the Arthur Banks Cross-National Time Series (CNTS) databank. The political liberties latent 
variable is measured by four observed variables: freedom of broadcast media, freedom of print 
media, civil liberties, and freedom of group opposition. The democratic rule latent variable is 
also measured by four observed variables: political rights, competitiveness of the nominating 
process for chief executive, a measure of the selection process for legislatures, and a measure of 
the effectiveness of legislatures. In addition, because these measures are expert ratings, Bollen 
made an assessment of the measurement error due to the judges and used three method factors 
added to the model to correct for the inherent biases of the judges. The result is a measure of 
liberal democracy that is nearly free from the biases unique to each rater. In addition to the eight 
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variables in the factor model described above, a ninth variable, suffrage score, is used in the 
creation of Bollen’s Liberal Democracy Series I Indicator. The suffrage score is a quantitative 
measure of the percent of people in a country that actually have the right to vote and are not 
excluded from voting (Paxton et al. 2003). It is not a measure of actual political participation. 
Bollen’s Series I Indicator of liberal democracy then is a weighted combination of a 
subset of these eight observed measures from the measurement model described above, and the 
suffrage score that minimizes association with the method factors and maximizes association of 
the two underlying latent variables, political liberties and democratic rule. The index is created 
by following a series of rules detailed below.  
The clear conceptual definition and operationalization of this indicator along with the 
clear aggregation rules for the individual components is an important strength of this indicator. 
Another positive feature of this indicator is that it accounts for and minimizes measurement 
error— an aspect of measurement overlooked in most other measures that are comprised of 
subjective assessments. Further, Bollen’s index of liberal democracy is the only cross-national, 
commonly used index that incorporates suffrage (Paxton 2008). This is an important and often-
overlooked aspect of liberal democracy ignored in most other indicators. Including suffrage is 
important, and in some cases, changes our assessment of a nation’s level of liberal democracy. 
This would make a difference, for example, if one were examining the case of Switzerland. 
Although it was said to become democratic in 1848, it did not allow women the right to vote 
until 1971. It is hard to argue a country is democratic if is systematically excludes approximately 
half of the population from exercising the right to vote. Thus, incorporating suffrage is a major 
strength of Bollen’s index.  
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According to Wyndow (2013), the main limitation of this variable has been its coverage, 
however, this is no longer the case. Initially this indicator was only available from 1972 to 1988 
but since it has been updated to 2006 in work done by the author under the guidance of Dr. 
Bollen. Updates since 2007 were hampered by the fact that after Arthur Bank’s death the Cross-
National Time-Series (CNTS) project was only producing limited annual updates, and the key 
variables from this dataset used in the creation of Bollen’s Liberal Democracy Series I Indicator 
were missing from these annual updates. It has now become possible to update this measure from 
2007 to 2013 due to the June 2015 release of the fully updated CNTS dataset. Unfortunately, the 
data on key variables needed to construct Bollen’s indicator were not updated to 2014 (as 
advertised) and this prevents the Bollen’s indicator from being as current as possible. Thus, 
updating Bollen’s Liberal Democracy Series I Indicator from 2007 to 2013 is work that was 
completed as part of this study. I have already updated the corresponding suffrage score to the 
present year, which is needed to compute Bollen’s index through early 2016. 
Another criticism of Bollen’s index of liberal democracy is that it neglects political 
participation (Doorenspleet 2000:388). However, Bollen’s assessment is that political 
participation represents a distinct concept, and an attempt to incorporate actual participation into 
a measure of democracy conflates the later with the former. “Voter turnout and political stability 
are two examples of concepts that are confounded with political democracy” (Bollen 1990:81).  
Comparison of the Indicators of Liberal Democracy Over-Time 
This study compares the different indicators of liberal democracy through the use of 
correlations. In general, extremely high correlations appear between 1972 and 2013. Pairwise 
correlations between measures regardless of year are seen below. Immediately, two points stand 
out regarding the correlations between these different measures. First, the correlations between 
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Bollen’s, Freedom House’s, and Polity’s indexes of democracy are quite high. The correlation 
between Bollen’s Liberal Democracy and Freedom House is 0.88, between Bollen’s Liberal 
Democracy and Polity is 0.9, and between Freedom House and Polity is 0.89. The correlations 
between Vanhanen’s ID and the other measures range between 0.83 and 0.84. Just this initial 
correlation table is highly useful. However, I next examined the pairwise correlations between all 
of these measures for 1972-2013. 
 
Table 1: Pairwise Correlation Matrix of 4 Indicators of Liberal 
Democracy (All Years Combined) 
  
Bollen 
Freedom 
House 
Polity 
Vanhanen’s 
ID 
Bollen 1    
Freedom House 0.88 1   
Polity  0.90 0.89 1  
Vanhanen’s ID 0.83 0.83 0.84 1 
 
 Below are two graphs that visually display the correlations between the indicators of 
democracy from 1972 to 2013. Figure 1 includes Vanhanen’s ID for the years in which it is 
available (1972-2000). Again, what is unmistakably clear is that the correlations between 
Vanhanen’s ID and any other indicator are lower than correlations among Bollen’s Liberal 
Democracy, Freedom House’s democracy, and Polity’s polity2 indicator. It is hard to come to 
any other conclusion than this measure is tapping into something very similar to democracy but 
still unique. Nonetheless there is still a strong correlation between all of the measures, however, 
the correlations are stronger among Bollen’s Liberal Democracy, Freedom House’s democracy, 
and Polity’s polity2 indicator. 
Figure 2 drops Vanhanen’s ID so the focus can just be placed on the other three over this 
entire period.  An interesting aspect of Figure 2 is that at the beginning and the end of the period 
the correlations are all pretty close to each other. However, it is clear that at the beginning of the 
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period the correlation among these three indicators was higher (approximately 0.9) than in 2013 
(approximately 0.86). In fact, in the years 1986-1988, the correlations among these three 
indicators actually got even stronger, peaking in 1988 for LibDem with Freedom House 
(0.9232), peaking in 1987 with LibDem and Polity (0.9335) and also peaking in 1987 with 
Freedom House and Polity (0.9327). Interestingly, the discrepancies between these three 
indicators began to occur in 1989. This is not so surprising, given the dramatic events unfolding 
during this time and the many newly- independent countries entering the world system. What is 
more surprising is just how closely these indicators are correlated throughout the third wave.  
 
Figure 1: Correlation among Measures of Liberal Democracy 1972-2013 
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Figure 2: Correlation Among Measures of Liberal Democracy 1972-2013 (excluding ID) 
 
Trends in Liberal Democracy Indicators Compared 
The second way I will compare these indicators of liberal democracy is by examining 
their individual trends over time. In turn I will examine the trajectory of each of the indicators 
used in this study: Polity IV’s polity2 indicator, the average of Freedom House political rights 
and civil liberties indicators, and Bollen’s Liberal Democracy Series I Indicator. Not 
surprisingly, while each indicator captures changes in levels of liberal democracy from a slightly 
different perspective, they all reflect similarities in the trends. 
The trajectory of Polity IV’s polity2 indicator clearly exhibits different rates of growth at 
different times throughout the third wave. In this analysis, I have recoded the variable from its 
original range of -10 to +10 to a new range of 1 to 21, to facilitate in the evaluation of trends. 
From 1972 to 1988 there is a period of gradual increase in Polity’s indicator from 8.5 to just over 
10.   From 1988 to 1993, there was rapid growth of from approximately 10 to over 13 in just 
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these five years. However, this period gives way to a short period of decline from 1994 to 1997. 
From 1997 to 2013, this indicator increases again, but with more modest gains. The shorter 
period from 2006 to 2013 displays oscillation, with four of these years experiencing increases 
and the other three experiencing declines. The overall period from 1997 to 2013 does show a 
gradual increase of just over 13 to just over 15. This is slightly lower growth than for the period 
1972 to 1988. In addition, the period does end in 2013 on a slight upward increase and at its 
highest level at any time in the 41-year period. 
 
Figure 3: Worldwide mean value of Polity IV’s polity2 indicator of liberal democracy 1972-2013 
 
Thus, overall, Polity IV indicates that liberal democracy is still increasing today, albeit 
gradually. This is by far the most optimistic indicator of the ones examined here, as will be seen 
below. It is clear that three periods of growth are apparent when examining recent trends with 
this indicator of liberal democracy. The next indicator to be examined over time is Freedom  
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Figure 4: Worldwide mean value of Freedom House’s democracy indicator of liberal democracy 
1972-2013 
 
House’s indicator of democracy. As noted above, Freedom House does not directly put this 
indicator of democracy directly into the public domain, but they do so indirectly by posting 
scores for civil liberties and political rights assessing the status of liberal democracy in countries 
each year (Coppedge et al. 2011:251). Each of these components have ranges from 1 to 7, so 
their average score has the same range. At first glance, the trajectory of Freedom House’s 
democracy measure is more nuanced than other measures. From 1972 to 1989 there was a period 
of overall, moderate growth. In the early years in this period, there was a steady decrease for 
three years followed by steady increases that essentially canceled each other out, giving way to 
less steep increases until 19892. From 1989 to 1992 it is clear that there is a rapid increase. The 
years of 1993 and 1994 are slightly lower, and then from 1995 until 2005 there is a gradual 
                                                     
2 Freedom House assigned scores are not continuous, so they do not lend themselves to interpretations with 
percentages.  
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increase. Interestingly, 2005 is the highest score of Freedom House democracy from 1972 to 
2013. Since 2005 there been 7 years where the value declined year-to-year, and only three years 
where the measure has increased from the previous year. However, Freedom House’s democracy 
score is at its lowest level since 2004. This is completely consistent with Freedom House’s 2016 
report on the state of freedom in the world, where Paddington and Roylance state, “[t]hese 
unsettling developments contributed to the 10th consecutive year of decline in global freedom” 
(Paddington and Roylance 2016:1).  
In summary, Freedom House’s liberal democracy indicator demonstrates a more nuanced 
pattern in liberal democracy when examined closely. However, if you step back a bit, it is 
possible to see three distinct patterns of growth. The first, beginning in 1972 and ending in 1989, 
demonstrated overall gradual increases. During the second period, from 1989 to 1992, there is a 
rapid increase followed by a slight downward correction. From that period forward, there has 
been another period of overall gradual increase. However, the worldwide apogee of this indicator 
is in 2005, and since then there have been gradual declines. Thus, this indicator is probably the 
most pessimistic of the three indicators of liberal democracy examined here. It is clear that there 
is decline in this democracy indicator since 2005.   
The next indicator used to assess recent trends is Bollen’s Liberal Democracy Series I 
Indicator. To review, this indicator is approximately continuous and is scaled from 0 to 100. A 
quick examination of the graph clearly displays that growth has not been experienced linearly 
throughout this period. This period can be divided into three distinct sub-periods: 1972-1989, 
1989-1995, and 1995-2013. For the 17 years in the first sub-period, there was moderate growth 
in liberal democracy. The world-wide average was about 36 in 1972 and 46 in 1989, growing 
about 10 points. During the second sub-period, 1989-1995, there was a steep increase in liberal 
50 
democracy worldwide, raising the measure from 46 to 64, an approximately 18-point increase in 
just six years. This indicates growth several times faster than in the first moderate growth sub-
period. In the final sub-period, 1995 to 2013, it appears as if the growth rate has been very slow, 
even less than in the first sub-period. This measure of worldwide liberal democracy increased by 
about 5 points in these 18 years. If we are to look even closer within this final sub-period, we see 
that since 2008 democracy has only gained slightly. In this period, democracy has only gained 
0.36 points, reflecting minimal yearly gains for these five years.  
Figure 5: Worldwide mean value of Bollen’s Liberal Democracy Series I Indicator of liberal 
democracy 1972-2013 
 
Looking at liberal democracy over the entire 41-year period we see some incredible gains 
during the third wave. Liberal Democracy has increased 32 points in these 41 years. In addition, 
it is also clear that liberal democracy has not grown at a consistent rate throughout the period. I 
have identified three different sub-periods:  a moderate period of growth for the 17 years from 
1972 to 1989, a period of steep growth for the six years from 1989 to 1995, and a long period of 
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minimal growth from 1995 to 2013. If we look closely within this third sub-period it is also clear 
that growth in democracy has stagnated since 2008, and from 2012 to 2013 it has declined. This 
indicator ends in 2013 for lack of recent data. The most recent updates (2016) of the Banks’ 
CNTS dataset have not included all of the variables used to create this indicator beyond 2013. 
However, when we look to Freedom House’s indicator we see that this downward trend that is 
just becoming apparent with Bollen’s Liberal Democracy from 2012 to 2013 continuing 
downward for 2014 and 2015. It is reasonable to expect that we are just beginning to see 
democratic decline. 
To get a better sense of how these three indicators compare to each other over time from 
1972 to 2013, each is standardized (they are all on different scales originally) and   then plotted 
on the line graph displayed in Figure 6. As Vanhanen ID is not available for the complete time 
period, I did not describe it above; however, I have included it in Figure 6.  
Figure 6: Comparison of liberal democracy indicators 1972-2013 
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When examining the measures in Figure 6, note the similarities in their trajectories over 
time. This should not be too surprising, given that I have already displayed their pairwise 
correlations above. The one exception in this group is Vanhanen’s ID. For each year in which it 
is available (1972-2000), it is higher than the other three indicators. The other three indicators 
appear to be closely intertwined throughout time. However, somewhat amazingly, they all take 
turns being the highest, middle, or lowest measure, depending on the year. So, while these 
indicators may not always agree over time, but, overall, Bollen’s Liberal Democracy, Freedom 
House’s average of political rights and civil liberties, and Polity IV’s polity2 variables display an 
amazing amount of congruence over time. Vanhanen’s ID follows the general trend of the other 
three, but for each year is substantially higher than the others, and appears to even further 
diverge from the others in the mid-1990s. I conclude that either of the three other indicators 
appear to be reasonable substitutes for one another. It is beyond the scope of this descriptive 
analysis to investigate empirically the consequences of using one particular indicator or another 
in any particular study. It seems reasonable that there may be differences in results depending on 
the indicator chosen. However, if one’s goal is to examine the trends of liberal democracy, any 
of the three measures seems able to elucidate the general contours of change.  
Similarities in the Three Indicators Over Time 
These three indicators of democracy share some important characteristics in their 
trajectories over time. First, it is clear that there were distinct periods of growth during the third 
wave of democratization. All three of the indicators demonstrated growth in the overall period 
from 1972 to approximately 1988 or 1989. While Freedom House did show a decline in the early 
years, when looking from 1972 to 1988, it does conform to the other two indicators. Next is a 
period of rapid increase, apparent for all of the measures. This period is followed with a very 
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short period of decline for Freedom House and Polity of two and three years respectively. 
Bollen’s Liberal Democracy does not register a decline in these years. Next comes an extended 
period of slow growth for all three measures. Towards the end of this period near approximately 
2005 to 2007 begins a period of total stagnation, if not reversal, for Freedom House and Bollen’s 
Liberal Democracy. Polity shows during this period a mix of increases and decreases. Due to the 
data limitations of Polity and Bollen’s Liberal Democracy, we do not get the benefit of seeing 
scores for 2014 and 2015. Freedom House has recently released the scores from 2015 and it is 
clear that the world is currently in decline. Bollen’s indicator also shows decline from 2012 to 
2013 (the most recent year that the underlying data is available). Polity is the only indicator that 
ends on a slight upward swing. 
Final Choice: Bollen’s Liberal Democracy Series I Indicator 
This study, and subsequent chapters of this dissertation, will use Bollen’s Liberal 
Democracy Series I Indicator as the indicator for liberal democracy3. There are several reasons 
why this is justified. First, this indicator has a clear conceptual definition of liberal democracy 
featuring two dimensions. Each of these dimensions is clearly operationalized. Bollen’s measure 
is approximately continuous on a 0 to 100-point scale, compared to the Polity’s indicator’s 21-
point scale and the Freedom House’s indicator’s 7-point scale. It is clear that Bollen and many 
other argue that liberal democracy is a continuous concept, so it only makes sense to measure it 
continuously.  Other benefits of this indicator include its measurement properties and the ability 
to control for measurement error. In addition, when comparing the trends with the other two 
prominent indicators, it appears as if they all yield similar results. The major difference is the 
measurement of the apparent decline that has characterized recent years. Here, Bollen’s measure 
                                                     
3 Although in robustness checks, I do from time to time investigate Polity IV’s indicator as well. 
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is more conservative than Freedom House, but there is every indication that Bollen’s indicator 
shows this decline as well. Finally, all of these indicators have high correlations with each other, 
although the correlations slightly decreased over time. It seems unlikely that major differences in 
these findings will depend upon which indicator is used.  
In summary, given the lack of criticisms of Bollen’s measure, its ability to minimize 
measurement error due to subjective ratings, the fact that it is available for over 40 years, and 
perhaps, most importantly, that its operationalization matches closely with its conceptual 
definition, this is the preferred choice for the main indicator of liberal democracy in this 
dissertation. 
Descriptive Analysis 
Overall Worldwide Trends in Liberal Democracy 
Again, the recent trajectory of Bollen’s Liberal Democracy Series I Indicator suggests 
that the period from 1972 to 2013 can be divided into three distinct sub-periods, as distinguished 
by their overall pattern of liberal democracy growth: 1972-1989, 1989-1995, and 1995-2013. 
The first 17-years sub-period illustrates moderate growth in liberal democracy. During the 
second sub-period, 1989-1995, there were steep increases in liberal democracy world-wide. In 
the final sub-period, 1995 to 2013, the growth rate has been very slow, even less than in the early 
period. Looking at liberal democracy over the entire 41-year period we see some incredible gains 
during the third wave. If we look closely within the third sub-period, it is also clear that growth 
in democracy has stagnated since 2008, and from 2012 to 2013 it has declined. It is reasonable to 
anticipate that we are just beginning to see democratic decline, since Freedom House’s indicator 
has shown decline in 2014 and 2015, and there is a high degree of correlation between these two 
indicators.  
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These are the overall contours of worldwide change in liberal democracy from 1972 to 
2013. The sections that follow in this descriptive analysis will investigate whether or not these 
trends can be seen equally around the world. I posit that the different regions may differ as to 
their regional experiences with liberal democracy throughout this period. To investigate this, I 
divide the world into regions following the World Bank’s seven regional classifications: East 
Asia and the Pacific, Europe and Central Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean, the Middle 
East and North Africa, North America, South Asia, and Sub-Saharan Africa. In addition to the 
possibility of distinct regional trends, it is also possible that there could be distinct trends by 
income group. Indeed, one of the most commonly held findings in the literature is the close 
relationship between economic development and democracy (e.g. Lerner 1958, Lipset 1959). 
Thus, this study investigates the likelihood that trends will differ by World Bank income groups 
as well. Within each of these group’s descriptive analyses, I will discuss the nature of the trends 
and their most important aspects. 
Regional Trends in Liberal Democracy 
East Asia and the Pacific 
Listings of the countries, regions, and income groups examined in this study are provided 
in the Appendices.  
In the East Asia and Pacific (EAP) region, this study identifies four significant 
characteristics of this region’s trends in liberal democracy from 1972 to 2013. First, there was 
steady growth throughout the period. Second, despite this steady growth, the region still has 
relatively low levels of liberal democracy at the end of the period. Third, there is quite a lot of 
diversity in the trajectories of the different countries in this region. Lastly, there are numerous 
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over and underperforming countries in this region. Below I will discuss each of these 
characteristics and the graph  
 
Figure 7: East Asia & Pacific mean of liberal democracy 1972-2013 
 
 
Steady growth through the period. When examining EAP the region appears to be 
rather unremarkable in its region-level trajectory of liberal democracy from 1972 to 2013. On the 
positive side, overall, the region has seen steady growth throughout the 1972 to 2013 period. 
Notably, this region did not experience the major increases that were seen in other regions of the 
world, such as Latin American and the Caribbean, Sub-Saharan Africa and, to a lesser extent, 
Europe and Central Asia. It appears as if the third wave left the EAP region rather untouched of 
dramatic increases. In 1972, the region had an average score of 36, and by 2013 this had 
increased approximately 61 points. Again, this demonstrates rather moderate growth compared 
to the gains in other regions.  
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Numerous countries demonstrated impressive improvements in liberal democracy, with 
Samoa, Mongolia, and Tonga leading the way with improvements resulting in scores near 80. 
Other notable gainers during this period were the Republic of Korea, Thailand, Indonesia, the 
Philippines, Singapore and Myanmar. Two countries finished 2013 substantially worse off than 
they were in 1972, with Fiji losing 75 points and Vietnam losing 42 points. Three other countries 
were approximately eight points lower than in 1972 (Brunei Darussalam, Malaysia, and Laos).  
These are the only five countries that ended the period with an overall decline.   
Relatively low levels of liberal democracy. Although East Asia & the Pacific did 
experience substantial growth during this entire period, the region is still at a relatively low level 
of liberal democracy when compared with the rest of the world, and low in general compared to 
the potential maximum score. Despite the steady growth in the period, the regional average is 
still comparatively low - around 60 points. This demonstrates that much more growth in liberal 
democracy is possible.  
Diversity in trajectories. One of the most fascinating aspects of the EAP region’s 
experience with liberal democracy during this period is that disaggregating the region yields a 
rather eclectic mix of country growth trajectories. I classify trajectories in the region in four 
categories: stability, volatility, increasing, and decreasing. Not surprising, 14 of the countries 
exhibit stability in their trajectories during this period. This stability occurs at high levels of 
liberal democracy in countries such as Japan, Australia, Papua New Guinea, New Zealand, 
Vanuatu, and the Marshall Islands. Stability also can be found in some middle- level countries 
such as Tuvalu, Palau, and the Federated States of Micronesia, and also at low democracy levels 
in China, North Korea, Laos, Vietnam, and Brunei. There are three particular noteworthy 
countries whose trajectories are quite volatile during this period: Thailand, Fiji, and Nauru 
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(although here it was volatile before 1990 but holding steady since at a middle level of liberal 
democracy). I classify 10 countries in the region as increasing throughout this period, including 
Mongolia, South Korea, Myanmar (Burma), Cambodia, Singapore, the Philippines, Indonesia, 
Kiribati, Tonga, and Samoa. Only two countries exhibit steadily decreasing levels: Malaysia and 
Timor-Leste. 
Numerous over- and under-performing countries. The steady upward trend for the 
entire region belies the real divisions within the region. There are numerous over- and under-
performing countries in the EAP region. In 1972, four countries were significantly separated 
from the rest of the region, all with scores above 95: New Zealand, Australia, Fiji, and Japan. A 
large gap separates these four from the next highest-scoring countries:  Malaysia, with a score of 
71, and Vietnam, with a score of 50. Only two other countries (Nauru and Singapore) had scores 
above the regional average of 36. Thus, while there were some instances of high liberal 
democracy, most countries were actually performing quite poorly by global standards, and these 
four high performing countries really helped to raise the regional average. Several countries had 
a score of 0 in 1972, including Thailand, China, Myanmar and Tonga, while the Republic of 
Korea, the DPR of Korea, Mongolia, and Brunei Darussalam all had scores under 10. Samoa and 
Laos round out the top 10 worst-performing countries in 1972 with scores of 10 and 16 
respectively. Thus, we see very few high scores in the region with numerous low scoring 
countries.  
By 2013, the situation in EAP is much different than in 1972. The best performers in the 
region include eight countries that have scores above 90:  Kiribati, the Marshall Islands, New 
Zealand, Japan, Australia, Samoa, Papua New Guinea, and Mongolia.  In addition, by 2013, the 
only country that had a score of 0 was Brunei Darussalam. There still are several low-performing 
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countries, including Vietnam, Laos, the DPR of Korea, China, Fiji, and Myanmar, all with scores 
of 29 or lower. However, there is a gap to the next group of countries; Cambodia, Tuvalu, Palau, 
and the Federated States of Micronesia all have scores slightly under 50. The growth of liberal 
democracy in the region can further be put into perspective as position four through nine of the 
worst performing countries in 2013 had scores high enough to be in the top 10 performing 
countries in the region if they had those scores in 1972.  
In conclusion, we see several important characteristics of trends in liberal democracy in 
EAP from 1972 to 2013. There was steady growth throughout the period as a whole, yet despite 
this steady growth the region still has relatively low levels of liberal democracy, under the 
worldwide average at the end of the period (about 61 to 69). There is quite a lot of variation in 
the trajectories of the different countries in this region as there is a mix of countries with stable 
and volatile trajectories during the period. In addition, there are numerous over and 
underperforming countries in this region. With several countries towards the absolute bottom and 
top of the range of liberal democracy scores.  
Europe and Central Asia 
The Europe and Central Asia region also has some distinguishing aspects to its growth 
trajectory of liberal democracy during this period. First, the region had high levels of liberal 
democracy throughout the entire period. Second, the growth trajectory exhibits periods with 
varying trends - a period of steady growth until 1988, followed by rapid growth, rapid decline, 
and then stagnation. Third, there is limited diversity in the patterns of growth and the majority of 
countries in the region exhibited signs of democratic stability. Fourth, there are few under-
performing countries in the region.  
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Figure 8: Europe and Central Asia mean of liberal democracy 1972-2013 
 
High levels of liberal democracy throughout the period. Europe and Central Asia both 
started and finished the period with the highest regional average of liberal democracy. However, 
today this region is only slightly ahead of Latin America and the Caribbean. Notably the region 
started with the highest level of liberal democracy in 1972 at near 59 (excepting North America, 
consisting of only the U.S. and Canada). The region as a whole experienced modest growth to an 
ending level of 84, netting an increase of approximately 25 points during this time period. 
Low levels of steady growth followed by rapid growth and stagnation. Growth during 
the period appears fairly steady overall, but with two periods of rapid growth and one period of 
rapid decline. The first period of rapid increase can be seen in 1974-1975, when the score jumps 
five points from about 60 to 65. Then the trajectory continues with steady growth until 1988. 
From 1988-1990 there was rapid growth from approximately 72 to 86. Interestingly, 1990 is the 
year with the highest level of liberal democracy in the entire period from 1972 to 2013. 
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Limited diversity in the patterns of growth. Although it is possible to distinguish 
between four different main types of trajectories during the period (steady, transition upward, 
increasing and decreasing), the majority of countries in the region remained relatively stable 
throughout the period., some remarkable so.  29 of the 50 countries that ended the period can be 
characterized as stable, and 25 of these are stable at high levels of liberal democracy, including 
all the Western Europe countries. In middle Asia, Azerbaijan is stable at a middle level of liberal 
democracy and it is faring much better than the other countries that emerged after the break-up of 
the former Soviet Union. Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan have been relatively stable, 
but at exceptionally low levels of democracy for the region. 
A second type of trajectory pattern that applies to several countries in the region is 
characterized by a sharp transition upward, usually occurring near 1990, and accounts for the 
steep upward slope that appears for the region at large during this time. The countries that 
experienced significant upward gains include Monaco, Liechtenstein (both with small but 
noticeable gains), Spain, Portugal, Poland, Hungary, Greece, Bulgaria, Moldova, Romania, 
Armenia, and Turkey.  The countries experiencing this pattern together with the countries 
exhibiting stability, account for a large majority of the countries in the region (44 of the 50). 
The third and fourth type of trajectory patterns only account for the remaining six 
countries. Countries that are increasing are Bosnia and Herzegovina, Latvia, Croatia, and 
Kyrgyzstan; the two countries decreasing are Belarus and Kazakhstan.  
Few under-performing countries. As is evident from the above description, there are 
relatively few countries in this region that are poor performers throughout the period. When 
examining countries that ended the period, we identify only a few countries that end the period at 
low levels of democracy:  Belarus, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, 
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Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan. All of these countries were formed in the early 1990s with the 
break-up of the former Soviet Union. Clearly the region would be doing much better if these 
countries were excluded from the region.  
The high regional average level of democracy is apparent when the top 10 performers in 
1972 are examined. Three countries have perfect 100 scores of liberal democracy in 1972 
(Sweden, Austria, and Belgium) while Iceland, Norway, the United Kingdom and Switzerland 
narrowly miss out on a perfect score. In fact, to be considered in the top 10 in Europe in 1972, a 
country’s score would have to be above 98. There were 14 countries in the region with scores 
above 95. This was a quite remarkably democratic region of the world in 1972. This is not to say 
that the entire region was doing well. There were 13 countries that were doing quite poorly with 
scores under 50, and 12 of these had scores lower than 21:  Spain, Greece, Albania, 
Czechoslovakia, Romania, Bulgaria, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, the Soviet Union, 
Portugal, and Serbia. Cyprus was under-performing despite a score of 45.5.  
Not surprisingly, those countries that did away with military or centralized governments 
during the third wave of democratization exhibited the highest gains in the region during the 
period, including Bulgaria, Poland, Hungary, Spain, Portugal, Greece, Romania, and Albania. 
Only four countries in the region that were in existence in 1972 are at lower levels of liberal 
democracy now and these four countries have only seen minor losses. In fact, none of these 
countries lost more than one-half of a point on the 100-point scale. 
 Liberal democracy remained relatively high during the entire period and is still strong in 
the region. A list of the top 10 performers in 2013 illustrates liberal democracy’s strength   in the 
region.  Italy, France, and Norway each score of over 99, high enough to make the top 10.  Even 
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more impressively the top 30 countries in the region all have liberal democracy scores of over 
91.  
Yet, there are still a few poor performing countries in this region. Mostly notably, as mentioned 
above, the former Soviet states (Belarus, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, 
Azerbaijan, Russia, and Kyrgyzstan) are doing the worst. Their growth trajectory could be 
considered in two parts, with a period of steady growth until 1988, then rapid growth, rapid 
decline, and then stagnation. 
In summary, the good performance of the region as a whole indicates limited diversity in the 
patterns of growth, and the majority of countries in the region exhibited signs of democratic 
stability. However, there are still a few under-performing countries in the region. 
Latin America and the Caribbean 
An examination of recent trends in liberal democracy in the Latin American and 
Caribbean (LA) region distinguishes five important characteristics of this region. First, this 
region typifies good performance since 1972 and ends the period at relatively high levels of 
liberal democracy when compared to the rest of the world. Second, two distinct sub-periods of 
growth in the region can be identified within the period from 1972 to 2013. Third, there is 
substantial regional convergence in this period as democracy mostly has a good foothold in the 
region. Fourth, during this period many countries made substantial gains. Fifth, by 2013 there are 
very few underperforming countries left in the region.  
Good performance/relatively high levels of liberal democracy. Overall, Latin America 
as a region can be considered a good performer and has witnessed a significantly positive 
increase. Beginning the period in 1972, Latin America had a regional mean liberal democracy 
score of just over 44, about 8 points over the world-wide average.  By the end of the period in 
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2013, LA had experienced a large increase in liberal democracy resulting in a regional score of 
83, 14 points higher than the world-wide average. This demonstrates that LA as a region grew 
faster than the world average. As of 2013, LA is one of the most democratic regions in the world 
(again, except for North America), coming in only one point behind Europe & Central Asia. This 
is impressive and a great success story after the region experienced a slew of military 
governments in the 1960s-1980s. This is not to say that there are not still problems in some Latin 
American countries, such as Cuba and Venezuela. While most of the region underwent increases 
in liberal democracy, five countries in the region have experienced net declines in liberal 
democracy from 1972 to 2013 (Guyana, Uruguay, Jamaica, Venezuela, and Chile).  
 
Figure 9: Latin America and Caribbean mean of liberal democracy 1972-2013 
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scores greater than 91. Another stand-out performer was Costa Rica although its score was only 
83. As you can see from the rest of the top 10 highest liberal democracy scores in 1972, there is 
quite a gap between Costa Rica and the Dominican Republic (83 compared to 67).  The worst 
performers in 1972 were Bolivia, Honduras, Cuba, Argentina, Peru, Ecuador, and Panama, all 
with scores of zero; these nations were experiencing significant periods of military rule at that 
time.  
In contrast, by 2013, the top nine countries in the region have liberal democracy scores 
greater than 99, while Trinidad & Tobago comes in at number ten with a score of 95.75. This is 
quite a different situation compared to 1972 when a score of only 54 was required to be 
considered a top performer. The positive democratic situation in Latin America in 2013 is further 
highlighted by looking at those countries with the worst scores in the region. Venezuela, with a 
2013 score of 59, the second worst in the region, would have made the top 10 with that score in 
1972. Although Cuba still ranks poorly in 2013, this is most likely to change as diplomatic 
relations between Cuba and the United States have thawed significantly. Among those countries 
with the largest gains in liberal democracy during the 1972 to 2013 period are several that were 
under military rule at the beginning of the period, including Panama, Bolivia, Ecuador, 
Argentina, Peru, Honduras, and Brazil. Unsurprisingly, these countries experienced impressive 
gains after the military left power.  
Two distinct periods of growth. Latin America’s overall trajectory during the period 
can be characterized as consisting of two sub-periods:  1972-1991 and 1991-2013. The earlier 
sub-period is a period of significant increase. Beginning in 1972, the region’s mean liberal 
democracy score was 45. The region experiences sharp growth until 1991, with an average score 
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of 78 in that year. The second sub-period for this region (1991-2013) is a period of slight 
increases or even stagnation, with a gain of only 5 points in 23 years. 
Significant regional convergence. In addition to witnessing significant increases in this 
region’s mean level of liberal democracy, we have also witnessed regional convergence. The 
standard deviation about the region’s mean levels of liberal democracy is much smaller in 2013 
compared to 1985. Liberal democracy’s coefficient of determination during this period decreased 
from 0.83 to 0.22, this is significantly lower than the world’s value of 0.41, indicating that LA 
has converged more rapidly than the worldwide average.  
Many countries with substantial gains. During this period, most of the countries in 
Latin America underwent increases in liberal democracy.  18 of the 24 countries that were 
independent in 1972 saw increases during the period. Fourteen of these were increases of 30 
points or more.  Countries experienced gains of 42 or more points during this period.4 There 
were only five countries that currently have lower levels of democracy in 2013 than they did in 
1972:  Guyana (lost 17 points), Uruguay (lost 17 points), Jamaica (lost 11points), and Venezuela 
(lost four points). One additional country, Antigua & Barbuda, that entered the sample when it 
became independent of the U.K. in 1981, lost 8 points from 1981 to 2013.  
Very few under-performing countries. There are also very few underperforming 
countries in 2013 in the region as a whole. In fact, only three of the 33 countries in the region 
have lower scores in 2013 than the world-wide average of 69. These countries are Cuba at 8, by 
                                                     
4 The 9 countries that enter the sample after 1972 (Suriname, Grenada, Antigua & Barbuda, St. Lucia, Belize, 
Bahamas, St. Kitts & Nevis, Dominica, St. Vincent & Grenadine) enter with mostly high values and stay 
there. There are some exceptions such as Grenada and Suriname, who experienced some fluctuations, but 
both were at levels as least as high if not higher from the first year of the data until 2013. The one real 
exception is Antigua & Barbuda who enters the sample in 1981 at 95.75 fresh off of independence from the 
U.K. but has since declined and only scores 87.5 in 2013.  
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far has the lowest level of liberal democracy in the region, Venezuela at 59, and Honduras at 63. 
Only five countries in the region have experienced net declines in liberal democracy from 1972 
to 2013 (Guyana, Uruguay, Jamaica, Venezuela, and Chile).  
In summary, Latin America is a liberal democracy success story. There are few 
underperforming countries, many countries made substantial gains during the period, and the 
region as a whole ends the period at relatively high levels of liberal democracy compared to the 
rest of the world. While there were two distinct periods of growth in the region from 1972 to 
2013, there was still a substantial amount of regional convergence, and democracy has a good 
foothold in the region.  
The Middle East and North Africa 
There are some important distinguishing aspects to the growth trajectory of liberal 
democracy in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). First, the region has low starting and 
ending points when compared to the rest of the world’s regions, yet has a clear upward 
trajectory. Second, there has been steady growth during the period that is quite impressive. Third, 
this region is seemingly untouched by dramatic increases found in other regions of the world. 
Fourth, there is a real absence of high performing countries in the region. Fifth, there have been 
few losses during this period. 
Low starting and ending points with a clear upward trajectory. The MENA region 
started the period in 1972 with the lowest regional level of liberal democracy in the world, with a 
score of 17, only slightly above sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), with   a score of 19. At the end of the 
period in 2013, however, SSA was faring much better, with a 57 score, compared to 44 for the 
MENA region. Despite its historically low levels, this region has demonstrated an increasing 
trend in recent years.  MENA was stagnant like many of the other world’s regions since the mid-
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1990s but began to increase in 2005 and, after a small plateau from 2007 to 2010, began to 
increase again.  
 
Figure 10: Middle East and North Africa mean of liberal democracy 1972-2013 
 
Steady growth during the period. Despite the fact that the overall levels of liberal 
democracy are low in the region, it has seen gains during this time period. The rise in the 
region’s average level of liberal democracy from 17 to 44 during these 41 years is impressive, 
ranking second behind SSA’s equally impressive gains, in terms of the highest growth of any 
region during this period. If Malta is excluded from this region, then the growth rate is even 
more impressive, and it would be the region of the world that has experienced the most growth.  
Seemingly untouched by dramatic increases. These characteristics seem to 
demonstrate that the region was mostly excluded from the dramatic increases exhibited in most 
other regions of the world. Although there is no evidence of dramatic increases in the region as a 
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whole, it is possible to identify seven countries in the region that have experienced rapid growth. 
For instance, Morocco was a historical leader and experienced a large increase in liberal 
democracy from 8.25 in 1976 to 67 in 1978. This is relatively early in the third wave and, since 
its apogee of 67 in 1978, it has regressed a bit to 59 from 1991-2013, leaving few excited about 
future prospects.  
Three other countries experienced gains that coincide with the gains made in Europe and 
Central Asia precipitated by the fall of the Berlin Wall. Jordan experienced a rapid increase in 
liberal democracy from 0 (1972-1989) to 54 by 1993, but after just a few years experienced a 
rapid decrease down to 13 in 2002, before moving up to 33 in 2003, and again moving up to 66.5 
in 2007. Since 2007, Jordan has been trending down, ending at 63 in 2013. Lebanon also 
increased significantly from low levels of 17 in 1991 to 55 in 1993. Lebanon has maintained this 
level of democracy, slightly increased to 59 in 2005 and remaining there since. Yemen also 
experienced rapid growth from 1992 to 1993 (from 13 to 54) and has since lost a little ground, 
ending 2013 with a score of 50. Thus, although these three countries experienced an initial spike 
in liberal democracy in the early 1990s, they have done little to improve their position in 
subsequent decades.  
As the period came to a close it was also possible to identify three other countries that 
have seen dramatic increases in levels of liberal democracy occurring later. Iraq experienced a 
rapid increase in from low scores of 8 during the reign of Saddam Hussein up to 55 in 2005 with 
the installation of a new government at the hands of the U.S. and its allies. Since then Iraq has 
oscillated upwards and downwards, ending 2013 with a score of 59. Tunisia and Libya have both 
experienced late upward spikes, with Libya moving from 0 in 2011 to an impressive 79 in 2013 
after the ouster of Muammar Gaddafi. Tunisia also experienced a large spike from 33 in 2010 to 
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92 in 2013 and represents the bright spot for the region as it has held parliamentary elections 
twice and is now considered the first “free” Middle Eastern country since Freedom House began 
providing annual scores for civil rights and political liberties.  
Absence of high-performing countries. Another interesting characteristic of the region 
is an absence of high performing countries. Malta is the exception, and has maintained an 
extremely high level of liberal democracy since 1972, ending the period slightly higher than it 
began at over 99.5 compared to 98.  
Few losses. Despite the low absolute levels of democratization at the beginning and 
ending time points in this study, only one country (Iran) is worse off in 2013 than in 1972. Two 
other countries, Saudi Arabia and Qatar have managed to keep their scores at 0 the entire period 
under examination. The low regional average level of democracy is apparent when the top 10 
performers in 1972 are examined. Only two countries (Malta and Israel) have liberal democracy 
scores that are impressive at 98 and 96. The third best country in the region, Lebanon, only had a 
score of 54, with Iran at 42 and Tunisia at 21. The rest of the countries in the region had 
extremely low scores (below 13). The poor standing of liberal democracy in the region is further 
demonstrated by the fact that 11 countries had scores of 0 in 1972. Thus, the region was quite 
undemocratic in 1972. 
Liberal democracy is still very thin in this region. A list of the top 10 performers in 2013 
demonstrates this fact. Only three countries (Malta, Israel, and Tunisia) have scores above 90.  
Only Iran had a lower score in 2013 than in 1972. Two other countries have seen no 
improvement/loss since 1972, Qatar and Saudi Arabia, and can be considered losers in a region 
that has witnessed tremendous growth. These two states have retained a score of 0 during the 
entire 41-year period. Despite the region’s low starting and ending points compared to the rest of 
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the world it does have a clear upward trajectory. The steady growth during the period is quite 
impressive, yet the region is seemingly remained untouched by the dramatic increases in other 
places in the world. Despite these positive facts, there is a real absence of high performing 
countries in the region today. 
North America 
 There is little to note regarding regional trends in North America other than to say that 
both countries (the United States and Canada) maintained high and stable levels of liberal 
democracy throughout the period. It would be fair to group the U.S. and Canada with the 
Western European countries in this respect.  
South Asia 
In my descriptive analysis of South Asia (SA), I have distinguished five features of 
liberal democracy. First, there was extremely modest growth during the 1972-2013 period in this 
region. Second, SA is the most volatile region in the world during this time as evidenced by large 
increases and decreases in liberal democracy for the region as a whole. Third, the region did 
experiences increases in the early 1990s, but these were extremely small compared to other 
regions such as Latin America and the Caribbean. Fourth, there was large growth in the mid-
2000s, far surpassing the gains in the early 1990s. Fifth, there have been regional convergences, 
but not convergence at high levels.  
Modest growth. When the entire period is examined from 1972 to 2013, the region 
appears to have grown in liberal democracy gaining a modest 14 points. This growth is really 
small and unimpressive compared to some of the spectacular gains in regions such as SSA and 
the MENA. However, stopping the analysis here would mean missing the most interesting part of 
the story. 
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Figure 11: South Asia mean of liberal democracy 1972-2013 
 
Volatility with large increases and decreases. Underneath this meager growth we see 
much regional volatility, not just within particular countries, but within all of the region’s 
countries with the exception of India. Afghanistan, Bhutan, Pakistan, Bangladesh Sri Lanka, 
Maldives, and Nepal all experienced substantial increases in democracy during the period. 
Afghanistan started the period with a modest score of 29 and then went to 0 in 1973 before 
spiking at 43 in 1992, then plummeting back to 0 between 1996 and 2004, until rising again to 
46. This was quite a volatile period for Afghanistan and these downward spikes reflect the 
communist control during the 1980s, and the Taliban gaining control over the capital in 1996. 
Pakistan was also quite volatile during the period. It witnessed a large spike between 1984 and 
1988, was relatively stable for about a decade, and then plummeted back again to 0 by 1999, 
before recovering again and ending the period at 63.  
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Muted gains in the early 1990s. While there is increase in the region as a whole 
between 1990 and 1992, from 40 to 53, it is followed by a prolonged period of decreases.  By 
2003, the region is back down to an average level of liberal democracy of 39. Thus, because the 
period is so volatile, alternating between gains and losses several times, it is hard to view these 
gains and losses as anything more than regional instability witnessed during the entire period 
under examination.  
Large growth in the mid-2000s. Additionally, a period of decline from 1992 to 2003 
allowed the region another opportunity to grow substantially again in the mid-2000s. This 
growth from 2007 to 2009 there was the largest single period of growth for the region of 15 
points large growth in the mid-2000s far surpassing the gains in the early 1990s. Much of this 
large growth is due to dramatic changes in the Maldives, Nepal, and Afghanistan. The Maldives 
experienced a rapid increase in democracy from 13 in 2004 to 71 in 2008. Nepal increased its 
score from 34 in 2007 to 71 in 2008. Also, in Afghanistan there was a sizeable increase from 
2006 to 2007 (17 to 50). Interestingly, India experienced a noticeable decrease from 96 in 2006 
to 79 to in 2007, pointing to the volatility of the region as a whole, and the disparate upward and 
downward movement of countries during the same time.  
Regional convergence at low levels of liberal democracy. The region has exhibited 
regional convergence but not in the way that might be expected, that is, lower countries 
increasing in liberal democracy making up ground on those with high levels of democracy. 
Instead, we see compression due to the   simultaneous movement of good performing countries 
downward while poor performers have moved upward.  Among top performing countries, only 
three countries in the region had high scores in liberal democracy in 2013 at the end of the 
period:  India at 96, Sri Lanka at 90, and Bangladesh at 71.  
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 The region had more poor performers in 1972 than good performers. The worst of the 
region were Nepal and Pakistan at 13 and 17, respectively. Bhutan, Afghanistan, and the 
Maldives all had low scores as well. By 2013, the region now had more good performers than 
poor ones, but the top performers were not as well off as in 1972.  
The overall trend throughout the period is regional convergence; the gap between the best 
and the worst scores fell from 83 in 1972 to 33 in 2013.  Unfortunately, this is not just a case of 
the poor performers rising to higher levels, but also a result of downward movement from those 
countries originally at the top. Three of the region’s countries, Sri Lanka, India, and Bangladesh, 
had lower scores in 2013 than in 1972.  Sri Lanka endured the largest loss of 31 points, and India 
had the second largest loss of 17 points. Bangladesh is only moderately lower by 4 points.  
In summary, SA had extremely modest growth from the beginning to the end of the 
period. This modest growth belies the underlying volatility of this region; it was the most volatile 
region in the world during this period, as evidenced by large increases and decreases throughout 
the region. Although the overall region did experiences sharp increases in the early 1990s, these 
were extremely small compared to other regions such as Latin America and the Caribbean. In the 
mid-2000s the region again experienced significant growth, far surpassing the gains of the early 
1990s. In the end, there has been regional convergence, but not convergence at high levels of 
liberal democracy. 
Sub-Sahara Africa 
The last world region to be analyzed, Sub-Sahara Africa (SSA).  Exhibits three important 
characteristics in its trajectory of liberal democracy during the period from 1972 to 2013. First, 
there is wide variation and volatility, increasing in the first half of the period, and then declining 
to beginning of the period levels. Second, there are three distinct sub-periods of growth, Part 1: 
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1972-1989, Part 2: 1989-1996, Part 3: 1996-2013. Third, this region exhibits relatively low 
levels of liberal democracy as a whole.  
 
Figure 12: Sub-Saharan Africa mean of liberal democracy 1972-2013 
 
Wide variation/volatility. Sub-Saharan Africa is a region that displays wide variations in 
trajectories of liberal democracy among its constituent countries. While a majority of the other 
regions and the world as a whole has seen cross-country variation decline, Sub-Saharan Africa 
has continued to experience significant variation. In fact, the variance actually increased from the 
early 1970s to mid-1990s, before declining from the mid-1990s to the present. The region’s 
volatility is readily apparent during an examination of individual country’s trajectories.   Of the 
48 countries in SSA that have been assigned liberal democracy scores, only Senegal as exhibits a 
steady increase throughout this period. However, about 29 countries had extremely steep 
increases during the 1989-1996 sub-period, as discussed below. On the other hand, over the 
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course of the entire period, period, 19 countries experienced a steep decline in liberal democracy. 
These steep increases and declines demonstrate the unique volatility of liberal democracy in 
SSA.  
Most countries in this region experienced some improvement over the course of the 
period (i.e., when comparing conditions in 1972 to 2013). Only 6 countries (Gambia, Somalia, 
Eritrea, Namibia, Botswana, and Swaziland) saw their democracy ratings decrease compared to 
their original scores (their score in 1972, or their first score within the period). Swaziland is the 
worst performer during the 1972 to 2013 period; it had a steep decrease in 1973, remained at 
zero until 1994, rose to 13 by 2007, and settled at about 8 for the rest of the period. Gambia is the 
next worse performer of the period, losing a total of 25 points in the liberal democracy score.   
The performance of nations such as Seychelles is indicative of this region’s volatility. 
This country started the period with a score of 83 in 1972, and is very marginally better off in 
2013 with a score of 84. In between, it has been a wild ride, with a precipitous drop to 13 in 
1977, followed by a tremendous increase to 78 in 1993. Similarly, for most countries in SSA, it 
has been a volatile period, but the region as a whole finds itself in a much better place, 
democratically speaking, in 2013. Yet, the region as a whole has appeared to stagnate since 
1996, and over the last 17 years (to 2013) has not exhibited significant overall improvement, 
despite witnessing high variability.  
The least volatile countries in the region during this time were Eritrea, South Sudan, 
Botswana, Somalia, Namibia, Swaziland, Zimbabwe, Mauritius, Mauritania, Senegal, and 
Gabon. This is not to suggest that these countries are faring well in terms of liberal democracy.  
Eritrea, Botswana, Mauritania, Somalia, Swaziland rank among the worst in the region. 
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However, there are some relatively stable success stories during this period; Botswana, 
Mauritius, and Senegal rank among the best in the region.  
The most volatile countries in the region during this time were Sao Tome and Principe, 
Cape Verde, Benin, Ghana, Mozambique, Mali, South Africa, Burkina Faso, Seychelles, and the 
Central African Republic. Several of these countries, including Sao Tome and Principe, Cape 
Verde, Benin, Ghana, Mozambique, Mali, South Africa, and Seychelles, experienced a sharp 
increase in liberal democracy, and initially low scores have now been vastly improved.  
Three distinct sub-periods.  
Part 1: 1972-1989: The first sub-period could be considered the low, stable period. In 
1972, the region’s mean of liberal democracy was 19. The next three years witness a decline, and 
then a gradual increase, reaching back up to 19 by 1989. Thus, for this first 17-year sub-period 
(1972 to 1989), there were essentially minor variations to the region’s mean liberal democracy 
score, both upward and downward, but always staying between scores of 13 and 20.  
Part 2: 1989-1996: The second sub-period was relatively short (7 years), and the 
trajectory can be characterized as a precipitous increase in the region’s mean liberal democracy 
score. From an initial regional mean level of liberal democracy of 18 in 1989 this trajectory 
peaks at 54 in 1996, a dramatic increase within just seven years.  
Part 3: 1996-2013: This third part of the trajectory begins in 1996 and lasts 17 years 
until 2013, and again can be characterized by its overall stability, but with a high degree of 
variability between countries. In 1996, the region’s average liberal democracy score was 54, and 
in 2013 was a bit higher at 58. Although there has been some increase in the region’s mean level 
during this period, most of the growth took place in the relatively short period between 2004 and 
2007. At this point it is hard to tell for certainty that liberal democracy will continue to hold 
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constant in the region, but it seems safe to say that, at least for the years 2014 and 2015, this 
trend has continued.  
Relatively low levels of liberal democracy. Although witnessing large increases during 
this entire period, the SSA region is still at a relatively low level of liberal democracy when 
compared to the rest of the world. Only the Middle East and North Africa region has a lower 
mean liberal democracy score. However, without the precipitous increase during 1989-1996, it is 
doubtful that SSA would be in a better position than the Middle East and North Africa. In 1972, 
there were only three countries in SSA that had liberal democracy scores above 80:  the Gambia, 
Mauritius, and Botswana. To put into perspective how poorly the region was doing in 1972, only 
four other countries had liberal democracy scores above 40: Sierra Leone, Swaziland, 
Zimbabwe, and Burkina Faso. Also in 1972, there were several countries in the region that had 
liberal democracy scores of 0:  Uganda, Burundi, Nigeria, Lesotho, Mali, the Central African 
Republic, the Republic of Congo, Malawi, Ghana, Togo, and Somalia.  
Despite overall low levels, there were some large gains in the period from 1972 to2013.  
Malawi leads the list with an almost 84-point improvement. Other countries experiencing 
substantial gains were Ghana, South Africa (both with gains above 72 points), and the Republic 
of the Congo, Lesotho, Senegal, Niger, Liberia, Nigeria, and Toto (all with gains of at least 54 
points). That being said, only two countries in SSA finished 2013 at a lower level of liberal 
democracy than tin 1972, Swaziland and the Gambia. 
In summary, SSA exhibits three important characteristics in its trajectory of liberal 
democracy from 1972 to 2013. There is wide variation and volatility, increasing in the first half 
of the period and then declining to original levels. Three distinct periods of growth can be 
79 
discerned within the larger period.  When compared to other regions of the world SSA has 
relatively low levels of liberal democracy.  
Summary of Regional Trends 
Table 2 displays a comparison of all world regions in the mean level of liberal 
democracy. In East Asia and the Pacific there was steady growth throughout the period as a 
whole. Yet despite this steady growth, the region still has relatively low levels of liberal 
democracy – well under the worldwide average at the end of the period. EAP encompasses much 
diversity in the trajectories of the different countries, and there is a mix of stable and volatile 
trajectories during the period. 
I compared to the volatility of East Asia and the Pacific, liberal democracy is strong in 
the Europe and Central Asia region and has remained relatively high during the entire period. 
This region has the second highest score on liberal democracy behind North America. However, 
with only two countries in North America, the United States and Canada, there is not much to 
say about this regions trends, other than it has been high and stable. Latin America is principally 
a success story, and has a level of liberal democracy only about 7 points lower than Europe and 
Central Asia. There are few underperforming countries, many countries made substantial gains 
during the period, and the region as a whole ends the period at relatively high levels of liberal 
democracy compared to the rest of the world. While there were two distinct sub-periods of 
growth in the region, from there was still a substantial amount of regional convergence, as 
democracy has a good foothold in the region.  
The three lowest regions, in terms of liberal democracy scores, are the Middle East and 
North Africa, South Asia, and Sub-Saharan Africa. In fact, each of these regions has scores 
significantly below the other regions. 
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The best performing of these three laggards is South Asia. This region had extremely 
modest growth from the beginning to the end of the period, yet, underneath this modest growth, 
it was the most volatile region in the world during this period. In the end, there has been regional 
convergence but not convergence at high levels of liberal democracy.  
Sub-Sahara Africa exhibits three distinct periods of growth can be discerned within the 
larger period. When compared to other regions of the world, Sub-Saharan Africa has the second 
lowest levels of liberal democracy in 2013, barely ahead of the Middle East and North Africa. It 
is clear that liberal democracy is still very fragile in this region. Despite the region’s relatively 
low starting and ending points, it does have a clear upward trajectory, making it one of the few 
regions to go against the trend of stagnation. This region has witnessed steady growth during the 
period that is quite impressive, yet it seemingly remained untouched by the dramatic increases in 
other places in the world. Despite these positive facts, there is a noticeable absence of high 
performing countries in the region today.  
Income Group Differences 
As mentioned earlier, beyond these distinct regional trends, there may be discernable 
trends by income group.  One of the classic findings from comparative political science and 
political sociology is that economic development and democracy are highly correlated to each 
other over time (Burkhart and Lewis-Beck (1994), Dahl (1971), Lipset (1959), Londregan and 
Poole (1996), Przeworski et al. (2000), Treisman (2011)). Therefore, it can be anticipated that 
trends will differ dependent on the income group to which they belong. This hypothesis will be 
tested in two ways in this dissertation: (1) by examining the trends of developed versus less 
developed countries, and (2) by investigating the trends of each of the World Bank’s five income 
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groups: high income nations of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 
high income non-OECD, upper middle income, lower middle income, and low income.   
 
Figure 13: Liberal Democracy by the Level of Development 
 
 
When we look at the world disaggregated by income, we also see that there has been 
substantial slow-down of democratic growth in recent years. For the purposes of this study, 
countries are divided into two categories: developed and less-developed. Developed countries are 
those that, according to the World Bank, are high income (OECD and non-OECD) countries. For 
all discussions of income group trends, groupings were constructed placing countries in their 
ending categories as of 2013.  
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Developed Countries 
Gradual increase. In developed countries, levels of liberal democracy increased over the 
examined period (1972-2013). The average level of liberal democracy increased from 61 in 1972 
to 82 in 2013. The largest annual increase occurs between 1992 and 1993, when liberal 
democracy increased from 76 to 80. However, this gradual increase only illuminates part of the 
story.  
Democratic stability? Perhaps more interesting than the gradual increase is what has 
occurred in the developed countries during the last 20 years. There is an open empirical question 
in the literature today whether recent trends in democracy indicate stability or decline, and 
examining developed countries gives us some insight into this debate. Strictly speaking, 
according to the modernization hypothesis, we would assume that more developed countries will 
have higher scores of liberal democracy, and thus it seems accurate to expect these countries to 
perform better than less-developed countries. However, since 1994, there has been a flat growth 
trajectory for the developed countries. While the average liberal democracy score for developed 
countries was 81 in 1994, as of 2013 the score was just 82 - a fairly insignificant increase. It is 
possible that this represents some sort of ceiling effect, in that a country or grouping of countries 
cannot have a score of liberal democracy higher than 100. However, there is good reason to 
suspect that, since these values still are almost 20 points from maximum, they are less 
constrained by ceiling effects than by other factors which limit liberal democracy.  
Downward trend in recent years? A closer look at the numbers reveals that liberal 
democracy is at its lowest level since 2004 for developed countries. Do we call this democratic 
stability, decline, or stagnation? It really depends on the evidence that one wishes to marshal. 
What is clear is that between 2012 and 2013 liberal democracy decreased slightly. All 
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indications are that this downward trend continued in 2014 and 2015. (None of the democracy 
indicators except Freedom House are this current.)  In fact, when rounding the numbers to the 
first decimal place, democracy has slightly declined since 2007. Thus, the current period could 
be characterized as one of democratic stagnation (although I could understand other researchers 
coming up with slightly different interpretations).  
To restate, although democracy scores are higher in 2013 than in 1972 in developed 
countries, it does appear as if we are witnessing democratic stagnation at levels of liberal 
democracy that, while high, do have significant deficiencies and cannot be considered a ceiling 
effect. To put this in better perspective, developed countries that had liberal democracy scores of 
approximately 80 in 2013 include Germany, India, Latvia, Libya, Singapore, Ukraine, Greece, 
Nicaragua, and Mozambique. Obviously, liberal democracy still has room to grow in these 
developed countries. Recent years have actually seen a slight decline in democracy in developed 
countries, confirming observations of democratic stagnation. 
Less Developed Countries 
Pronounced increase from 1972. Less-developed countries have seen impressive gains 
throughout the period, beginning with an average score of 26 in 1972 and rising to 63 in 2013. 
This increase of 37 points is quite impressive when compared to developed countries. This being 
said, less-developed countries still have a long way to go before they reach the levels of liberal 
democracy enjoyed by developed countries. The realization that less-developed countries are 
barely ahead of where developed countries were at the start of the period demonstrates just how 
much work is still needed.  
Rapid increase in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Between 1989 and 1994, less-
developed countries experienced a rapid increase from 35 to 54- a 19-point increase in just five 
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years. This group clearly experienced a huge uptick in liberal democracy in this time. For the 
group, these gains have been sustained and have fed into a smaller period of democratic 
stagnation.  
Smaller period of stagnation. Even though less-developed countries have fared well, 
there is still evidence of a period of stagnation since 2007. Scores during the most recent six-year 
period have been fluctuating between small gains and losses year-to-year. These countries, too, 
have seen a small decrease from 2012 to 2013.  
In summary, investigating differences in recent trends in liberal democracy between 
developed and less-developed countries has illuminated important insights that may be obscured 
when examining the worldwide level of liberal democracy. While both groups have seen recent 
downward trends, there is no denying that developed countries have endured a longer period of 
democratic stagnation than less developed countries, and there has been a lengthy period of 
decline since 2007.  
Figure 14: Liberal Democracy by the World Bank’s Five Income Groups 
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World Bank’s Five Income Groups 
 This next section will analyze how recent trends differ based upon a finer categorization 
of countries into income groups.  This study utilizes five income groups as defined by the World 
Bank: high income OECD, high income non-OECD, upper middle income, lower middle 
income, and low income, leading to some more nuanced observations.  Utilizing this view 
reveals further instances of democratic stability and stagnation.  (The analysis here will be more 
streamlined than in the previous section to avoid repetition.)  
High Income OECD 
 For high income OECD countries, there are three striking features evident in liberal 
democracy trends from 1972 to 2013. These include a high starting and high ending point, a brief 
but sharp increase lasting for three years, and a clear instance of democratic stability. However, 
within this larger period of relative stability, the record since 2007 has been remarkably stable - 
each year has been essential equivalent. 
High income OECD countries started out the period at extremely high levels of liberal 
democracy (78) compared to the rest of the world. For reference, non-OECD high income 
countries were next best at only 32 in 1972, demonstrating just far ahead the high-income OECD 
countries were. In 2013, this gap between these countries and the next highest income group 
(upper-middle income), while not as large in absolute terms, is certainly quite noticeable. The 
high-income OECD countries ended the period at an average score of 97. The lowest performing 
countries in this group were South Korea, Greece, Spain, and Chile with scores of 71, 79, 83, and 
92, respectively, in 2013.  The other 27 high income OECD countries score above 99 on Bollen’s 
Liberal Democracy Series I Indicator. Thus, there is really little room for additional measurable 
growth as a whole, except for the four lowest performers mentioned above. However, even in 
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developed countries, the average level of democracy is at its lowest level since 2004. Since 2007, 
no year is higher than the previous year. While liberal democracy is not seriously threatened in 
high income OECD countries, there are signs that all is not well, directly contradicting claims 
made by Levitsky and Way (2015) that democratic recession is a myth. 
Interestingly, the impact of the third wave can be seen more starkly in individual 
countries within the entire group of high income countries. Early increases in the group were 
driven by Portugal (between 1974 and 1976), Spain (between 1976 and 1977), and Greece 
(between 1973 and 1975).  Between 1988 and 1990, the whole group logged a sizeable increase 
of 9 points, from 87to 96; these r gains were largely driven by Chile, Poland, and Hungary.  
Thus, it is not surprising that since 1990 there has been relatively little growth in the 
average level of democracy in these countries (95 in 1990, and 97 in 2013). For the 24 years 
from 1990 to 2013, there has only been a slight increase. I would term this democratic stability, 
in that there is very little improvement that can be made in these countries, as their current levels 
of liberal democracy are extremely high. As already mentioned above, all but four countries in 
this income grouping had liberal democracy scores over 99 in 2013. In summary, high income 
OECD countries have high starting and ending points, a short period of rapid increase, and 
widespread democratic stability since 1992. However, even amidst this stability, there are signs 
of recent decline.  
High Income Non-OECD 
When examining the high income non-OECD, upper middle income and lower middle 
income groupings, the similarities of their growth trajectories are notable (see Figure 14). High 
income non-OECD countries have two distinguishing features. First, they have low starting 
points and modest ending levels of liberal democracy and, second, these modest results belie 
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some rapid increases within the analyzed time period.  High income non-OECD countries began 
the period in 1972 with a relatively low   liberal democracy score of 32. This is substantially 
lower than their OECD counterparts, who averaged 78.32 the same year.  
In addition, these countries experienced alternating periods of fairly rapid growth 
followed by stagnation. The first period of rapid growth occurred between 1972 and 1983, where 
average scores were 49. This growth was followed by a seven-year period of stagnation, with 
scores slowly increasing to 50 by 1990. Another period of rapid increase occurred between 1990 
and 1994, with scores climbing to 64.  Interestingly, the examination of the high income non-
OECD countries reveals a prolonged period when the growth trajectory essentially becomes flat. 
In 1995, the liberal democracy score was 64 and in 2013 the score was only one point higher at 
65. I will characterize this period as one of stagnation, since the score of liberal democracy is far 
from ideal, and has exhibited little growth since 1995. It is also conceivable to consider this a 
period of slight decline for this group; the average score in 2013 was 65, the lowest score of any 
year since 2001. Whether seen as stagnation or decline, the evidence is clear that, at best, the 
liberal democracy scores of high-income non-OECD countries have stopped increasing. It seems 
that in the most recent years there have been declines albeit minor ones and it is too early to 
know whether these declines have continued in the last couple of years. What is clear is that 
these countries (and all other countries of the world) are still quite far from where the high-
income OECD countries were at the start of the period in 1972. It seems inconceivable that these 
countries could catch up to their OECD counterparts anytime soon. 
Upper Middle Income  
Two distinguishing features are revealed when analyzing o liberal democracy trends for 
the upper middle income group. There is a noticeable mix of high and low performing countries 
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and few signs of democratic stagnation in this income group.  The countries of Dominica, 
Grenada, Mauritius, Saint Lucia, the Marshall Islands, Costa Rica, Belize, and St. Vincent and 
the Grenadines lead this group - all with scores above 99. Thirteen countries in this group 
garnered scores above 91 in 2013. In contrast, this group also includes low-performing countries, 
with Cuba and China scoring 8 in 2013, and 7 additional countries with scores of 29 or lower. 
Between these extremes, 28 countries had scores ranging from 46 to 88. Thus, there is great 
diversity in the experiences with democracy in these upper middle income countries.   The upper 
middle-income countries do not appear to exhibit the democratic stagnation or slight decline 
experienced by the high income non-OECD countries. In fact, since 2007, these countries have 
surpassed the high-income non-OECD countries in terms of their level of liberal democracy, and, 
as of 2013, have a higher average score of 70.28 compared to 65.07. Impressively, since 2006, 
each and every year has experienced continued growth. This growth is at a lower rate than the 
growth in the 1970s and 1980s, but nonetheless is still growing, bucking the global trends.  
Lower Middle Income 
As with upper middle income countries, lower middle income countries have a mix of 
good and poor performers. In addition, this income group has seen slow but steady growth since 
2002. Only four countries - Kiribati, Samoa, Papua New Guinea and Moldova - score above 90. 
At the low end, Laos, Swaziland, and Vietnam have scores under 25. The large majority of 
countries have mid-range scores of liberal democracy, with 17 countries having scores in the 60s 
and 70s.  
Lower middle-income countries portray slow democratic growth since 2002. Some years 
have been up and others have been down, but from 2002 to 2013 as a whole there has been slow 
growth. In 2002, the average liberal democracy score for this group was 58; in 2013, it is only 
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slightly higher at 61. However, there have been other minor increases and decreases since 2002, 
making it difficult to judge the significance of this yearly decline at this point in time. Still, the 
average level of liberal democracy for this group is 61, so there is ample room for improvement 
in the lower middle income countries.  
Low Income  
Low income countries have a more complicated growth trajectory, with clear democratic 
decline in recent years as well as low levels of liberal democracy overall. Low income countries 
are, not surprisingly, faring worse than other countries in terms of liberal democracy. From 1972 
to 1990 democracy for these countries declined and then started to rise but had not even 
recovered to 1972 levels by 1990 (17 in 1972 compared to 14 in 1990). Between 1990 and 1995, 
the average score increased from 14 to 46, a 32-point increase in liberal democracy in just five 
years. These impressive gains could not be sustained and leveled off in 1995. There are 
fluctuations upwards and downwards between 1995 and 2005, and the score slipped below the 
40-point level in 2003. Since 2008, however, there has a very clear trajectory, and it is 
decreasing; there has been decline every single year since 2008, decreasing from 56 in 2008 
down to 52 in 2013.  This represents a significant decline, given the relatively short time frame. 
Thus, this analysis indicates that democratic decline is taking place in these 31 low income 
countries. This recent trend does not bode well for the future prospects of liberal democracy, and 
may indicate that leaders and people in these countries are questioning their support for liberal 
democracy. It is precisely in these countries where the influence of models competing with 
liberal democracy, such as the China model, may make the most head-way.  
It is also evident that this group has a low average level of liberal democracy, 
exacerbating the effects of the recent declines. In 2013 this group’s average is 53 points lower 
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than any other income group.  Furthermore, this income group is not converging with the rest of 
the world, but actually diverging. Excluding comparisons to high-income OECD countries5, low 
income countries are further behind in 2013 than they were in 1972, in most cases. When we 
compare low and upper middle income countries, the gap was 14 in 1972 and 18 in 2013. For 
high-income non-OECD countries, the gap has increased from 9 to over 12. The gap is slightly 
closed comparing low income to lower-middle income 9 compared to 8. Thus, despite some 
increases during this period, low income countries are falling further behind most other countries 
in their level of liberal democracy. Again, this paints a grim picture for the future of liberal 
democracy in these countries. 
In summary, there are also important differences between the trajectories of liberal 
democracies when examining countries based upon their income groupings. When divided 
between developed and less developed countries we see low income countries still have a long 
way to go. While they have closed the gap some it is still pretty wide. When I group countries 
into five income groups we see that income OECD countries are doing really well despite recent 
democratic stagnation. The remaining four income groups seem to follow a similar gender trend 
with low income countries exhibiting the most volatility and the sharpest decline in recent years.  
Formal Modeling of Trends in Liberal Democracy 
Method of Analysis: Latent Growth Curve Model 
In order to investigate trends or changes over time in liberal democracy, this study uses 
latent growth curve models (LGCMs). LGCMs analyze change over time from a very different 
                                                     
5 Here high income OECD countries are limited by the ceiling effect as the highest score of liberal democracy is 100 and 
this income group’s average score has been over 91 each and every year since 1989. In 1972 the gap between high 
income OECD countries and low income countries was 61.52. In 2013 the gap is still at 44.6. These numbers still 
illustrate nicely the larger point:   low income countries have few prospects for attaining the highest levels of liberal 
democracy in the near future. This group has made meager progress in the last 40 years, despite all the dramatic changes 
that have taken place around the world.   
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perspective than traditional panel models. In any analysis of trajectories over time, there are three 
main issues that a technique needs to address.  First, what is the trajectory over time for the entire 
sample? This question can be answered by finding the values of the average starting point (α) 
and average rates of change (β) for all observations in the analysis. The mean values of α and β 
give us a two-variable summary of the trajectory for the entire group. The second issue is 
whether or not we need to model distinct trajectories for each case.  In other words, do different 
countries have different starting points and different rates of change over time? If the variances 
about the mean α and mean β are significant, then we would like to be able to model these 
differences. The third question is what predicts different starting points and different rates of 
change over time. These predictors can be internal characteristics of countries, such as 
industrialization and urbanization (as predicted by modernization theory), or characteristics 
external to a particular country, such as world system position (as predicted by dependency 
theory) or integration into the world polity as measured by linkages to international organizations 
and international NGOs (as predicted by WPT).  
The path diagram in Figure 15 represents an unconditional LGCM. This model is 
unconditional because there are no other predictors of the intercept and slope latent factors. In 
this diagram, the ovals represent latent variables that are not directly observed in the data. In this 
model, there are two latent variables, α and β, representing the intercept and slope, respectively. 
The values of α and β are estimated from the values of the repeated measures of y, as shown in 
the boxes y1-y4. These boxes represent observed variables found in the data set. The arrows from 
the latent variables to the observed variables signify that the underlying latent growth factors α 
and β cause the observed variables y1-y4. The coefficients located on the arrows are analogous to 
factor loadings. The factor loadings on the arrows from the latent intercept, α, are set to one and 
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are and analogous to including an intercept in an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression model. 
The factor loadings on the arrows to the repeated measures from the latent slope factor, β, 
represent the time trend. In the path diagram, these values are set to 0, 1, 2, and 3 for y1-y4, 
respectively, and signify a linear trend.6 The arrows on each of the y values represent error in the 
repeated measures or unique variance not accounted for by the latent growth variables. The ε’s 
are excluded from the path diagram for the sake of simplicity. The double-headed arrow between 
α and β signifies covariance between the latent growth factor.   
 
Figure 15: Path Diagram of an Unconditional Latent Growth Curve Model 
 
Motivations Behind Modeling Strategy  
The formal modeling began with an examination of the initial descriptive work above. 
For example, as described earlier, one of the striking aspects of the world-wide trajectory of 
liberal democracy from 1972 to 2013 was the discovery of three distinct pieces of trajectories. 
The 42-year period is divided as follows: sub-period 1: 1972-1989, sub-period 2: 1989-1995, and 
sub-period 3: 1995-2013. During the first sub-period, there is a slight linear increasing pattern of 
change. The world-wide average for liberal democracy was 37 in 1972, increasing to 47 by   
1989, so, during this 17-year period, liberal democracy grew slowly by 10 points. The second 
                                                     
6 This assumption of linear change can be relaxed when there are three or more waves of data, in this analysis. 
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sub-period from 1989 to 1995 witnessed a significantly more rapid growth of liberal democracy 
worldwide, beginning with a score of 47 in 1989 and increasing 17 points to 64 by 1995. The 
final sub-period is the longest at 18 years, with liberal democracy increasing a modest 5 points 
from 64 to 69. In fact, if we isolate just the years from 2008 to 2013, the worldwide average 
increases by less than one point. 
 The intuition that this exercise yields is that, clearly, the annual rate of change in 
democracy is not consistent throughout the period. Thus, in order for a model to accurately fit the 
data, it must accommodate incorporating differing rates of change throughout the period, and this 
capability is incorporated into the study’s modeling strategy.  Rather than modeling every single 
year, the modeling strategy involves dividing the data into two parts, exploratory and 
confirmatory. The exploratory data analysis used nine repeated measures of liberal democracy, in 
five year increments, for the following years: 1972, 1977, 1982, 1987, 1992, 1997, 2002, 2007, 
and 2012.  The series of models listed below was then constructed, searching for the one that 
best fit the observed data using empirical methods of overall and component fit. Once the best-
fitting model was identified, some minor adjustments were aimed at bringing it in line with 
expectations from the exploratory modeling. After choosing the best-fitting model on the 
exploratory data, the same models were analyzed using the confirmatory data. The confirmatory 
data consisted of eight repeated measures of liberal democracy (also in 5-year increments) for the 
following years: 1975, 1980, 1985, 1990, 1995, 2000, 2005, and 2010.  
The series of models that I constructed started with the most basic form of change, linear, 
as a starting and reference point for future models. Next I moved to models that would 
incorporate nonlinear change, such as the freed loading or latent basis model, the quadratic 
model, and a piecewise model that divides the trajectory into three linear pieces, as driven by my 
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interpretation of the time series graph of liberal democracy (Figure 5). Another non-linear model 
that I examine is the logarithmic LGCM, as a logarithmic function increases nonlinearly over 
time eventually reaching an asymptote. Given that there could be a ceiling effect with liberal 
democracy, this initially appeared like a fine candidate. Next I examine the autoregressive latent 
trajectory (ALT) model (Bollen and Curran 2004), that combines aspects of a LGCM with an 
autoregressive component. Finally, I model just an auto-regressive model. The flexibility of the 
LGCM framework allowed me to systematically test which model fit the data best, as opposed to 
choosing one model a priori and making the assumption that the model fit the data. Throughout 
all of the modeling, my goal was to identify the model that could best describe the data, taking 
into account that the growth of liberal democracy has not been consistent throughout the period. 
Common longitudinal modeling techniques often make the untenable assumption that change is 
constant from each time point to the next, and my descriptive analysis above certainly did not 
find that this was the case with liberal democracy from 1972 to 2013.  
Determination of the Best-Fitting Model, Evaluation of the Different Models 
In this section I will uncover the best fitting unconditional model for the dependent 
variable, Bollen’s Series I Indicator of Liberal Democracy. Unconditional models are those that 
do not have any predictors, only the repeated measures of the dependent variable. As stated 
above, I fit a baseline linear model as an initial starting point. I do not expect the linear model to 
fit the data particularly well, but it will provide a frame of reference from which to compare the 
subsequent models that can incorporate the non-linearity found in the descriptive analysis.  
Baseline linear LGCM- The initial starting point for this analysis was a simple linear 
LGCM. In a simple linear LGCM, the parameters for the intercept are set to 1 for all repeated 
measures (this also applies to subsequent LGCMs described below), and the slope parameters are 
96 
set to sequential numbers, ranging from 0 for the first repeated measure to 8 for the last. These 
sequential numbers give this model a linear trajectory. Thus, this model assumes that there is 
linear growth in liberal democracy throughout the period. As expected from my insights into the 
simple time series graph, this model did not fit the data well. Measures of overall fit, including 
the confirmatory fit index (CFI), Tucker-Lewis Index (TLI), the incremental fit index (IFI), and 
the reverse coded Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA), all demonstrated poor 
model fit with the data. With all four of these indices, ideal fit is 1.0 and 0.0 would indicate no fit 
with the data. Raftery’s formulation of the Bayesian Information Criteria (BIC) is another 
measure commonly used to quantify how well the model fits the data. This formulation of the 
BIC tests the hypothesized model against a completely saturated model, and is expressed in a 
way in which negative values indicate that the hypothesized model fits the data better than a 
model that is completely saturated. There are also guidelines suggested by Raftery that allow this 
measure to be used to adjudicate competing models. A 10-point difference between competing 
models is strong evidence in favor of the model that has the more negative BIC. In addition to 
these measures of overall model fit, component measures of fit also were used to identify the 
best fitting model. Component measures of fit include parameter estimates with the correct sign, 
the statistical significance of parameters in the model, and R2 values. 
Freed Loading LGCM-The next model that I estimated was the freed loading LGCM. 
The major difference between this model and the linear model described above is that instead of 
fixing all of the slope parameters to values (0-8 in the case above) only two of the slope 
parameters are set. Customarily, the first repeated measure’s parameter is set to zero and then 
either the second repeated measure’s parameter or the last repeated measure’s parameter is set to 
one. This feature allows the freed loading model to incorporate nonlinear patterns of change over 
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time. I chose the latter option and the other slope parameters are freely estimated. The freed 
loading model fit the data better than the linear mode as the CFI, TLI, and IFI all were over .90. 
However, the BIC was positive, indicating that the freed loading LGCM model did not fit the 
data as well as the saturated model. 
Quadratic LGCM- Another model of nonlinear change is the quadratic model. Here, 
instead of having two latent variables, the intercept and the slope, there are three. The additional 
latent variable represents the portion of the model that incorporates the nonlinear change. In 
practical set-up terms, the quadratic LGCM is quite similar to the linear model, the only 
difference being the additional latent variable affecting the repeated measures of liberal 
democracy. The parameters on these paths are set at the squared values of the linear trajectory.  
0, 1, 4, 9, 16, 25…64. The quadratic model did not fit as well as the freed loading model. The 
CFI, TLI, IFI were all exactly at 0.9 however, the BIC was 65.8, even more positive than in the 
freed loading model. Thus, the quadratic LGCM model did not fit the data well. 
Piecewise 3 LGCM- The piecewise model is essentially a linear LGCM, but instead of a 
single latent variable to model the slope (numbered 0to 8 in this study), there are multiple latent 
variables - one for each of the slope pieces. Each of the slope pieces models linear change, but 
the model allows for this change to differ over time. This model was a promising contender, 
since it accommodates the different rates of change in liberal democracy apparent from my 
descriptive analysis. The researcher has to choose at which time points the slopes will change; in 
this case, the first piece consists of the repeated measures for 1972, 1977, 1982, and 1987, as 
these four samples appear to most accurately represent the first sub-period of moderate growth in 
liberal democracy, from 1972 to the late 1980s. The second linear piece begins in 1987 and 
continues until 1997, and represents the period of rapid growth of liberal democracy. The third 
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and final slope piece picks up at 1997 and continues until 2012, and represents the period of slow 
growth or stagnation. This model appears to fit the data quite well. The CFI, TLI and IFI were 
0.978, 0.975, and 0.978, respectively. In addition, this was the first model in which the BIC was 
large and negative at -84.9. A major concern with the model arose that during the estimation; a 
warning message was produced by Mplus stating that the residual covariance matrix was not 
positive definite. Error messages during estimation do not always indicate that there are serious 
problems, but should be investigated. The problem involved a negative variance computed for 
the last repeated measure of liberal democracy.  
Logarithmic LGCM- another LGCM capable of incorporating non-linear growth is the 
logarithmic LGCM. It is identical to a linear model, with the exception of the values affixed to 
the coefficients of the slope growth parameter. Instead of using sequential numbers (in my case, 
0-8 for the nine repeated measures), this method uses the values of the natural log of sequential
numbers, beginning with 1-9. In this study, the values used for the slope coefficients were 0.69, 
1.10, 1.39, 1.61, 1.79, 1.95, 2.08, and 2.20.7 This was by far the worst-fitting model of those 
investigated and so it was quickly discarded. 
Autoregressive Latent Trajectory (ALT) Model- An intriguing model developed by 
Bollen and Curran (2004) is the auto-regressive latent trajectory model, commonly known as the 
ALT model. It is similar to the LGCM except it also allows for an auto-regressive relationship 
amongst the repeated measures of liberal democracy. Another major difference of the ALT 
model is that the first repeated measure, in this case, liberal democracy in 1972, is modeled as an 
exogenous variable along with the intercept and slope growth parameter. Instead of the intercept 
and slope affecting the first repeated measure, they are all correlated. The rest of the model is 
7 I also explored using log base 10 numbers and the results were quite similar. 
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set-up identically to the linear model, except there are paths from each of the repeated measures.  
Ingeniously, this model allows the researcher to identify any auto-regressive relations between 
the repeated measures over and above the growth curve. This model initially fit the data quite 
well. However, like the piecewise model described above, this model produced an error message 
because the latent variable covariance matrix was not positive definite. Given that the overall fit 
statistics were not quite as good as with the piecewise LGCM and given the presence of an error 
message, the ALT model also was discarded.  
Autoregressive (AR) Model- The last model examined was an AR model. In this model, 
all of the growth parameters are removed so that all that is remaining are the auto-regressive 
effects between the repeated measures. In essence liberal democracy in 2012 is regressed on 
liberal democracy in 2007, and 2007 is regressed on 2002, etc. The first repeated measure, here 
in 1972, is exogenous in the model and does not have a cause in the model. In essence, the model 
was stripped of growth process over time to see how well the previous value of liberal 
democracy predicted the current value. This AR model fit the data better than any of the previous 
models and did not produce any warning messages. In essence, the simplest type of model, in 
this case, was a very good fitting model. The overall fit statistics for the model were as follows: 
the CFI, TLI, and ISI were all 0.97. The 1-RMSEA was 0.903 and the BIC was 85.1. This BIC 
was the best of any of the models thus far, slightly out-performing the piecewise LGCM and, 
again, the estimation did not produce as error message as with the piecewise model.  
Description of the Final Model 
In addition, there still were some modifications that I could make to incorporate the 
knowledge that I had gained along the way. From the descriptive analysis and also from the 3 
piecewise models, it appeared as if there was substance to the three distinct growth rates to 
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liberal democracy. In order to incorporate this information into the AR model I could do so with 
the rho, or autoregressive coefficients between the repeated measures. The initial AR model 
constrained all of the autoregressive coefficients to be the same across all the repeated measures.  
However, because there are more than three waves of data, this constraint can be relaxed and 
these values can be freely estimated.  I had prior suspicion, based on the insights gained from the 
piecewise model and descriptive analysis, that these would not all be equal. Therefore, the rhos 
were allowed to differ in a specific pattern. Equality constraints were imposed on the rhos to 
match the initial 3 pieces of time in which it appeared as if the effects could differ. Thus, equality 
constraints were placed on the effects from 1972 to 1977, 1977 to 1982, and 1982 to 1987. The 
effects from 1987 to 1992 and 1992 to 1997 were allowed to be equal but different from the first 
set. Finally, the effects from 1997 to 2002, 2002 to 2007, and 2007 to 2012 were constrained to 
again be equal, but different from the first two equality constraints. In essence, the auto-
regressive parameters are allowed to be equal within the three identified periods (1972-1989; 
1989 to 1995; and 1995-2013). This modification produced the best-fitting model, by far 
exceeding any of the previous models. The overall fit statistics were 0.982 for the CFI, 0.98 for 
the TLI, and 0.982 for the IFI. The 1-RMSEA was 0.921 and the BIC was -101.2. According to 
Raftery’s guidelines, this BIC produces strong evidence in favor of this model compared to any 
other that had been tested.  
Robustness Checks 
Graphs of Model Implied Means vs. Observed Means 
Once the best-fitting model was identified, it was evaluated using some robustness 
checks. The first test of the robustness of the results involved obtaining the estimated implied 
mean vector from the model and plotting it against the vector of observed means.  This provides 
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a better sense of where the model does a good (and poor) job of reproducing the observed means. 
Then, I created a series of plots (two for each of the models estimated above).  The first plot has 
the observed sample means and the model implied means on the y-axis and the year on the x-
axis. The second plot has the observed sample means on the y-axis and the model implied means 
on the x-axis. Both of these graphs were used to determine where each of the models did a good 
(and poor) job of predicting the observed values. These two graphs are displayed here for the 
autoregressive model with piecewise rhos. The plots for the other models can be found in the 
appendix. 
 
Figure 16: Observed sample means and the model implied means plotted by year 
 
An examination of the plots reveals that the auto-regressive model with piecewise rhos 
does the best job of predicting the observed means. These plots confirmed the superior fit of the 
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AR model with piecewise rhos, providing additional evidence that the best-fitting model had 
been correctly identified.  
 
Figure 17: Observed sample means on the y-axis and the model implied means 
 
Comparison of Longitudinal Models 
To guard against the fact that there are competing indicators of democracy used in 
various empirical studies, an additional robustness check was employed to ensure that the 
conclusions of the best-fitting model was not driven by any idiosyncrasies in the Bollen Series I 
Indicator.  Having earlier established the close correlations between the three indices of 
democracy (Freedom House, Polity IV’s polity 2 variable, and Bollen’s Liberal Democracy 
Series I Indicator), it was anticipated that, when substituting between these various measures of 
liberal democracy used in these models, similar results would ensue. Therefore, all of the 
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previously discussed models were re-constructed for each of the other two indices of liberal 
democracy (Freedom House and Polity IV’s polity 2 index).  
The Index of Democratization by Vanhanen was excluded for two reasons. First, it had 
significantly lower correlations with the other three measures and, thus, was not likely to be a 
reliable measure of democracy. The participation dimension of the ID is a likely source for this 
divergence   from the other measures. As argued by Bollen and described above, participation 
can be considered a distinct concept from liberal democracy. While it may be correlated to a 
large extent with liberal democracy, it is conceptually different. At the least, it lacks external 
validity when compared to the other indices. Second, and of more practical concern; this index 
has not been constructed beyond 2002. Thus, it would not allow for accurate comparisons with 
my other measures. Since the ID is constructed from quantitative variables it would to be 
updated through 2013. However, this does not seem like a fruitful use of time, given its 
discordance with the other measures.  
The results from this robustness check confirm that the best-fitting model for all three of 
the indicators of liberal democracy is the AR model with the piecewise rhos. The overall fit 
statistics are quite similar across all three of these indicators, as seen in the Table 3.  
In fact, utilizing this robustness check led to some additional insights that further confirm 
this choice. In both the Polity and Freedom House series, the piecewise model estimated without 
producing any error messages, facilitating a more direct comparison with the AR model with 
piecewise rhos. In both of these time series, the AR model with the piecewise rhos outperformed 
the piecewise model (and all other models examined). For the Freedom House time series’ 
piecewise model the CFI, TLI, IFI, 1-RMSEA, and BIC were 0.971, 0.966, 0.971, 0.89, and -
58.8 respectively compared with these values for the AR model with piecewise rhos: 0.981, 0.98, 
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0.981, 0.915, and -93.8. With the Polity IV’s time series’ piecewise model the CFI, TLI, IFI, 1-
RMSEA, and BIC were 0.973, 0.969, 0.973, 0.905 and -80.6. As with the other time series, the 
AR model with piecewise rhos produced better fit statistics; the CFI, TLI, IFI, 1-RMSEA, and 
BIC were 0.991, 0.99, 0.991, 0.946, and -120.7. In fact, the model fit the Polity IV data better 
than it did any of the other time series. Thus, I feel confident through these robustness checks 
that I have identified the best-fitting model.  
Implications of the Final Model for the Current Theory of the Diffusion of Liberal Democracy 
These results also demonstrate that if one were using conventional longitudinal modeling 
techniques or LGCM in isolation, they would not find the best-fitting model. The empirical and 
substantive conclusions of this model misspecification is beyond the scope of this paper, but 
would be a useful exercise for future work.  
The literature on the determinants and consequences of democratization is plagued with 
discordant results. It is at least possible that some of the findings from previous studies would 
not hold if the proper modeling technique was utilized. Thus, taking advantage of the tools 
available to in the SEM framework and applying them to other models may allow researchers to 
find that previous studies have not always utilized the best-fitting model when presenting results. 
Conclusions 
Levitsky and Way (2015) argue that the idea of a democratic backslide is just an illusion.  
They contend that the 1990s were a time of unrealistic hype and enthusiasm about the prospects 
for liberal democracy in the future. Thus, when subsequent decades did not meet expectations 
and reproduce the lofty gains of the 1990s, it seemed like backsliding. They further argue that, 
when examining the empirical evidence, the picture that develops is one of stagnation, not 
backsliding. Thus, they conclude that all of the negative hype is unfounded and empirically 
inaccurate. 
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Their conclusions seem plausible given the state of the empirical evidence in 2013 (the 
latest year that they examined). However, the perspective presented here, based on the 
examination of the evidence above using three common measures of liberal democracy (Bollen’s 
Liberal Democracy Series I indicator, Freedom House average of political rights and civil 
liberties, and Polity IV’s polity2 variable), is somewhat different than Levitsky and Way’s 
assertions. In sum, I disagree is with their portrayal of the situation. I do not agree with their rosy 
gloss of stability to describe the serious world-wide trend of liberal democratic stagnation.  
Several arguments challenge their view of the empirical evidence. First, their argument 
holds for examining liberal democracy at the world-wide level through 2013, but the next two 
subsequent years (2014 and 2015) completely undermine their evidence for the stability 
perspective. 
Second, the evidence they provide only examines the overall global level of democracy. 
They do not go beneath the aggregated global numbers by investigating regional or income 
groupings to test the consistency of the world-wide trends. It is possible, if not probable, that 
some groups of countries exhibit stability, while others exhibit stagnation or even decline. This 
disaggregation is interesting and should not be overlooked. In fact, the disaggregated data paints 
a more troubling picture that does not coincide with their vision of stability. Third, the empirical 
modeling shows that the best predictor of current levels of democracy are previous levels of 
democracy, and this does not necessarily bode well for the future of liberal democracy. 
According to Freedom House’s numbers, the downward trend is now apparent, albeit 
small. In 2014 and 2015, we have witnessed declines in the average world-wide levels of 
political rights and civil liberties. The average Freedom House score in 2015 was 4.66, the 
lowest score since 2004.  Examining the most recent years reveals a decline since 2005, when the 
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score was 4.76. Only the year 2013 saw any improvement during this period. While these 
declines are relatively minor compared to the upward trends witnessed during the third wave, 
they are real and cannot be overlooked anymore.  
However, the Freedom House ratings cannot be considered definitive evidence of a 
democratic decline when looking at the overall world-wide level of democracy. Some caution 
must be employed when using any one organization as the source of liberal democracy ratings. 
That being said, the Freedom House ratings are the most widely used indicators. 
Does this study mean to imply that continued decreases in democracy are inevitable? 
Absolutely not. It does, however, lead us to at least question the terminology used currently; we 
should seriously think about replacing the word “stability” with “stagnation” or “decline”.  
When one delves beneath the overall global average of democracy or the overall numbers 
of countries that are classified as a democracy and investigates trends among regions and income 
groups, it appears that the stagnation is occurring almost everywhere. In fact, it is inaccurate to 
claim that there is democratic stability if most of the world’s population experiences only modest 
levels of liberal democracy. Stagnation at low levels of liberal democracy cannot substantiate the 
viewpoint of stability. The regions of SSA and East Asia and the Pacific exemplify this 
viewpoint. The lack of substantial gains since the early 1990s does not promote the view of 
stability when nations are stagnating at levels of liberal democracy that are barely half of those in 
North America and a full 20 points less than the Europe and Central Asia and the Latin America 
and Caribbean regions. Similarly, when examining South Asia since 1992, or, more recently, 
since the mid-2000s, we do not see stability here but rather instability - steep gains followed by a 
leveling off and then a recent decline. Again, this does not bode well for stability.  
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 IA regional snap-shot of liberal democracy in 2013 reveals substantial regional 
clustering. North America (the U.S. and Canada) have levels essentially at 100, Europe and 
Central Asia and Latin America and Caribbean countries are just over 80 points. A third cluster 
develops around the 60-point mark, including parts of East Asia and the Pacific, South Asia, and 
SSA. Left slightly above the 40% mark is the Middle East and North Africa which, as many have 
argued, was essentially untouched by the third wave. Thus, to label this diverse landscape as 
stability belies the fact there are real and significant differences in the quality and trend lines of 
liberal democracy around the world. This finding is obscured when looking only at binary 
measures of democracy or failing to disaggregate overall world-wide trends. 
 Viewing the world disaggregated by income also reveals substantial democratic 
stagnation. Using this simple dichotomous classification of developed vs. less-developed 
countries, democratic stagnation is apparent. In developed countries, levels of democracy have 
only increased slightly in the last 20 years. The average level of liberal democracy is hovering 
around 82 and as of 2013, values were lower than they were in 2007. Thus, even in high income 
countries, liberal democracy is lower today than in 2007 (although just marginally). For less-
developed countries, the stagnation is apparent since 2007; while there have not been declines in 
this group, there are year-to-year fluctuations that can, at best, be characterized as stagnation. 
 The real insight comes when examining democratic trends with 5 income groups: high 
income OECD, high income non-OECD, upper middle income, lower middle income, and low 
income. This view reveals instances of stability and stagnation. Obviously, there is a potential 
ceiling effect, as liberal democracy is scored on a scale from 0 to 100. Thus, it is not surprising 
that, since 1990, there has been relatively little growth in the average level of democracy in high 
income OECD countries (96 in 1990 and 97 in 2013). I would term this democratic stability, in 
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that there is very little improvement that can be made in these countries. However, when an 
examination of the high income non-OECD countries uncovers stagnation, (in 1995 the liberal 
democracy score was 64; in 2013 the score was 65). This should be considered as stagnation, not 
stability, since the score of liberal democracy is far from ideal. Unfortunately, the most recent 
years have brought declines, albeit minor ones; the score in 2013 was   the lowest score of any 
year since 2001.  
 Upper middle-income countries do not exhibit this level of democratic stagnation. In fact, 
since 2007, these countries have surpassed the high-income non-OECD countries in terms of 
their level of liberal democracy, and as of 2013 have a higher average score of 70.28 (compared 
to 65.07). There has been continued growth in almost every year, although it has slowed down 
when compared to the growth experienced in the 1970s and 1980s. 
 Lower middle-income countries portray democratic stagnation, with a minor decline from 
2012 to 2013. The average level of liberal democracy here is 61, leaving ample room for 
improvement. 
 Low income countries, not surprisingly, are faring worse than other countries. After some 
impressive gains, mostly due to rapid improvements in the early 1990s, there was some leveling 
off in 1995. There was also a noticeable dip in the trajectory from 2002 to 2003. Since 2008, 
however, there has been decline in every single year. In 2008, the average score was 56 for these 
countries; by 2013 it had dropped to 53. This recent trend does not bode well for the future 
prospects of liberal democracy and may indicate that leaders and people in these countries are 
questioning their support for liberal democracy. It is precisely in these countries where the 
influence of models competing with liberal democracy, such as the China model, may make the 
most head-way. 
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In addition, the prospects for democratic convergence are not good. Countries, regions, 
and income groups at low levels of liberal democracy are actually moving further apart in some 
instances. It is clear there is not convergence.  
 My empirical modeling of recent trends in liberal democracy since 1972 suggest that the 
best-fitting model is an autoregressive model that allows for different magnitudes of change over 
time. Thus, when it is all said and done, essentially the best predictor of liberal democracy today 
is the level of liberal democracy in the previous year. Thus, the prospects for the future appear to 
be similar to the recent past. It also suggests that deepening democratization is a process that 
happens slowly. Thus, it seems unlikely that we are witnessing the inevitable march of history to 
liberal democracy as the final form of government. It is more probable that we will end up 
having hybrid regimes that exhibit a mix of democratic and authoritarian characteristics, placing 
those regimes in gray areas between the two extremes.  
 It is also prudent to ask whether or not the world is still in the Third Wave of 
Democratization. I would argue that it is not, and that the analogy has outlived its usefulness. It 
is time that we begin to take the situation of stagnation seriously as it appears to be pervasive, 
occurring in multiple regions as well as both developed and developing countries. In my opinion, 
the Third Wave is over and it is given over to a new future for liberal democracy. Gone is the era 
where the world will witness independence movements and break-ups the like that of the Soviet 
Union. Instead, the world may still experience spectacular increases in democracy in some 
countries, but others likely will remain stuck at middling levels of liberal democracy. In this new 
era, we can expect those countries in the gray zone between democracy and authoritarianism to 
continue to struggle.
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CHAPTER 3: PREDICTING RECENT TRENDS IN LIBERAL DEMOCRACY 1972 TO 
2013: TESTING EXISTING EXPLANATIONS WITH NEW METHODS 
Introduction 
It is hard to overstate the importance of research that contributes to our understanding of 
liberal democracy. As was stated in chapter two, a better understanding of liberal democracy is 
of utmost importance because, as the form of government chosen by the winners of WWII, its 
ideals, such as democratic rule, respect for political liberties, and equality, are now embedded in 
international norms and the international institutions that further these norms. Just the mere 
invocation of the ideal of democracy can lend legitimacy to political regimes. Further, the 
Western world spends an enormous amount of public and private resources in the promotion of 
democracy around the world. As a result, there is a vibrant research program examining the 
causes and consequences of democracy. Further indication of democracy’s importance is the 
plethora of social goods that are assumed to accompany democracy: well-being, health, peace, 
gender equality, etc. Based on the insights from chapter two (namely, that liberal democracy 
around the world is in a state of stagnation rather than stability), it is also important to identify 
why this may be the case and so determine why countries are moving away from this ideal. This 
may well be one of the most important questions of the new millennium: why, despite its high 
level of worldwide acceptance and perceived social advantages, does democracy as experienced 
by the population in most countries around the world fall far short of the ideal standard?  
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The Causes of Democracy 
Determining the causes of democracy is a task that has been around for centuries. 
“Indeed, efforts to determine what factors give rise to democratic governance date back to 
Aristotle” (Malone 2011:66). Today, the majority of studies on democracy reside within the 
disciplines of political science, sociology, and economics.  This disciplinary divide certainly 
makes it more difficult to aggregate what is known about democracy. Geddes reviews what is 
known about democracy in a recent article, and comes to the conclusion that, despite the 
voluminous attention of scholars, we really do not know that much about democracy’s root 
causes. “What do we now know about the causes of democratization that we did not know nearly 
50 years ago when Seymour Martin Lipset (1959) wrote his famous article linking development 
with democracy? The answer is surprisingly little” Geddes 2009: 278). Why is there a perceived 
lack of progress, despite considerable academic effort?  Malone argues that this is the case for 
multiple reasons, including the use of different definitions and measures, the employment of 
different methodologies, and the selection of different cases for analysis. Furthermore, the 
research may be aiming for a moving target; that is, the nature of democracy itself has changed 
over time. Also, important to consider is exactly what aspects of democracy are targeted by each 
study.  
Of course, any study of democracy should start with a review of prior research. To help 
aid in the organization of this voluminous literature, this study will focus on three ways that 
scholarly work has examined democracy, as described below. Any study on the causes of 
democracy requires us to specify exactly which aspect(s) of democracy we are trying to predict. 
To this end, Munck (2007) identified three core agendas of the research on democracy as 
distinguished by the focus of the research: democratic transition, democratic consolidation and 
115 
stability, or the quality of democracy (i.e. the level of democracy achieved).  Each of these 
agendas lends some insight regarding the causes of democracy. The present study will be an 
investigation in the latter research agenda, the quality (or level) of democracy.  As argued below, 
this research agenda is perhaps the most relevant today, and is a more general research agenda 
that subsumes the first two.  
Democratic Transition 
The first core agenda on research on democracy is that concerning democratic transition.  
This research focuses on determining the factors that bring about a democratic transition from 
authoritarian regimes to democratic ones. Before the study of democratic transitions became 
popular, the mainstream political science literature of the 1960s and 1970s focused on the 
structural prerequisites and necessary conditions for a stable democracy. For example, 
modernization and industrialization (Lerner 1958, Lipset 1959), the formation of a middle class 
(Aristotle 1962, Huntington 1991, Lipset 1959, 1960), the growth of tolerant civic cultures 
(Almond and Verba 1963), and the ability of a country to prevail over economic dependency 
(Cardoso and Faleto 1979) were all seen as necessary structural conditions for democracy to 
flourish. This literature can be traced back to Lipset 1960 and Rustow 1970.  In the early 970s, 
with democratic transitions actually occurring worldwide, including in Spain and Portugal, this 
attempts to explain transitions became timely and highly relevant. A four-volume work by 
Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead helped to extend this 
research paradigm’s reach into the 1980s and 1990s.  
The transitions literature, or ‘transitology’, as it is sometimes called, moved the focus 
from the larger structural conditions to the actions and strategic interactions of the political elites 
in position to influence the nature of the coming democracy. In order for a democratic transition 
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to occur, three processes have to take place: 1) liberalization or loosening of the authoritarian 
rule, 2) the reemergence or initiation of a civil society which increases the pace of the 
liberalization, often beyond what the political elites initially anticipated, and 3) free and fair 
elections where the outcome is not known ahead of time (Karl 2005). Transitions were then 
“understood to be the product of strategic interactions among political elites who were often 
pushed from below and who made conscious choices under exceptional conditions about the 
types of constitutions, electoral arrangements, party systems, civil-military configurations and 
economic models their countries should adapt” (Karl 2005:10). This is not to say that transition 
scholars rejected out of hand the earlier structural approaches to the causes of democracy, they 
just considered the agency of the political elites to be more important at this critical moment than 
the structural forces.  
There are some main lines of theoretical debate that have taken place within the 
transitions paradigm. One of the early assumptions in all literature on democratization was the 
exact nature of its relationship with modernization and industrialization. This long-standing view 
was challenged and led to one of the liveliest debates in the transitions paradigm literature. This 
debate centered on whether or not increases in modernization lead to democratic transitions or 
whether these transitions take place only in countries where there are existing high levels of 
modernization and industrialization (see Przeworski et al. 1996; Przeworski and Limongi 1997; 
Przeworski et al. 2000).   
The transition scholars did, however, question the importance of these structural forces 
and found that some of these, such as modernization, may not help to predict a democratic 
transition -although they may be important to the survivability of an established democracy 
(Przeworski et al. 2000). Other structural features that once had been hypothesized to hinder 
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democracy were shown to be surmountable with prudent strategic interactions taken by elites. 
For instance, colonial legacies and religious traditions (Barro 1999) and unequal class structures 
(Przeworski 199) could be overcome. Thus, the message was one of hope that all outcomes were 
not predetermined by structural conditions. However, this is not to say that all structural 
conditions are surmountable.  For instance, Moore’s ideas about agrarian elites and rentier states 
who depend on oil revenues being incompatible with democracy seem to present some 
intractable problems for democracy and democratic transitions (Karl 2005). 
A major finding in the transitions literature is that there is no single cause for a transition. 
Rather, there are complex interactions as well as different pathways to a democratic transition. 
Thus, there is not a holistic theory that can account for all democratic transitions. As Karl tells 
us, [p]erhaps the most important contribution of ‘transitology’, in both theory and praxis, has 
been to lighten the burden of pessimism over the possibility of democratization that prevailed in 
more authoritarian periods when a long list of necessary and sufficient prerequisites (almost 
never present and only fulfilled by a small number of stable Anglo-American democracies) 
implied that the demise of autocracies would simply produce other autocracies” (Karl 2005:34).  
Other lines of debate focus on the need to distinguish between short, medium, and long-
term factors (Munck 2007). For example, short-term factors might emphasize choices made by 
elites, medium-term factors might be the path dependencies created by the characteristics of the 
old authoritarian regimes, and long-term factors might be more structural in nature, such as the 
development model being followed. A closely related debate in this transitions literature 
concerns whether or not transition is initiated from the top down, such as in elite pacts (Karl 
2005) or from the bottom up, such as due to popular mobilizations (O’Donnell and Schmitter 
1986).  
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The challenges presented by this research agenda are many. The first problem is that of 
identifying when a democratic transition actually takes place. Most often the line is drawn in the 
sand after free and fair elections have taken place. Thus, this concept rests heavily on the idea of 
a “founding election” (O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986:61). Munck (2007) argues that examining 
recent democratization is less problematic than in earlier waves of democracy. During the late 
19th and early 20th century, there was a gradual extension of voting rights, first to adult males 
who owned property, then gradually extended to all adult males regardless of property. Later 
still, in most cases, the franchise was then extended to women. To consider political regimes as 
democratic when they systematically exclude certain, and in most instances, large percentages of 
the population, is problematic. Today this practice is seen as unfavorable and undemocratic. For 
instance, for the year 1972, Freedom House produced separate estimates of political rights and 
civil liberties for the minority white population and the majority black population of South 
African under their system of apartheid. In subsequent years, until the ending of apartheid in 
1994, South Africa overall received poor democracy scores, since large percentages of the 
population were systematically excluded from participating (as in most countries before women 
or racial minorities were allowed to vote). While today it may be more appropriate to look for 
sharp dividing lines between authoritarian and democratic regimes than in previous eras, it 
continues to be problematic.  
Even recently there are cases of regime transition that are not clear cut. As Haggard and 
Kaufman argue (2016) there are stark differences in the various measures that are used to 
evaluate democratic transitions. Cheibub et al.’s (1996, 2010) counting of transitions relies on a 
minimalist dichotomous measure (Democracy-Dictatorship (DD) developed by the authors.  Its 
results are quite different than the results obtained when using the Polity IV measure and the 
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combined polity2 variable (Marshall et al. 2010). Haggard and Kaufman find that even allowing 
for two year temporal differences in the coding of the transition, still these two data sources only 
agreed about 55% of the time. In essence, each of these datasets is capturing a different type of 
transition.  
Thus, precisely examining a democratic transition is not a clear-cut exercise. The 
example of Chile’s democratic transition in 1990 serves as a good illustration of this problem, as 
identified by Haggard and Kaufman (2016). Although Chile held democratic elections in 1990 
that resulted in the removal from power of the military government led by General Augusto 
Pinochet, Chile cannot be considered an ideal democracy at this point. In fact, due to the relative 
strength of the Pinochet regime, the military had good terms in which to negotiate their exit from 
power. There were many areas of government policy where the military maintained its influence, 
and a number of senators were awarded life-long terms of office and were not subject to 
elections. In addition, the civilian presidents were denied the authority to remove or replace the 
commander-in-chief of the armed forces. This lack of civilian oversight, reserved areas of policy, 
and life-time senate appointments are not consistent with democratic policies. It was not until 
2005 that many of these onerous provisions in the 1980s constitution were overturned.  
Another problem with the regime transition paradigm is a growing recognition that there 
are regimes that are hard to classify, as they are not fully authoritarian or fully democratic.  
Recent literature on “hybrid” regimes acknowledges that regimes in practice are not ideal types; 
some regimes simultaneously possess characteristics of both authoritarianism and democracy. 
The proliferation of these types of regimes has led to a seemingly endless articulation of new 
classification systems of “diminished sub-types” or “democracy with adjectives.” 
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A third problem with the regime transition paradigm is that it only provides a slice of the 
full concept of democracy - only that slice which informs why non-democratic regimes become 
democratic. The factors that lead to a democratic transition may not be the ones that sustain it. 
Furthermore, understanding just a piece of the analytical puzzle and generalizing from that to all 
experiences of democracy would be misleading.  
A fourth, and related, problem is that focusing on regime transitions excludes necessarily 
from the analysis countries that have already had a democratic transition. Thus, this paradigm is 
silent about movements up and down the authoritarian/ democratic continuum unless it involves 
the one-way movement across an arbitrary threshold.  
Another problem with the transitions research is that there is a need to search for a broad 
theoretical integration of all of the factors that have been shown to be important in some cases of 
transition. Often a kitchen sink approach is utilized when searching for predictors, but these 
studies lack or are based on rather thin theoretical ground. Another problem is that research has 
tended to focus on either small to medium size samples or be qualitative in nature and be more 
case studies. There is an obvious need to utilize mixed methodologies (quantitative and 
qualitative), but this is problematic due to the variety of differing benchmark measures of 
democracy used by the various researchers.    
Thus, viewing democracy as a dichotomous or even a categorical variable is not only 
theoretically incongruent with dominant conceptualizations of liberal democracy, but necessarily 
limits the understanding of democracy to moments of regime transition. While investigating the 
complex causes leading to the breakdown of an authoritarian regime in a particular instance is an 
intellectually worthy subject of study, it may be more rewarding to examine those forces that 
propel a country either toward or further away from democracy, regardless of the initial starting 
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point. This leads to the question of what happens after a regime transition. To help answer this 
question, other concepts of democracy are examined, namely democratic consolidation and 
democratic stability.   
Democratic Consolidation/Democratic Stability 
So, what happens after a regime transition? Two strands of research investigate this 
question and represent the second core agenda of democracy scholars. A democracy is said to be 
consolidated when there is general agreement, not just by political elites but also the public, that 
it is the ‘only game in town’. The concept of democratic consolidation was initially used by 
Schmitter 1995, Schedler 1998, Merkel 1998, and Hartlyn 2002. Over time, however, this 
concept of democratic consolidation became diluted, as it was used in many different ways, to 
the extent that   it was suggested the concept be retired (O’Donnell 1996).   In its place, there was 
a renewed focus on democratic stability, defined as the sustainability of regimes after they had 
made a successful transition to democracy in the Shumpterian (electoral democracy) tradition. 
Democratic stability is not a new concept in the literature. Cutright (1963) clearly focused on this 
aspect of democracy when he created his index of democracy. However, there was renewed 
research interest in issues of democratic stability and this led to a more cohesive research 
program (as with the transitions literature) that focused on the factors that made some 
democracies more stable than others.  Many countries in the world that adopted democracy 
subsequently experienced times when there were democratic reversals. Democratic reversals 
took place throughout Latin America (Haiti 1991, 2004, Peru 1992, Ecuador 2000), and in some 
countries in Africa (Nigeria 1983, Sudan 1989, Niger 1996, Sierra Leone 1997, Ivory Coast 
1999, CAR 2003, Guinea-Bissau 2003), and Asia (Pakistan 1999, Thailand 1991, 2006) (Munck 
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2007:24). Thus, the study of democratic stability and reversals remains a timely and important 
research topic. 
As with the transitions literature, there are regional studies and cross-regional analyses of 
democratic stability, but to a larger extent these have been influenced by large-N, quantitative 
studies. It is generally assumed that the factors that cause a democracy to come into being are not 
necessarily the same factors that cause a democracy to become consolidated (i.e., seen as the 
only desired result). In one of the more influential pieces of scholarship on democracy, 
Przeworski et al. (2000) challenge one of the most commonly held findings, of the close 
relationship between economic development and democracy, and claim that economic 
development does not bring about regime transitions from dictatorships to democracy. Instead, 
they argue that economic development makes democratic reversals less likely. Factors beyond 
economic development can affect democratic stability; for example, countries with plural 
societies and/or multinational states seem more susceptible to democratic reversals. International 
factors also influence democratic stability, such as the democratic nature of a country’s 
neighbors, the global environment (Gleditsch and Ward 2006, Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán 
2007), and   the level of participation in international organizations (Pevehouse 2005). 
Many  factors have been championed as predictors of  democratic stability, such as 
economic performance and crises (Przeworski 1991), characteristics about the outgoing 
authoritarian regime and those concerning transitions (Karl 1990, Karl and Schmitter 1991), the 
sequence of political and economic reforms (Haggard and Kaufman 1992, Przeworksi 1991), 
civil society and the role of the working class (Rueschemeyer, Stephens, and Stephens 1992), 
and whether or not the country has a presidential or parliamentary system of government (Linz 
1994).  In general, these predictors have not proven to be valid. Countries that have become 
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democratic since the 1970s vary in many significant aspects, however, most countries have been 
relatively stable democracies. These factors also do not seem to predict democratic breakdowns, 
either. In general, it seems that just as there are many pathways and combinations of factors that 
lead to democratic transitions, this too is the case for what sustains democracy after the transition 
(Munck 2007).  
This core agenda of democratic stability also suffers from some challenges as well. One 
major challenge is the conceptualization of what constitutes democratic stability. Bollen (1990) 
is clear that democratic stability (and voter turnout) is a separate analytical concept from liberal 
democracy, and as such, indicators in this research tradition should be handled carefully when 
operationalizing democratic stability. The search to identify the factors that keep a democracy 
stable (i.e., preventing it from breakdown) is really just the study of democratic transitions, but in 
reverse. Unsurprisingly, it faces many of the same challenges. One challenge, not well met in 
current literature, is distinguishing from those factors that change the nature of the regime (from 
democratic to authoritarian) from those that produce change within a regime already committed 
to democracy. A second major challenge is the identification and explanation of the causal 
processes influencing stability. Undoubtedly, many of the factors tested operate in some sort of 
sequence or through interactions, and these often are not specified in this literature. As with the 
literature on democratic transitions, this research agenda could benefit with a mixed methods 
approach that leverages the strengths of large-N quantitative studies with those of qualitative 
case studies. 
Quality of Democracy/Levels of Democracy 
The third core agenda on the research on democracy focuses on the quality of democracy. 
It is essentially an examination of how closely a given regime approaches an   ideal type of 
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liberal democracy. This study will equate this concept to examining levels of democracy. This 
agenda goes beyond explaining the factors that lead to a democratic transition or those that 
prevent a democratic reversal (or keep a minimalist democracy stable), to identifying those 
factors that produce changes in the level of a country’s democracy, regardless of the initial level 
of democracy.  
Of course, such a task requires a measure of democracy that goes beyond the minimalist 
definition of electoral democracy utilized in the two previously introduced research agendas. 
One of the earliest attempts to look beyond the simple dichotomy was Cutright (1963). In that 
work, he was concerned about political development and was attempting to determine its 
association with other institutions in society. The goal was to create an index of political 
development, where nations could be placed on a continuum and compared. Cutright (1963) 
examined the 21-year period from 1940 to 1960. His index had a yearly range of 0 to 3 and, thus, 
accumulating for the entire 21 period, his index was scored 0 to 63. In order to identify changes 
that occur at any level of democracy, it is necessary to use an approximately continuous measure, 
such as those discussed in my analysis in chapter two (Freedom House, Vanhanen, Polity IV, and 
Bollen’s Liberal Democracy Series I Indicator). 
Work on this research agenda often tests whether or not some of the most prominent 
predictors of transition and stability are useful explanations for predicting levels of liberal 
democracy. A recent work by Wejnert (2014) investigated the accuracy of predictors from 
modernization theory, class conflict theory, the world system/ dependency theory, and diffusion 
factors when predicting levels of liberal democracy from 1800 to 2005. While Wejnert initially 
found evidence that more developed countries were in a more advantageous position regarding 
higher levels of democracy, she found that once other predictors such as indicators of diffusion 
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and networks were included in the model, industrialization was no longer significant.  One of the 
major findings was the failure of socio-economic predictors as significant predictors of 
democracy across all regions of the world.  
Another recent study by Woodberry (2012) also undertook an investigation of levels of 
liberal democracy, utilizing the mean level of liberal democracy from 1950 to 1994 as the 
dependent variable in the study. Woodberry integrated several religious variables in the analysis, 
and tested their explanatory power against several leading explanations, including modernization 
variables, former British colony, latitude, and whether a country is a major oil producer, amongst 
others. Woodberry found that four religious variables accounted for many of the effects normally 
attributed to these other variables.  
Criticisms of this research agenda revolve around two fundamental disputes. Since most 
of the literature that focuses on level of democracy is quantitative in nature and features an 
indicator of liberal democracy that is not dichotomous, this debate becomes subsumed by other 
debates in the literature. Therefore, the same critics of the approximately continuous measures of 
liberal democracy are those that criticize these works as well. In addition, another critique is that 
quantitative indicators do not really capture more qualitative aspects of levels of democracy. 
These are fundamental criticisms that are deeply ingrained in the literature on democracy. 
Therefore, the onus will be on the researcher to provide convincing analysis that can bridge the 
binary/continuous divide. 
Existing Explanations of Liberal Democracy 
Now that I have situated my current study in a core research agenda, level of liberal 
democracy, I will now give it theoretical grounding. One of the major critiques of studies on 
democracy is that they lack serious theoretical grounding. As such, this study will call upon the 
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following theoretical perspectives: modernization theory, globalization theory that highlights the 
importance of Protestant missionaries, dependency/ world systems theory, and world polity 
theory. These perspectives, while not all encompassing, are able to accommodate many of the 
most popular predictors used in previous studies, as well as provide a theoretical grounding for 
this study. 
However, a re-examination of the factors that lead to liberal democracy may be prudent 
in light of the previous descriptive analysis of the trends of liberal democracy since 1972. These 
trends reveal that democracy is not stable, but rather stagnating. This finding casts serious doubts 
on several of the most influential theoretical perspectives that have been employed to explain 
democracy in the past: modernization theory, world polity theory, and diffusion processes. Even 
a casual observer of world events in the last four decades would be hard-pressed to deny that 
today the world is becoming more industrialized, interconnected, and that there are a larger 
number (and percentage) of the world’s countries that are characterized as democratic. Even 
looking back at just the last decade or so (approximately the same time period of worldwide 
democratic stagnation, as discussed in the previous section). Yet, the worldwide economy has 
increased during the decade, from 44 trillion USD at the end of 2004 to 78 trillion USD at the 
end of 2014 (World Bank 2016). This period has experienced growth in the size, scope, and 
importance of international non-governmental organizations (INGOs), one of the key players in 
the world (if not the key player), according to proponents of world polity. In this global 
environment, why then has the percent of countries classified by Freedom House as electoral 
democracies stagnated between 2006 and 2016 at only 64%?  What do existing theoretical 
perspectives say about those factors that influence the level of democracy, for better or worse? 
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Also, can any of these existing theoretical perspectives help identify the factors driving these 
recent trends of democratic stagnation?  
Modernization Theory 
The modernization school of thought (known as modernization theory) formed as a 
multidisciplinary endeavor between sociology, political science, and economics to evaluate the 
prospects for the development of the Third World. It posited that the underdevelopment seen in 
the Third World was a consequence of traditional values, psychological traits, and cultural traits 
(Lerner 1958; Inkeles and Smith 1974). Modernization theory generally states that (1) 
development is an evolutionary process in which states progress  from underdeveloped  to 
modern, developed societies; (2)  the different stages in this evolutionary process need, for the 
functional maintenance of society, different patterns of social differentiation and a reformulation 
of cultural and structural elements; (3) developing countries will eventually take on the 
characteristics of the already developed countries in Western Europe and North America upon  
reaching the last stage of development; and (4) the process will cause a discarding of traditional 
cultures and structures that are incongruent with modern life and they will be replaced with 
modern ones. 
Early Modernization theorists have posited that modernization causes changes within the 
social and economic landscape of developing countries, making them fertile grounds for 
democracy and democratic transition: (Deutsch 1961, Lerner 1958, Lipset 1959).  The basic 
theory is that economic development inevitably leads from a traditional to a modern society, and 
these societies become too complex and unwieldy to be maintained by authoritarian political 
regimes. The identity of the underlying mechanisms causing this  differ, depending on the shade 
of the modernization argument being put forth, but include via: increasing levels of education 
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(Lipset 1959), the expansion of individual values congruent with political freedoms (Inglehart 
and Welzel 2005), the diversification of individual interests and increasing social ties (Dahl 
1971, Rustow 1970),  new constellations of class power such as the acquisition of increased 
power by a growing middle class (Moore 1966) or by a growing working class (Collier 1999; 
Rueschemeyer, Stephens, and Stephens 1992), growing economic inequality (Boix 2003; 
Acemoglu and Robinson 2006; Houle 2009), and  the emergence of a civil society (i.e., those 
relations outside of the family, church, government, or business) (Cheibub and Vreeland 2011). 
Perhaps one of the clearest and earliest statements of how the process of modernization 
should impact the development of liberal democracy is in the work of Daniel Lerner. Lerner 
(1958) conceptualized modernization as consisting of a set of interrelated sequences or phases. 
Lerner posits that urbanization is the first phase, with increases in urbanization leading to 
increases in literacy (second phase). Increases in literacy then lead to an increase in media 
exposure (third phase). In turn, this third phase of increased media exposure leads to two 
outcomes: wider economic participation (i.e., increases in per capita income) and increased 
political participation (i.e., voting).  Lerner’s sequence of phases conceptualizes education as 
prior to liberal democracy, and considers democracy as the most important achievement of 
modern society. “We come, then, to political participation. Democratic governance comes late, 
historically, and typically as the crowning institution of the participant society” (Lerner 1958). 
Lipset (1959) conceptualizes modernization or, more specifically, economic development, as a 
latent factor consisting of education, industrialization, urbanization, and wealth, and he finds that 
these correlate to a large extent with democracy. Thus, modernization theories typically focus on 
the internal characteristics of countries in the prediction of liberal democracy.   
 
129 
Global & International Factors  
Beyond the perceived positive impacts of the process of modernization on liberal 
democracy, this study will investigate the impact of other processes that have been recently 
shown to be intimately tied to modernization process. In an influential article in 2012, 
Woodberry integrated often overlooked religious factors into an analysis of the causes of liberal 
democracy. As with this study, he utilized an indicator of liberal democracy from Bollen in his 
analysis, but instead of looking at overall trends, he examined as the dependent variable the 
mean level of liberal democracy from 1950 to 1994; thus, the dynamics of liberal democracy 
were removed from the investigation. He argued that religious factors were vital in shaping 
modernity, of which liberal democracy is a key aspect. The aspects of religion that he found most 
important were those associated with conversionary Protestants (Protestant missionaries).  
Historically, missionaries have had a significant role in propagating modern innovations, such as 
increased literacy and education for the masses and religious liberty (the so-called missionary 
roots of liberal democracy). These processes were initiated simply as a means to convert natives 
to Protestantism.  The ability of the population to read the Bible in their native language was 
integral to this process, and increasing literacy was a key part of the process of introducing 
Christianity to the community. The conversion goal of the Protestant missionaries also facilitated 
the spread of mass printing and expands civil society (Woodberry 2012). This argument is 
consistent with the positive effects that Bollen (1979) found for the percent of the population that 
were Protestant, and might actually explain Bollen’s findings. Woodberry further claims that 
Protestant missionaries can account for the positive effects on democracy that Bollen and 
Jackman (1985) identified for the variable ‘former British colony’. While there were often 
counterforces that wanted to keep Protestant teachings out of the community, the argument given 
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by Woodberry that this modernizing process initially was spurred on by Protestant missionaries 
seems quite compelling.  
Woodberry presents an alternative to, or rather a clarification of, the modernization 
process.  His path diagram of the mechanisms of how Protestant missionaries influenced 
democracy is particularly informative. He found that many of the underlying structural factors 
that modernization theory predicts will be important for democracy are, in fact, merely 
intervening variables in the process. These include factors such as economic development, mass 
education, mass printing, civil society, the rise of the middle class, and political parties 
established prior to independence. He hypothesized that increases in Protestant missionaries 
would lead to higher levels of all of these variables. Essentially, Protestant missionaries had 
positive impacts on a society, in terms of facilitating the spread of modernity.  
In Woodberry’s final analysis, the following four variables were found to be statistically 
significant and, as such, are included in this analysis. These variables include whether or not a 
country is a former Dutch colony, the number of years prior to 1960 that Protestant missions 
were active in a country, the number of Protestant missionaries per 10,000 population in 1923, 
and the percent of the population evangelized by 1900.  All these variables were found to have a 
positive impact on a country’s mean level of democracy from 1950 to 1994, with the exception 
of the former Dutch colony variable. 
Dependency Theory/World Systems Theory 
Dependency theory is a theory of development and underdevelopment formed in reaction 
to modernization theory, taking issue with how modernization theory places the blame for 
underdevelopment on internal deficient characteristics of developing nations. The intellectual 
innovation brought to this perspective is that when seeking to explain nations’ development and 
131 
underdevelopment, the unit of analysis is not the nation but rather the world-system, the 
capitalist economic system (Petras 1981). Events in any one place cannot be explained without 
considering the entire system as a whole. In order to understand local actions, such as political 
struggles in a particular nation, it is necessary to consider the entire world system and view this 
struggle from that perspective. Whereas modernization theory focused on the internal 
characteristics of nations, dependency theory posited that it was these external characteristics of 
the capitalist economic system that are useful for predicting liberal democracy. 
As noted earlier, the modernization school overlooks a significant factor that has allowed 
core countries to successfully develop:  as core countries develop, they gain a structural 
advantage. As stated previously, the world system is comprised of three types of nations: core, 
semi-periphery, and periphery. Peripheral countries are at a structural disadvantage. They seek to 
develop politically even as they are being exploited by core countries for their resources, labor, 
and markets. This alignment of foreign capitalists with their internal partners and enablers can 
lead to processes that suppress a peripheral country’s development of liberal democracy. One 
line of argument made by world system theorists would argue that if the domestic elites and 
merchants receive outside support from core countries, then they have less of a need to rely on 
the support of the middle class within their own country. In essence, a mini world system plays 
out domestically in the periphery, where the middle class becomes the exploited and their 
potential for political power undercut (Chase-Dunn 1975). Another line of argument is that 
instead of being suppressed by the elites the commercial and industrial middle class in peripheral 
nations instead become complicit in the system that upholds the exploitation the peripheral 
nation. Regardless of the reasoning, the end result is the same, the middle class, seen by the 
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modernization school as an important agent to the entire modernization process does not fulfill 
the same role as in core countries that developed earlier. 
Thus, we would suspect that the effects of the world system might operate in two ways. 
First, the message of capitalism as the dominant economic model is without a doubt intimately 
tied to democracy; we would expect that as this message is broadcast to the rest of the world it 
would be a mutually re-enforcing message. However, the world system is by definition one in 
which the core countries will always have the advantage over the peripheral countries. Thus, 
despite the message of capitalist development and liberal democracy going hand-in-hand, it is 
unlikely that these turn into realities everywhere evenly around the world. It is quite likely that 
world system theory would say that semi-peripheral and peripheral countries may start to exhibit 
some of the trappings of liberal democracy, such as elections, but these countries will never be 
able to fully develop economically or politically because of their unequal relationship to the 
dominant countries in the world system. 
Empirical work reveals that the world system has a negative impact on liberal democracy 
controlling for economic development (Bollen 1983). Wejnert (2005) using Bollen’s indicator of 
world system position, however, finds that world system position does not have a negative effect 
on liberal democracy, and there has been significant convergence between core and non-core 
countries. More recent work (Clark 2012) confirmed Wejnert’s finding, using the same indicator 
of world system position. However, Clark (2012) also extended previous research by integrating 
a new trichotomous indicator of world system position derived from a country’s position in the 
world trade network originally created by Clark and Beckfield (2009). Using this new indicator 
Clark (2012) finds that, in fact, a country’s world system position does have an influence on 
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democracy, and concludes that the semi-periphery and periphery countries have not converged 
toward the core, in opposition to Wejnert’s results. 
World Polity Theory 
World polity/institutional theory/world society theory is a theory of the global system 
from sociology based on sociological institutionalism that seeks to explain global social change 
as a result of the diffusion of universal cultural scripts containing Western ideas, norms, and 
policies. It investigates the global level and how it creates or impacts social structures at national 
and even local levels (Holzer et al. 2015:1). World polity theory can be considered, in some 
ways, a more contemporary take on modernization. Both are theories of convergence, positing 
that countries will become more similar over time. Modernization theory posits that when poorer 
countries adopt western models of economic growth, they will catch up to developed countries. 
World polity theory also anticipates convergence. However, the convergence is not a result of the 
acceptance of western models of economic development, but is driven by the existence of a 
common world culture that plays a key role in how governments and societies are structured. 
World polity theory would predict the global diffusion of democracy into countries that 
are more closely tied to the world system. According to Meyer et al. (1997), IGOs and INGOs 
are the main apparatuses of modernity. These organizations are at once seen as carriers and 
manifestations of the world polity. As stated above, the United Nations and other international 
organizations have an agenda of liberal democracy promotion embedded in their international 
policies (Hobson 2009: 384). Within this neo-institutionalist perspective, those that focus on a 
coercive isomorphism have stressed the importance of IGOs, specifically the World Bank and 
the IMF, to exert coercive pressure on member states to adopt neoliberal economics. These 
neoliberal economic policies are intimately tied to liberal democracy, and are likely to increase 
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their influence in countries that have to undertake austerity measures. However, as Torfason and 
Ingram argue, coercion is not the only mechanism of diffusion by which IGOs can operate. In 
fact, they posit that any IGO in which a country is a member could be a vehicle for cross-cultural 
links. Increased linkages between countries though IGOs lead to greater understanding and 
cooperation, and increases the likelihood that countries will adopt similar policies. However, the 
adoption of similar policies relies on the legitimacy of said policies. Therefore, a country that is 
less democratic than another to which is shares linkages is unlikely to influence a the more 
democratic country to become less democratic because liberal democracy is seen as legitimate in 
the eyes of the world, and such a move would be discordant with the world polity. Further, IGOs 
can aid in the diffusion of liberal democracy by their regular hosting of conferences and 
meetings between the political elites of member countries. These instances serve as an incubator 
for information and exchanges that increase the odds of isomorphism in policies.  
Recent Debates and Trends of Liberal Democracy  
This section discusses a recent debate in the literature on democracy surrounding the 
assessment of recent trends in liberal democracy. The major debate is whether or not the world is 
experiencing a democratic recession. Although many fear a coming recession or backsliding of 
liberal democracy (Diamond 2008, 2014, 2015; Gat 2007; Kurlantzick 2011), Levitsky and Way 
(2015) argue that the idea of a democratic backslide is just an illusion. They contend that the 
illusion results from a failure to meet the lofty expectations placed on liberal democracy in the 
1990s, as opposed to a lack of actual progress. They further argue that, when examining the 
empirical evidence, the picture that develops is one of stagnation, not backsliding, and thusly 
conclude that all of the negative hype is unfounded and empirically inaccurate.  
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Their conclusions seem plausible given the state of the empirical evidence in 2013 (the 
latest year examined).  However, my perspective, based on the examination of my evidence 
above using three common measures of liberal democracy (Bollen’s Liberal Democracy Series I 
indicator, Freedom House average of political rights and civil liberties, and Polity IV’s polity2 
variable), is somewhat different than Levitsky and Way’s assertions. In sum, I disagree is with 
their portrayal of the situation. I do not agree with their rosy gloss of “stability” to describe the 
serious worldwide trend of liberal democratic stagnation. Levitsky and Way’s portrayal of recent 
trends only examines the overall global level of democracy. They do not go beneath the 
aggregated global numbers to investigate regional or income groupings to determine if the 
worldwide trends are consistent. As demonstrated in the previous chapter, multiple regions and 
income groups are showing a downward trend in recent years. Sub-Saharan Africa is on a 
downward trend since 2007. Likewise, South Asia has a regional mean of liberal democracy 
lower in 2013 than in 2007. Even high income non-OECD countries and low income countries 
are unmistakably on a downward trend. This disaggregation is not just interesting, but is vitally 
important when examining recent trends. If this information was examined, it would be much 
harder for Levitsky and Way to make their argument. 
Further evidence is provided by Freedom House’s most recent numbers; the downward 
trend is now apparent, albeit small. Their annual Freedom in the World reports for 2014 and 
2015 document declines in the average world-wide levels of both political rights and civil 
liberties. The world average score in 2015 was 4.7 and in 2005 it was 4.8. Liberal democracy 
was at its lowest point of the preceding 11 years. All years during this period exhibited decline, 
except for 2013. While these decreases are relatively minor compared to the awesome upward 
trends witnessed during the 1980s and 1990s they should not be overlooked. At this point, there 
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is not definitive evidence of an overall democratic decline in the worldwide level of democracy. I 
also advise caution when using Freedom House’s combined average political rights and civil 
liberties scores as the only indicator of liberal democracy. That being said, it is one of the most 
widely used indicators.  
Looking beyond the overall number and investigating trends among regions and income 
groups, it appears as if the stagnation is occurring almost everywhere.  Can it be accurate to 
contend that there is democratic stability while most of the world’s population lives under very 
modest levels of liberal democracy? If we are to take a regional snap-shot of liberal democracy 
in 2013 we see substantial regional clustering. North America (the U.S. and Canada) have levels 
essentially at 100, Europe and Central Asia and Latin America and the Caribbean are just over 
80 points. A third cluster develops around the 60% mark, including East Asia and the Pacific, 
South Asia, and Sub-Saharan Africa. Left slightly above the 40% mark is the Middle East and 
North Africa. Thus, to characterize this diverse descriptive picture as stability belies the fact that 
there are real and significant differences in the quality of liberal democracy all around the world. 
These findings are obscured when we utilize binary measures of democracy to model worldwide 
trends. 
Yet, Levitsky and Way say just that. “The state of global democracy has remained stable 
over the last decade, and it has improved markedly relative to the 1990s” (Levitsky and Way 
2015:45). To that I would say stable at what levels. Maybe the argument is one of semantics, but 
when multiple regions of the world have liberal democracy scores far from the ideal of 100, it 
seems inaccurate to say that democracy is stable. Stagnation at low levels of liberal democracy 
cannot substantiate the viewpoint of stability. In 2012, the following countries that had liberal 
democracy scores between 63 and 67, the same level or higher than the averages for most of the 
137 
regions of the world: Armenia, Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Honduras, Jordan, Kenya, Maldives, 
Mali, Malaysia, Pakistan, Thailand, Republic of Congo, Sierra Leone, and Zimbabwe. Few 
would characterize all these countries as stable democracies. A flat trend can be considered 
something stable, but the connotation of “stability” given to this flat trend by Levitsky and 
Way’s is much different than its reality.    
Viewing the world disaggregated by income also reveals substantial democratic 
stagnation. First, I divided the countries into two categories (developed and less-developed). 
Developed countries are those that according to the World Bank are high income (OECD and 
non-OECD) countries. Using this simple dichotomous classification of developed versus less-
developed countries, democratic stagnation is apparent. Developed countries are those that are 
high income (OECD and non-OECD) countries according to the World Bank. While the average 
level of liberal democracy was hovering around 82 as of 2013, representing a slight decline from 
2007. Thus, even high income countries have suffered a slight degradation in liberal democracy.  
This decline may possibly be influenced by a ceiling effect, in that a country or grouping of 
countries cannot have a score of liberal democracy higher than 100. However, since these values 
are almost 20 points from maximum, they are likely to be less constrained by ceiling effects than 
by other factors. For less-develop countries, there is clear evidence of democratic stagnation 
amid relatively low levels of democracy. The trend has flattened out at a score of approximately 
60. The 129 less-developed countries make up over 65% of all the countries in the world.  
 Further disaggregating the countries of the world into five income groups yields greater 
variations in recent trends. For high-income OECD countries, there is a ceiling effect limiting 
growth, as these countries are maintaining high average level of liberal democracy (95.78 in 
1990 and 97.21 in 2013). These countries are stable, and there is very little room for 
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improvement using the current measurement system. However, examining the high income non-
OECD countries reveals stagnation. In 1995, the liberal democracy score was 64, and, in 2013, 
the score was 65. I consider this stagnation because the score of liberal democracy is far from 
ideal. Also, 2013’s score of 65 is the lowest score of any year since 2001. It seems that in the 
most recent years have seen declines, albeit minor ones. 
 An examination of upper middle-income countries reveals that these countries do not 
exhibit democratic stagnation. In fact, since 2007, these countries have surpassed the high-
income non-OECD countries by 5 points in terms of their liberal democracy score, and, as of 
2013, have an average score of 70. A comparison of the medians for these two groups (84 for 
upper middle income, and 79 for high-income OECD countries) portrays these differences as 
robust and not driven by outliers. Upper middle-income countries have continued growth in 
almost every year, although at a slower rate than in the 1970s and 1980s.  Nonetheless, 
democracy is still growing for this income group, bucking the global trends. Lower middle-
income countries portray democratic stagnation. With a minor decline from 2012 to 2013, it is 
hard to reach any other conclusion. Still the average liberal democracy score for this income 
group is only 61, leaving substantial room for improvement. 
Unsurprisingly, low income countries are faring worse than other income groups. Despite 
some impressive gains, this group enjoyed rapid improvements in the early 1990s, leveling off in 
1995. There was a noticeable dip in the trajectory from 2002 to 2003. Since 2008, however, there 
has been decline every single year.  Between 2008 and 2013, the average score dipped from 56 
to 53.  This recent trend does not bode well for the future prospects of liberal democracy and 
may indicate that leaders and people in these countries are questioning their support for liberal 
democracy. It is precisely in these countries where the influence of models competing with 
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liberal democracy, such as the China model, may make the most head-way. In addition, the 
prospects for democratic convergence are not good. Countries, regions, and income groups at 
low levels of liberal democracy have diverging trends in some instances. It is clear there is not 
convergence.  
 My empirical modeling of recent trends in liberal democracy since 1972 suggests that the 
best-fitting model is an autoregressive model that allows for different magnitudes of change over 
time. Thus, when it is all said and done, essentially the best predictor of liberal democracy today 
is the level of liberal democracy in the previous year. Thus, the prospects for the future appear to 
be similar to the recent past. It also suggests that deepening democratization is a process that 
happens slowly. Thus, it seems unlikely that what we are witnessing is the inevitable march of 
history to liberal democracy as the final form of government, at least not in any reasonable time 
frame. It appears to be more accurate that the world will long continue to have hybrid regimes, 
those regimes with a mix of democratic and authoritarian characteristics. This observation comes 
at a time when the will to push for future democratic growth around the world is waning, not just 
from paradigms of liberal democracy, but also in the current leaders and the general populace of 
some countries.  
 It is time that we begin to take the situation of stagnation seriously. Gone is the era where 
the world will witness independence movements and break-ups the like of the Soviet Union, 
although some countries may exit regional organizations (such as the recent “Brexit” or the vote 
by the British people to exit the European Union). Instead, while a few countries may still 
experience spectacular increases, many more countries will remain stuck at a middling level of 
liberal democracy, somewhere between authoritarianism and liberal democracy.  In this new era, 
we can expect these countries to continue to struggle.  
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Unanswered Questions 
There are several unanswered questions that this chapter will seek to answer. First, as 
stated previously, as the research agenda of the quality of democracy or levels of democracy 
subsumes the other research agendas, it is an open empirical question as to whether the factors 
that lead to regime transition and democratic stability are the same factors that impact levels of 
democracy. In essence, do the same theoretical perspectives used in other research paradigms of 
democracy, such as modernization, world systems theory/dependency theory, and world polity 
theory, have analytic utility in this new research agenda? My analysis will place these competing 
theories in conversation with each other by integrating predictors from several theoretical 
perspectives into a single model of liberal democracy. 
Beyond the theoretical questions, it is also appropriate to ask if specific predictors have 
the same effects on liberal democracy over time, or if these effects have changed. Most existing 
studies employing a panel design have assumed that the effects of predictors are equal over time. 
As this remains a key assumption of panel designs, their feasibility is an open empirical question. 
In the previous chapter, I found that the best fitting unconditional model of liberal democracy is 
one that allowed for piecewise equality constraints on the autoregressive coefficients. Thus, it 
seems reasonable to ask whether other predictors will have equal effects over time.  Thus, the 
second major unanswered question this chapter will address is whether the relevance of some 
predictors declined compared to others in the last 40 years. My analysis will utilize ax mix of 
time-varying covariates (TVCs) and time-invariant covariate (TICs) to predict liberal democracy. 
TVCs are those that can change as a function of time. Examples from the democratization 
literature are level of industrialization and gross enrollment in secondary education. TICs are 
those that do not vary with time. Examples of these types of variable for countries could be year 
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of independence, former British colony, and the number of years prior to 1960 that Protestant 
missions were active in a country. Building on an autoregressive model of liberal democracy and 
utilizing the strengths of a general SEM framework, I will determine if TVCs should have their 
effects constrained to be equal over time, or if they have effects that vary over time. In addition, 
with TICs it is necessary to determine if they affect the first endogenous repeated measure of 
liberal democracy, whether they have persistent effects over time, and whether these effects are 
equal over time.  
A third related yet unanswered question centers on identifying the factors that are driving 
recent trends of democratic stagnation around the world. This chapter will first seek to assess 
how much analytic utility our standard predictors of liberal democracy have at explaining these 
recent trends. While this will be a first attempt at addressing   this question, I hope and anticipate 
that future studies will continue to expand our understanding of the factors explaining these 
recent trends.  
Beyond these substantial unanswered questions, there are some additional questions that 
this chapter will address. While education has been shown to be a statistically significant 
predictor of liberal democracy in past research, it is unclear just what, if any, level of education 
matters most (primary, secondary, or tertiary). Using the general SEM framework, this study will 
marshal additional empirical tools, such as overall fit indices, to investigate this question. Two 
closely related questions are whether gender parity in education truly has an effect on liberal 
democracy, and, if so, what level of education is most important. Other unanswered questions 
considered below concern whether or not religious factors, such as those examined in Woodberry 
(2012), will be shown to be an important predictor of liberal democracy with this modeling 
design, and with a dynamic dependent variable. In addition, the orthodox world system position 
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indicator originally created by Snyder and Kick has been criticized as being static (Wejnert 
2014). Therefore, I also will investigate whether the choice of indicator matters.  
Data and Methods 
Operationalizing Liberal Democracy 
To review, this study conceptualizes liberal democracy following Bollen (1980, 1990, 
1993, and 2009). Bollen offers a straight-forward, yet sophisticated definition of liberal 
democracy as “the extent to which a political system allows political liberties and democratic 
rule” (Bollen 2009:369). Political liberties refer to concepts such as freedom of expression and 
the right for people to organize freely in either defense or opposition to the current government. 
Democratic governance refers to concepts such as free and fair elections and democratic 
participation in governmental affairs by either direct or indirect means (Bollen 2009:369).  Thus, 
this definition of liberal democracy is two-dimensional, consisting of democratic governance and 
political liberties. In the study of democracy (like many academic endeavors) there are debates 
over the meaning, conceptualization, and operationalization of key concepts. This need not 
present an insurmountable obstacle to the study of democratic trends over time. As such, my 
definition of liberal democracy is two-dimensional, clear, and easily measured, facilitating the 
investigation of trends in liberal democracy from the third wave of democratization to the 
present. Bollen states that conceptual dimensionality does not always have to match the 
empirical dimensionality (Bollen 1993). For liberal democracy, Bollen presents evidence that 
these two dimensions can be captured by a single empirical dimension, since they are practically 
correlated at one when error covariances are entered into the model. The difference in overall fit, 
and the difference between the model parameters, are so slight that empirically the one-
dimensional model is favored (Bollen and Grandjean 1981 Bollen 1993).  
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I will operationalize liberal democracy using Bollen’s Liberal Democracy Series I 
Indicator that has recently been updated to include the years 1972 to 2013. As stated above, 
Bollen characterizes liberal democracy as a two-dimensional concept (political liberties and 
democratic rule). The original measurement model on which the Series I Indicator is based 
consists of a latent variable for each of these two dimensions, yet can also be represented by a 
single factor solution. The eight observed variables that are part of this measurement model are 
derived from expert ratings of the political landscape within each country, and originate from 
three sources: Sussman at Freedom House, Gastil at Freedom House, and the Arthur Banks 
Cross-National Time Series (CNTS) databank. The political liberties latent variable is measured 
by four observed variables: freedom of broadcast media, freedom of print media, civil liberties, 
and freedom of group opposition. The democratic rule latent variable is also measured by four 
observed variables: political rights, competitiveness of the nominating process for chief 
executive, and a measure of the selection process for legislatures, and a measure of the 
effectiveness of legislatures. In addition, because these measures are expert ratings, Bollen made 
an assessment of the measurement errors incurred by the judges, and added three method factors 
to the model to correct for any inherent biases of the judges. The result is a measure of liberal 
democracy that is nearly free from the biases unique to each rater. In addition to the eight 
variables in the factor model described above, a ninth variable, suffrage score, is used in the 
creation of Bollen’s Liberal Democracy Series I Indicator. The suffrage score is a quantitative 
measure of the percent of people in a country that actually have the right to vote and are not 
excluded from voting (Paxton et al. 2003). It is not a measure of actual political participation. 
Bollen’s Series I Indicator of liberal democracy is a weighted combination of a subset of 
these eight observed measures from the measurement model and the suffrage score that 
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minimizes association with the method factors and maximizes association of the two underlying 
latent variables, political liberties and democratic rule. The index is created following a series of 
rules detailed in the second chapter of this dissertation.  
The clear conceptual definition and operationalization of this indicator along with the 
clear aggregation rules for the individual components is an important strength of this indicator.  
This indicator accounts for and minimizes measurement error— an aspect overlooked in most 
other measures that are comprised of subjective assessments. Furthermore, Bollen’s index of 
liberal democracy is the only cross-national, commonly-used index that incorporates suffrage 
(Paxton 2008), a significant aspect of liberal democracy that is ignored in most other indicators. 
Including suffrage is important, and in some cases, changes our assessment of a nation’s level of 
liberal democracy. For example, consider the case of Switzerland. Although it was said to have 
become democratic in 1848, Switzerland did not allow women the right to vote until 1971. It is 
hard to argue that a country is fully democratic if it systematically excludes   a segment of the 
population from exercising the right to vote. Thus, incorporating suffrage is a major strength of 
Bollen’s index.  
Operationalizing Modernization Theory 
To operationalize modernization theory, I will use logged GDP per capita, logged energy 
use per capita, and the logged net output for the non-agricultural sector of the economy. The first 
two variables are widely used in the literature. The logged net output for the non-agricultural 
sector of the economy has been used in prior literature as an indicator of industrialization (see 
Teorell 2010) and has a high degree of correlation between the other indicators. In addition to 
these three variables I will also include educational attainment which is also been shown to be 
145 
significant predictors of liberal democracy. All of the variables discussed above are available 
from the World Bank's World Development Indicators database. 
An often-examined determinant of liberal democracy is industrialization, and trying to 
better assess this relationship has occupied a central place in comparative politics and political 
sociology over the last 50 years.  Przeworksi and Limongi claim that this relationship has 
generated the most research in comparative politics within political science (1997). This analysis 
uses logged values of GDP per capita to operationalize industrialization.  
Compared to the other determinants of democracy, educational attainment has not 
garnered much attention, despite being central in the ideas of Lerner (1958) and Lipset (1959) 
that education was an important part of the modernization process. However, during the last 
fifteen to twenty years there has been an increase in the attempts to evaluate the impact of 
education on democracy (Benavot 1996).   
Operationalizing Globalization Theory 
In addition to the above modernization variables, this study also investigates the impact 
of other variables that are intimately tied to the modernization process. In an influential article in 
2012, Woodberry integrated often ignored religious factors into an analysis of the causes of 
liberal democracy. Specifically, four variables were found to be statistically significant and are 
included in this analysis. These variables include whether or not a country is a former Dutch 
colony, the number of years prior to 1960 that Protestant missions were active in a country, the 
number of Protestant missionaries per 10,000 population in 1923, and the percent of the 
population evangelized by 1900.8 The variables all were found to have a positive impact on a 
                                                     
8 I investigated whether or not multicollinearity was an issue here. First, I attempted to model a latent variable using the 
following three variables as causal indicators of the latent variable: Protestantism: the number of years prior to 1960 that 
Protestant missions were active in a country, the number of Protestant missionaries per 10,000 population in 1923, and 
the percent of the population evangelized by 1900. In addition to these three causal indicators, I added percent 
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country’s mean level of democracy from 1950 to 1994, with the exception of former Dutch 
colonies. In this analysis, I construct a latent variable of Protestantism that consists of three 
causal indicators (the number of years prior to 1960 that Protestant missions were active in a 
country, the number of Protestant missionaries per 10,000 population in 1923, and the percent of 
the population evangelized by 1900) and one effect indicator (the percent of the population that 
is Protestant in 2010).  
Operationalizing World Systems Theory/ Dependency Theory 
World system position has been seen as an important predictor of economic, social, and 
political outcomes, such as democracy, (e.g., Bollen 1983; Bollen and Jackman 1985; Clark 
2013; Snyder and Kick 1979). The orthodox way to view the world system is that countries are 
classified as core, semi-periphery, or periphery, based upon how much power they hold in the 
world system. Countries that are not classified as core countries typically experience negative 
effects from the world system towards the outcomes listed above. To operationalize world 
systems and dependency theory, this study investigates two key sets of predictors, variables 
capturing a country’s position within the world system and those capturing export concentration 
variables.  First, I investigate the orthodoxy measure originally designed by Snyder & Kick 
(1979), modified by Bollen (1983) and Bollen and Appold (1993) to correct for the 
misclassification of several countries, and further updated by Wejnert (2014). This is a 
categorical variable with core, semi-periphery, and periphery as its three categories. I further 
consider another trichotomous variable of world system position utilizing the international trade 
                                                     
Protestant as an effect indicator. Surprisingly, the variable years of Protestant missions prior to 1960 did not have a 
significant effect on the latent variable. I verified this finding by running a simple regression of percent Protestant on 
these three dependent variables with the same result.  
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network designed by Clark and Beckfield (2009) and updated by Clark (2012) that has one value 
of world system position for the 1980s and another for the 1990s.  
The second set of predictors considered herein are continuous measures of a country’s 
trade dependency. Although trade dependency is not the only type of dependency (others include 
military, agricultural, etc.), it is the common indicator of dependency and the structure of the 
world system that has been used to predict economic growth (Kentor and Boswell 2003), 
environmental health (Shandra 2007), and other social and political outcomes. I rely on a 
relatively new dataset of trade dependency developed by Babones and Farabee-Siers (2012). 
This dataset includes variables of import, export, and total trade partner concentration. However, 
I choose to focus on export dependency, as this is most commonly-used indicator in this 
literature (Babones and Farabee-Siers 2012:267). Specifically, I include in analyses a variable of 
export concentration with the top trading partner, meaning the percentage of overall exports that 
are sent to just one country9. This variable is not skewed in any significant manner so no 
transformation was conducted.  
Operationalizing World Polity Theory 
According to proponents of the world polity theory, the major carriers of world polity 
today are international non-governmental organizations (INGOS) and international governmental 
organizations (IGOs). Those countries that are more closely tied with the world polity should be 
more likely to pattern themselves in manners that are consistent with international norms. Since 
liberal democracy represents one of these accepted international norms, it follows that   those 
countries more closely aligned to the world polity will have higher levels of liberal democracy. 
                                                     
9 The data also includes additional variables for the percentage of overall exports that are sent to a country’s top two and 
top five receiving countries. Babones and Farabee-Siers (2012) describe a high degree of correlation amongst these 
variables, so it should not make much difference which one is used. 
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Thus, to capture the influence of the world polity, I utilize two variables, the INGO Network 
Country Score and a measure of ties to IGOs.  
The first variable is available from Paxton et al. (2015), and is an updated version of 
Hughes et al. (2009) INGO Network Country Score. In the literature, integration into the world 
polity is commonly operationalized by using the total number of INGO memberships that a 
country has in a given year. While there are a number of limitations to this variable, including 
equating all ties to INGOs as equal regardless of a INGOs size, operating budget, mission, age, 
area of interest, etc., this variable also does not consider the importance of power and structural 
location within the world polity. For instance, two countries could have the same number of ties 
to INGOs within a given year, but may fit into the hierarchy of the world system in two entirely 
different places in terms of being a central or tangential country. The Paxton et al. (2015) 
variable corrects for this by using social network analysis to determine a country’s position, and 
then correcting the typical count measure to account for the centrality of a country’s position 
within the world system. They compute several different measures in their analysis, and I utilized 
the INGO Network Country Score (imputed INCS scaled). This variable is available in 11 
repeated measures, and I utilize those which fall within the time period in my models, including 
those repeated measures for 1973, 1978, 1983, 1988, 1993, 1998, 2003, and 2008. This variable 
was approximately normally distributed and no transformation was necessary  
To capture the influence of IGOs, I follow Teorell (2010) and use Pevenhouse and 
Nordstrom data from the Correlates of War (COW) data project. I create from the original data a 
variable that is the number of IGOs the country is involved with divided by the total number of 
IGOs in existence in that year expressed as a percent. In coding this variable, I treated all ties as 
equal (a full or associate member, or an observer). The coding is generous, in that the same 
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weight is assigned to countries that are either full members, associate members or observers. 
This variable is a time-varying covariate and is available for the years 1967 to 2005. This study 
utilized those measures for that fell into the dates under analysis. I did not find any evidence that 
this variable was skewed. 
Other Predictors 
In addition to the predictors discussed from modernization theory, world 
systems/dependency theory, world polity theory, and globalization theory I also include in this 
analysis several other variables that have been thought to influence levels of liberal democracy. 
These variables help to round out my baseline model and include: whether or not a country was 
Communist, whether a country is a former British colony, the percent of a country’s population 
that is Muslim, and the percent of a country’s population that is protestant. To measure the 
potential influence of communism I included a dummy variable if a country was Communist. 
This variable has been utilized in previous research (e.g., Mulligan et al. 2004).10 Whether or not 
a country was a former British colony has also been shown in previous research to be a 
significant predictor of liberal democracy. The variable the percent of a country’s population that 
is Muslim is thought to have a negative effect on a country’s level of democracy. Barro (1999) is 
just one of numerous studies to come to this conclusion. The source of this variable is La Porta et 
al. (1999) and the data are for 1980 and this variable was not found to be skewed. It is also 
hypothesized that Great Britain due to way that it managed its colonial dependencies via indirect 
rule that it laid the foundation for these countries to become democratic (Bollen and Jackman 
1985). This source for this variable is the appendix of Bollen and Jackman (1985). The percent 
of a country’s population that is Protestant has also been shown in previous research to be an 
                                                     
10 Initially I examined this variable as a TVC but had problems in estimation when included in the model as there was 
not change in the composition of countries that were Communist across multiple waves of data. 
150 
important predictor of liberal democracy (Bollen and Jackman 1985). As in their study I too 
found that the percent of the population that is Protestant is a highly skewed variable. Thus, I 
utilize a natural log transformation for the variable.11 The source of this variable is La Porta et al. 
(1999) and the data are for 1980. 
Autoregressive Model in the General SEM Framework 
This section discusses the autoregressive model in the general SEM framework. The 
previous chapter demonstrated that the best-fitting model of the repeated measures of liberal 
democracy was the autoregressive or simplex model. The technique will be introduced, the logic 
behind it will be explained, and the formal equation and assumptions will be reviewed below.  
Autoregressive models were first introduced by Guttman in 1954 and have been 
employed to model longitudinal data in macroeconomics (Gujarati 2004), sociology (Werts, Linn 
and Jöreskog 1977, 1978), and psychology. In sociology, these models have been used to analyze 
data ranging from an individual’s academic growth to a country’s level of democratization 
(Bollen and Curran 2004). Autoregressive models were quite popular for analyzing longitudinal 
data through the mid-1980s, but have recently seen their popularity decrease with the 
advancement of other modeling techniques, including latent growth curve models (LGCMs) 
(Geiser 2013). Despite this loss in popularity, they are still quite useful when examining certain 
types of questions concerning longitudinal growth. Hertzog and Nesselroade (1987) argue that 
the autoregressive model is not ideal for all types of psychological research questions. “The 
uncritical application of an autoregressive specification to repeated measures does not take into 
account subtleties of conceptions of stability and change (e.g., the trait-state distinction)” 
(Hertzog and Nesselroade 1987:93).  
                                                     
11 In this and all other natural log transformations in this analysis I first added a small constant to all of the values to  
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To better understand when these models may be appropriate, it is important to consider 
the differences between traits and states. In psychology, states are those individual attributes that 
are relatively variable over time, such as hormonal levels, daily fatigue, and situational anxiety. 
They are capable of exhibiting substantial change over time, even daily. Traits, on the other 
hand, can be defined as those attributes or characteristics of an individual that are relatively 
stable over time. Examples extend to behavioral dispositions, such as cigarette smoking or one’s 
reaction to chronic stress. Although these traits are not seen to change much over time, it does 
not preclude them from changing. "One of the defining characteristic of a trait is inertia. That is, 
a trait will remain the same unless and until organismic or environmental influences act to 
change it. Stable unchanging environments promote stable behavioral dispositions even if those 
dispositions are potentially modifiable by environmental intervention” (Hertzog and Nesselroade 
1987:95). According the Hertzon and Nesselroade (1987) it would be incorrect to see traits as 
immutable or solely determined by genetics. Although a distinction can be drawn between traits 
and states, it is important to realize that these are abstract concepts representing ideal types, and 
in practice it is likely that an individual attribute can be some mix of the two. Therefore, we 
should be cautious about seeing these two categories as mutually exclusive.  
The ideal application of an autoregressive model would be to explain stable 
characteristics such as traits. I would argue that viewing a country's level of liberal democracy 
could be considered a trait of a country. The experience of almost all countries with democracy 
over the last forty years is one where countries remain relatively stable in their levels and, 
typically, some sort of precipitous event is required to move them from their path dependent 
trajectory. While these events have occurred in recent history (such as the fall of the Berlin Wall 
and the subsequent breakup of the Soviet Union), these types of events remain relatively rare. As 
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such, I see a real advantage to the use of autoregressive models to explain liberal democracy that 
is rooted in theory and is perfectly in line with the spirit of their proper use in the psychological 
literature.  
The underlying logic of autoregressive models is that one of the predictors of the current 
value of the dependent variable is the previous value of the dependent variable. Thus, values of 
the dependent variable are regressed on the previous value of the dependent variable and an 
autoregressive parameter, ρ, describes the effect. One main purpose of this model is to predict 
the amount of variance explained by the previous measure as well as use other covariates to 
explain the amount of variance in the dependent variable not explained by the previous measure 
(Geiser 2013). 
There are two main classes of autoregressive models, manifest and latent, based on 
whether latent variables are included in the model for repeated measures. The latent 
autoregressive models (LAMs) account for measurement error, as other structural equation 
models do with latent variables, by including multiple indicators for each time point.  
This study utilizes the first-order manifest autoregressive model developed in the 
previous chapter as the best-fitting model, as depicted in the path diagram below (Figure 18). 
The square boxes depict the repeated measures of liberal democracy from 1972 to 2012. The 
arrows from one measure of liberal democracy to the next represent the autoregressive effect, 
and is symbolized by the ρj.  The three different subscripts on the ρ represent the piecewise 
nature of the autoregressive effects developed in chapter two. The ovals are unobserved errors 
which explain the remaining unexplained variance not explained by the prior value of liberal 
democracy. These latent errors all have a coefficient of one. The formal equation of the 
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autoregressive model can be found below in Equation 1, and the assumptions of the 
autoregressive model can be seen below in Table 6. 
 
Figure 18. The Autoregressive Model  
 
 
 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼𝑦𝑡 + 𝜌𝑦𝑡,𝑦𝑡−1 𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜖𝑦𝑖𝑡   (1) 
 
 
Table 6: Assumptions of the AR Model 
𝐸(𝜖𝑖𝑡) = 0 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑖 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑡 
𝐶𝑂𝑉(𝜖𝑖𝑡,𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1) = 0 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑖 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑡 = 2, 3, … , 𝑇 
𝐸(𝜖𝑖𝑡, 𝜖𝑗𝑡) = 0 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑡 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗  
𝐸(𝜖𝑖𝑡, 𝜖𝑗𝑡) = 𝑉𝐴𝑅(𝜖𝑦𝑡)𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑡 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑖 = 𝑗 
𝐸(𝜖𝑖𝑡, 𝜖𝑗𝑡+𝑠) = 0 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑠 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗 
𝐸(𝜖𝑖𝑡, 𝜖𝑗𝑡+𝑠) = 0 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑠 ≠ 0 
𝛼𝑦𝑡 𝑖𝑠 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑡 
𝜌𝑦𝑡,𝑦𝑡−1 𝑖𝑠 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑎𝑢𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑟 
𝑦𝑖1 𝑐𝑎𝑛 𝑏𝑒 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑑 𝑎𝑠: 𝑦𝑖1 =  𝛼𝑦1 + 𝜖𝑦𝑖1 
 
Autoregressive models can be extended by incorporating covariates into the model to 
help explain the amount of variance not explained by the previous value of the dependent 
variable. One such example is illustrated in Figure 19. Notice the addition of the variable GDP 
per capita, measured from 1972 to 2007. Notice that the value of GDP per capita in 1972 is 
influencing the value of liberal democracy in 1977, as indicated by the single-headed arrow 
terminating at the dependent variable. All of the β coefficients are assigned a one, symbolizing 
that the effect is equal across waves of data. This is a testable assumption. All exogenous 
variables in this model are allowed to correlate, as indicated by the double-headed arrows 
connecting liberal democracy in 1972 with all of the repeated measures of GDP per capita.  
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Figure 19: The Autoregressive Model with One Predictor 
 
 
Sample of Countries 
Due to the method of analysis used to estimate my models - the general structural 
equation model framework, in the Mplus version 6.12 and in the IBM SPSS Amos, version 21, 
software packages - I am able to take advantage of the direct (full) maximum likelihood 
estimator during estimation. Thus, my samples are not limited to list-wise deletion or even an 
imputation procedure. The direct (full) maximum likelihood procedure estimates the likelihood 
for the entire sample by summing the likelihoods for each case, using whatever information each 
case has available. This means that each country contributes the maximum amount of 
information as possible to the estimation (Arbuckle 1996; Enders and Bandalos 2001), no data is 
lost as in list-wise deletion and no data is “filled-in” by imputation procedures. In practice, this 
allows the sample to include a large number of countries in this analysis (187 in total), instead of 
a smaller number of countries as found in most empirical work on democratization. Another 
benefit of the use of the direct ML estimation procedure is that the sample sizes are consistent at 
187 throughout the numerous models in this analysis. This problem plagues other empirical 
research into democratization, as sample sizes are not uniform across all the models in analysis 
and also are not comparable from study to study. If this estimation method were to be used on a 
regular basis, then it would aid in one of the major criticisms of this field of study more 
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generally.  In addition, examining only recent trends in liberal democracy facilitates the ability to 
include a large number of countries in this analysis, as data collection is more complete and 
accurate in recent years, especially compared to the decades prior to the 1970s. In the end, this 
study investigates the predictors of liberal democracy for 187 countries from 1973 to 2013.  
Results 
Autoregressive Model of Liberal Democracy 
The first model that I evaluated is herein identified as the autoregressive model. First, and 
foremost, it includes the autoregressive relationship of liberal democracy, derived in chapter two 
of this dissertation, and proven as the best-fitting model to describe the rise in liberal democracy 
from 1972 to 2013. This model was found to be superior to traditional growth curve models and 
hybrid growth curve and autoregressive models (ALT models) (Bollen and Curran, 2004).  
The autoregressive model that I estimated in the chapter two has an additional important 
feature beyond the fact that the standard autoregressive relationship found in these models. 
Remember that it had piecewise pattern to the autoregressive effects. This interesting part of the 
model was initially identified by examining a simple descriptive graph of the world-wide level of 
liberal democracy over time from 1972 to 2013. This examination revealed that the rate of 
change was different in the approximate periods from 1972 to the mid-1980s, from the mid-
1980s to the late 1990s, and from the 1990s until the mid-2000s. This differential rate of change 
was incorporated into the model by placing equality constraints on the autoregressive parameters 
that correspond to this observation. Specifically, the autoregressive parameters are constrained to 
be equal for the effects of liberal democracy in three sets or pieces. Piece one includes the effects 
of liberal democracy in 1972 to 1977, 1977 to 1982, and 1982 to 1987. Piece two includes the 
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effects of liberal democracy from 1987 to 1992 and 1992 to 1997. Finally, the third piece 
includes the effects of liberal democracy in 1997 to 2002, 2002 to 2007, and 2007 to 2012.  
As discussed in chapter two, the overall model fit and an evaluation of the model fit at the 
parameter level indicates that this model fits the data quite well. The overall fit statistics were 
0.984 for the CFI, 0.982 for the TLI, and 0.984 for the IFI. The 1-RMSEA was 0.926 and the 
BIC was -105.7. This was by far the best BIC of any of the models and, according to Raftery’s 
(1995) guidelines, produces strong evidence in favor of this model compared to any other that 
had been tested. When evaluating the parameter level model fit, two important aspects of the 
model were revealed. The autoregressive coefficients are positive and statistically significant. 
For the first piecewise component, these coefficients are 0.837. The second piecewise 
component has a slightly smaller coefficient at 0.804, while the last piecewise rhos are 0.944. 
Investigating the amount of variance explained by the model unearths a couple of interesting 
findings. Second, it appears as if the previous value of liberal democracy does a nice job of 
explaining the variance in liberal democracy from 1977 to 1987. The R2 values for these years 
are 0.70, 0.72, and 0.75 respectively. This means that, during this first period of democratization, 
the AR model explains between 70 and 75 percent of the variance of liberal democracy in the 
subsequent wave. Interestingly, for 1992 and 1997, the model does a substantially poorer job 
predicting liberal democracy with R2 values at 0.58 and 0.69 respectively. This may indicate that 
outside forces hampered liberal democracy in this era. The fall of the Berlin Wall and the 
breakup of the Soviet Union occurred in this time frame, and had a momentous effect on the 
political landscape of the world. Surprisingly, it seems that for 2002, 2007, and 2012, prior 
values of liberal democracy do an excellent job in themselves at predicting subsequent values of 
liberal democracy. The R2 value for 2002 is 0.87, in 2007, 0.84, and in 2012 the value is 0.93. 
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This could be interpreted as at least for the last decade liberal democracy seems quite path 
dependent. I hypothesize that, especially in later years, liberal democracy is highly path 
dependent and that external factors have decreased in importance.  
Baseline Model (Including Modernization) 
Upon the autoregressive model developed above a baseline model was built which 
included predictors that have been shown in many previous studies to be important for liberal 
democracy. The model will contain a mix of time-varying covariates and time-invariant 
covariates. As one of the most prominent findings in the literature is that industrialization and 
liberal democracy are associated I include industrialization in the baseline model. Initially I 
attempted to construct a latent variable of industrialization measured with four effect indicators: 
logged GDP per capita, logged energy consumption per capita, logged net output for the non-
agricultural sector of the economy, and gross enrollment in secondary education. This 
confirmatory factor analysis was found to have excellent model fit.12 In this model, the variable 
logged GDP per capita has a very high R2 value with the latent variable industrialization. To 
avoid adding excessive complexity and additional variables in the analysis I will only use the 
logged GDP per capita variable in all analyses and justify this as it is a highly reliable measure of 
industrialization with it having a R2 value that is close to one.  
Beyond industrialization, other variables have been shown to be significant predictors of 
liberal democracy. These include whether or not a country was Communist at any time during 
the period, whether a country was a former British colony, and the percent of the population that 
is Protestant. Each of these additional three variables was entered into the model as TICs. All 
variables in the model had their coefficients constrained to be equal across all waves of data.  
                                                     
12 The chi-square is .355(1) with a p-value of 0.563. The CFI is 1.0 the TLI is 1.014, the IFI is 1.001, and the 1-RMSEA 
is 1.0. 
158 
In addition, for these TICs it was also tested in prior modeling steps whether or not there 
was an effect on only the first wave of liberal democracy (1977) or if there was an effect that was 
persistent over time. All indications of model fit identify that the effects persistent effects over 
time. For all of the TVCs in this model and in all models, I use a five-year lag which is the same 
that I use for liberal democracy’s autoregressive relationship. Thus, variables measured in 1972 
are used to predict liberal democracy in 1977, and variables measured in 1977 are used to predict 
liberal democracy in 1982 and so on. My baseline model then consists of two TVCs: a five-year 
lagged value of liberal democracy and industrialization lagged by five years (represented by 
logged GDP per capita) and three TICs: whether or not a country was Communist, the percent of 
the population that is Protestant, whether or not a country is a former British colony, and the 
percent of the population that is Muslim in 1980.  
Before discussing the specific effects of the predictors included in the model it is 
important to remember that the centerpiece of this model is the explicit modeling of the 
autoregressive relationship between measurements of liberal democracy. Thus, all of the effects 
of the other predictors in the model can be interpreted as explaining what is left unexplained by 
the modeling of liberal democracy on itself from a prior time point. It is possible that variables 
that have been found previously to be predictors of liberal democracy in models that do not 
explicitly control for prior effects of liberal democracy may not be found to be important once 
the prior wave’s value of liberal democracy is considered. Thus, some variables may indeed be 
correlated with liberal democracy at a particular wave but may not be important predictors over 
time when taking into account prior values of liberal democracy. 
Interpreting these effects, I find that several of these variables exhibit statistically 
significant effects in predicting liberal democracy including lagged liberal democracy, 
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industrialization, whether or not a country was Communist, and the percent of the population that 
is Muslim. The remaining variables the percent of Protestants in the country and whether or not a 
country is a former British colony were not significant predictors of liberal democracy in the 
baseline model.  
All of these predictors are statistically significant at the 0.05 level of lower. All of the 
effects are in the hypothesized direction (a positive effect for the lagged value of liberal 
democracy, a positive effect of logged GDP, a negative effect of being a former Communist 
country, a negative effect of Muslim). The overall fit statistics indicate that the model fit the data 
well and can be seen in Table 8.13  
In examining the R2 values associated with each of the repeated measures of liberal 
democracy there are some interesting findings displayed in Table 7. First, notice that the amount 
of variance explained by the model now as compared to the unconditional AR model solely with 
prior values of liberal democracy. The amount of variance explained increases only modestly for 
many of the early time points included in the model. For instance, the 1977 value of liberal 
democracy the amount of variance explained increases from 70 to 73 percent, increases from 71 
to 73 percent in 1982, increases 74 to 75 percent in 1987, increase from 58 to 59 percent in 1992 
and essentially stays the same in 1997. From 2002 to 2012 there is an actual decline in R2 values. 
Thus, while explaining more of the variance in liberal democracy in early time points the 
additional benefit of the explanatory variables in the baseline model diminishes over time and do 
not help us understand the trend in liberal democracy since 2002. In keeping with theme of this 
dissertation, this may be evidence of the declining value of some of the most important 
predictors of liberal democracy from past research to explain recent trends in democratization. 
13 244.512(124) for the chi-square and degrees of freedom, .948 for the CFI, .944 for the TLI, and .948 for the IFI and 
the 1-RMSEA was 0.928 and BIC’ of -401.5. 
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Baseline & World Systems Theory 
Two indicators for world system theory are tested with the other predictors from the 
baseline model, an indicator of world system position from Clark and Beckfield and a measure of 
export concentration from Babones and Farabee-Siers (2012). The Clark and Beckfield world 
system position indicator has been shown to be superior to the original measure by Snyder and 
Kick because it is dynamic. Thus, there are actually two TICs that stand for world system 
position. The first is an extension of the original Snyder and Kick measure and this indicator is 
used to predict liberal democracy from 1977 to 1987. The second takes stock in the world for the 
1990s and thus represents an improvement over the orthodox indicator that does not allow for 
changes in the composition of categories in the world system. In preliminary analysis, I first 
tested the original or orthodox indictor of WSP (world system position) and found it was not 
statistically significant. Then I re-estimated the model only making substitution of the Clark and 
Beckfield indicator and found the effect of WSP was statistically significant and negative as 
theory would indicate. Thus, for this model as well as all subsequent models containing WSP the 
Clark and Beckfield indicator is utilized.14 
The effects of world system position are found to be negative and statistically significant 
for all repeated measures of liberal democracy when controlling for a country’s liberal 
democracy score in previous waves. Although these effects are small they do indicate that a 
country’s location in the semi-periphery and the periphery does have a deleterious effect on the 
country’s liberal democracy score.  
14 The Clark and Beckfield indicator was preferred for three reasons. First, the effect of WSP was not significant when 
the orthodox WSP indicator is used. Second, there is a larger sample size with the more recent indicator. While this is 
not an issue per se due to the direct maximum likelihood estimator being used in estimation I prefer to use a more 
complete variable when the data exists. Second, previous studies (Wejnert 2015) have indicated that a critique/weakness 
of their study is the use of a non-dynamic indicator of world system position as the world system has undergone change 
since the original indicator by Snyder and Kick was first constructed.  
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The export concentration indicator is a TVC of the percent of exports that flow to the 
largest trading partner and although found in preliminary analysis to be a significant negative 
predictor of liberal democracy this effect does not come through when entered in the model with 
world system position. Thus, I conclude that export concentration is not a statistically significant 
predictor of liberal democracy in the autoregressive model.  
When examining other indicators of model fit I found the R2 values to follow the familiar 
pattern found above in previous models. The overall model fit statistics also indicate that this 
model does a fairly good job at reproducing the variances and covariances in the data and can be 
seen in Table 8. 
Baseline & World Polity Theory 
In evaluating the effect of world polity theory on liberal democracy controlling for prior 
levels of liberal democracy I decide only to include the variable the percent of IGOs in which a 
country is a member. Initial descriptive analyses indicated a strong, positive correlation between 
the INGO network score with Clark and Beckfield’s WSP. This correlation ranged between .78 
and .88 for the repeated measures of the INGO network score and WSP and was also 
monotonically increasing from 1972 to 2007. Preliminary statistical analyses confirmed the 
presence of this multicollinearity between INGO and WSP. Thus, this variable is dropped from 
all subsequent analyses.  
The results of this model suggest that IGOs do help to spread liberal democracy due to its 
positive and significant effect at the 0.05 level. The other predictors that were significant in the 
baseline model (lagged liberal democracy, logged GDP, Communist, and the percent Muslim in 
the population) also retain their statistical significance here with effects fairly consistent and all 
in the same direction. In this model as in the baseline model the percent of the population which 
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is Protestant, whether or not a country was a former British colony are not statistically 
significant.  
The overall fit statistics do not really fit the data well. This is the first model where the fit 
is below the suggested criteria for many of the overall indicators of model fit. The model’s CFI, 
TLI, IFI, 1-RMSEA are all below the .9 suggested value despite having a large and negative 
BIC’ indicating that the model fits better than a null model with no independent variables 
(Raftery 1995:133). 
Baseline & Globalization Model 
 In this model, I incorporate the baseline model along with global factors. One such global 
factor discussed by Woodberry was the role that conversionary Protestant missionaries played to 
help spur on the industrialization process and facilitate the spread of liberal democracy. In 
preliminary models, I examine three of the variables from Woodberry’s analysis. As with all 
TICs that enter this model, I first had to determine if the effect of the TIC is a one-time effect 
exhibiting influence only on liberal democracy in 1977 or whether or not there were persistent 
effects that last beyond liberal democracy in 1977. I found it appropriate to enter these TICs as 
persistent over time. However, I was concerned about the potential for multicollinearity and 
decided to only include one of these variables which was shown to be the strongest and most 
robust predictor, the percent of the population that had been evangelized by 1900. I addition, also 
to avoid any potential problems with multicollinearity I also dropped the percent Protestant 
variable from the baseline model when examining the effects of global factors.  
 The model fit the data well at the overall and parameter level. The overall fit statistics 
were 237.1 (124) for the chi-square and degrees of freedom, .949 for the CFI, .946 for the TLI, 
and .95 for the IFI, the 1-RMSEA was 0.929 and the BIC was -408.8. The effects from the 
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lagged value of liberal democracy, whether or not a country was Communist, and the percent of 
the population Muslim continue to be statistically significant in this model as they were in the 
baseline model. One change is with the industrialization variable. It is no longer statistically 
significant at the 0.05 level and is only significant at the 0.1 level. In addition, its effect size is 
attenuated from 0.5 to 0.026 with the inclusion of the percent of the population evangelized by 
1900. This is a similar finding to that by Woodberry (2012) in that he found that indicators of 
industrialization lost explanatory power when his indicators of conversional Protestants were 
included in the model. This also is consistent with findings by Wejnert (2005) as well as that 
once international factors are explicitly modeled it left industrialization as being a non-
significant predictor of growth curves of liberal democracy.   
The R2 values for liberal democracy from 1977 to 2012 also have a consistent pattern to 
those with the baseline model in that the values are higher for the repeated measures of liberal 
democracy from 1977 to 1997 but from 2002 and beyond this model does not explain as much of 
the variance in liberal democracy as in the AR model. These values are compared in Table 7.   
Combined Model with All Predictors (Equal Effects Model) 
 I now present the results for a model with all the previously identified predictors are 
simultaneously entered into the model. This model is an amalgamation of the previous models 
and includes the following: lagged liberal democracy, logged GDP, dummy variable for a former 
Communist country, dummy variable for former British colony, percent of the country’s 
population that is Muslim, the percent of the population evangelized by 1900, world system 
position, an indicator of export concentration, and the percent of all IGOs in a given year for 
which it was a member. The results are displayed in Table 7 in the Equal Effects column.  
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Table 9: Results of Final Models - Equal Effects and Piecewise Equality Constraints 
Variables 
Equal 
Effects 
Piecewise Equality Constraints 
 
1977-1987           1992-1997             2002-2012 
 
 
Lagged 
Liberal Democracy 
0.790*** 0.66*** 0.619*** 0.9*** 
(0.03) (0.052) (0.052) (0.031) 
[0.768] [0.676] [0.587] [0.877] 
Logged GDP pc -0.002 0.047 -0.043 0.009 
(0.022) (0.033) (0.044) (0.022) 
[-0.002] [0.046] [-0.041] [0.009] 
Communist Country -0.137* -0.302*** -0.166 -0.061 
(0.06) (0.085) (0.153) (0.059) 
[-0.041] [-0.094] [-0.05] [-0.019] 
Former British Colony 0.002 0.022 -0.056+ 0.02 
(0.013) (0.026) (0.030) (0.014) 
[.002] [0.021] [-0.051] [0.018] 
Muslim % of 
Population 
-0.018*** -0.024** -0.051*** -0.004 
(0.005) (0.008) (0.012) (0.006) 
[-0.063] [-0.086] [-0.181] [-0.016] 
World System 
Position  
-0.042+ -0.106* -0.092 -0.01 
(0.024) (0.041) (0.06) (0.026) 
[-0.038] [-0.099] [-0.081] [-0.009] 
Export Concentration 
 
0.088 -0.082 0.053 0.091 
(0.074) (0.147) (0.216) (0.083) 
[0.015] [-0.015] [0.009] [0.015] 
IGO Percent 
 
0.017 -0.006 -0.033 0.023 
(0.025) (0.043) (0.052) (0.031) 
[0.016] [-0.005] [-0.025] [0.014] 
% Evangelized by 
1900 
0.189** 0.263* 0.322** 0.073 
(0.059) (0.107) (0.121) (0.055) 
[0.078] [0.113] [0.135] [0.031] 
Note: Standardized regression coefficients vary slightly by year. Value give for first year in wave. 
 The goal of this analysis is to explain the effects of predictors on liberal democracy in 
models where there is a lagged effect of liberal democracy. As can be seen in Table 9 there are 
four variables in this equal effects model that have a statistically significant effect on liberal 
democracy: whether or not a country was Communist, the percent of Muslims in a country, the 
percent of the population evangelized by 1900, and a country’s WSP. Variables that did not turn 
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out to be significant in the model were logged GDP pc, whether or not a country is a former 
British colony, a country’s export concentration with its largest trading partner, and the percent 
of all IGOs that a country was a member of in a given year.  
 First, and perhaps surprisingly, industrialization, as measured by a country’s logged GDP 
is not a statistically significant predictor of liberal democracy during this period. This may be 
surprising at first but it is important to reiterate that this model is only seeking to explain 
differences in liberal democracy from a lagged prior value five years earlier. Thus, this finding of 
a non-significant effect of GDP does not mean that liberal democracy is not associated with 
industrialization. It is merely interpreted as knowing a country’s value of logged GDP does not 
help us predict a country’s liberal democracy five years later when we hold constant a country’s 
value of liberal democracy. To help solidify this point, I examine the correlations between liberal 
democracy and logged GDP in my model. As liberal democracy measured in 1972 is an 
exogenous variable (i.e., it does not have any predictors in the model) it is correlated with all 
other exogenous variables in the model, including logged GDP. Thus, these correlations are also 
helpful in identifying that there is an association with liberal democracy and industrialization at 
all waves of data. These correlations range from .44 to .51 and demonstrate a positive and fairly 
moderate association. Thus, these findings do not contradict the voluminous literature on this 
association. A more appropriate interpretation may be closer to that of Przeworksi and colleagues 
in finding that industrialization does not bring about democratic transitions but in highly 
industrialized countries they are unlikely to transition to an authoritarian regime. This finding 
may also be partially supportive of the findings from Wejnert (2014) in that once international 
factors were entered into her growth curve analysis the effects of industrialization was not a 
significant predictor of liberal democracy. 
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 It is really not surprising that the dummy variable for a Communist country is statistically 
significant. Countries that were Communist at any time during this period were found to have 
lower levels of liberal democracy. Given that for the sake of estimation I standardized many of 
the variables in my analysis including liberal democracy I will give a substantive interpretation. 
On average, the difference between a country’s score on liberal democracy in a given year given 
that it was a former Communist country compared to a never former Communist country is 
approximately four points lower.15 
 The percent Muslim variable was also found to have a statistically significant and 
negative effect on a country’s liberal democracy. Thus, for each 1 percent of population that is 
Muslim there is a corresponding lower mean level of liberal democracy of approximately .5. 
Thus, a country with 90 percent of its population as Muslim could expect on average to have a 
level of liberal democracy 20 points lower than a country with a 50 percent Muslim population.16  
 My indicator of global factors, Woodberry’s variable for the percent of the population 
that was evangelized by 1900 also has a statistically significant and positive effect. This variable 
has an effect of .189 and thus a country with 1 percent more of the population evangelized by 
1900 than another country would have on average a higher score of liberal democracy of about 5. 
This is a pretty sizeable effect. 
 The final variable that is found to be significant in this analysis is that of WSP. 
Remember that this is the dynamic indicator of WSP designed by Clark and Beckfield (2009) 
and updated by Clark (2012) and thus one indicator for the 1980s was used to predict liberal 
democracy until 1990 and the other indictor for the 1990s was used to predict liberal democracy 
                                                     
15 The Communist dummy variable is not standardized and the coefficient is -.137. Thus, former Communist countries 
have lower levels of liberal democracy in any year by an average of about -.137 x 28.3 (Liberal Democracy’s standard 
deviation in 2012). In earlier years, the standard deviation of liberal democracy is approximately 38.  
16 The effect of percent Muslim is -0.018 x 28 x (90-50=40) = -20.16 
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to 2012. On average, countries in the semi-periphery are about 1.2 points lower in liberal 
democracy than core countries and those in the periphery are about 2.4 points lower in liberal 
democracy than core countries.  
The overall fit of the saturated model is below what is normally considered a good fitting 
model and these indicators of model fit are displayed in Table 8. The chi-square is 513(259) with 
a p-value of 0.0000. The CFI is 0.886 the TLI is 0.882, the IFI is 0.887, and the 1-RMSEA is 
0.94. However, the BIC’ is still large in magnitude and negative (-836.3) indicating that this 
model is far superior to a model without any predictors. The R2 values associated with the 
combined model (Table 7) are larger than those of the AR (unconditional model) although rather 
modestly until 2002. Beyond 2002 the difference in the amount of variance of liberal democracy 
explained by this model and the AR model is negligible.  
There is little doubt that the model fit is a bit lacking in this model. This beckons that 
perhaps there is a bit more to the story. Below I will run one additional model, this one 
containing piecewise equality constraints across all time periods for all predictors in the model. 
As was demonstrated chapter two of this dissertation, a casual look at the time series graph of 
liberal democracy from 1972 to 2013 revealed that growth has not been experienced linearly 
throughout this period. I argued that growth in this period could be into three distinct sub-
periods: 1972-1989, 1989-1995, and 1995-2013. For the 17 years in the first sub-period there 
was moderate growth in liberal democracy. The world-wide average was about 36 in 1972 and 
46 in 1989 growing about 10 points. During the second period, 1989-1995, there was steep 
increases in liberal democracy world-wide increasing from 46 to 64, an approximate 18-point 
increase in just six years. This indicates growth several times faster than in the first moderate 
growth period. In the final period, 1995 to 2013 it appears as if the growth rate has been very 
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slow, even less than in the early period. Overall the trend of liberal democracy exhibits a non-
linear growth structure. I surmised that there are three distinct sub-periods of growth in liberal 
democracy from 1972 to 2013. However, as of yet, this is only reflected in my empirical model 
via my lagged liberal democracy predictors. This insight has yet to be integrated with the other 
predictors of liberal democracy. Therefore, the next model will include piecewise constraints on 
the effects for all predictors in the model.  
Piecewise Equality Constraint Model 
Constraining the effects of the covariates to be equal across waves, as is done in the 
previous model, is useful at giving a broad picture of liberal democracy between 1972 and 2013. 
This is precisely what has been done in previous studies that have employed panel models. A key 
assumption in panel models is that the effects of a predictor are equal over time. However, this 
assumption seems untenable when it is clear that growth has been nonlinear. Thus, a panel 
design does not allow us to judge whether or not these predictors are more or less important at 
any particular time during this period. Therefore, I also estimated the combined model with the 
same predictors but I allowed their effects to be constrained in a piecewise manner analogous to 
the piecewise equality constraints on the autoregressive parameters of liberal democracy. This 
should give a more detailed examination into the predictors of liberal democracy and how well 
they do over time at predicting liberal democracy. The results are displayed in the three right 
columns in Table 7.  
This change in model specification leads to several interesting developments in this 
model. By in large, the effects are consistent with those in the previous model. Table 7 indicates 
that the same variables which have been statistically significant in the equal effects model are 
also significant in this model as well. This also holds for variables that were not significant as 
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well. The major difference is that not all of the predictors are statistically significant at all time 
points. As the equal effects model made the assumption that the effects were equal, the 
coefficients listed for the prior model were the same for all years of the dependent variable in the 
model (1972 to 2012). Now I allow the effects to differ in each of the three periods as follows: 
1977-1987, 1992-1997, and 2002-2012. This modification allows for a more nuanced 
explanation to be offered at how well our existing explanations of change in liberal democracy 
fare throughout this period when the effects do not have to be equal for all years. 
The lagged values of liberal democracy are statistically significant at all three time 
periods. However, this is not the case for any other statistically significant variable in the model. 
Notice that whether or not a country was Communist was seen to be a significant predictor of 
liberal democracy in 1977 to 1987 but not afterwards. This makes sense in that this is 
approximately the same time when East and West Berlin were united and when former Soviet 
Union broke up into fifteen independent states. By the end of the next time period in the data 
(1992) these events had occurred. After this period this variable no longer is a significant 
predictor of liberal democracy. An interpretation of this finding may be that when holding all 
other variables constant whether or not a country was ever Communist, does not have any 
bearing on its current level of liberal democracy.  
The percent of the population that is Muslim in a country also predicts liberal democracy 
in the two early periods but not the latest. The effect of Muslim is -0.024 in 1977, 1982, and 
1987 and is more negative (-0.051) in 1992 and 1997. For years beyond that period the percent 
Muslim in a country does not have any effect on a country’s level of liberal democracy. 
Described in chapter one may be a partial explanation for this finding. Since 2002 the region of 
the Middle East and North Africa, where many of the countries with higher percent Muslim 
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populations are located, has seen a clear upward trajectory in liberal democracy since 2012. This 
is despite the low average value of liberal democracy in 1972 and comparatively low ending 
value in 2012.   
The percent of the population that had been evangelized by 1900 also displays uneven 
effects throughout this period. Its effect is significant from 1977 to 1987 but then increases in 
1992 to 1997 and becomes insignificant in recent years. No explanation of why this may have 
happened in apparent by Woodberry as this indicator is hypothesized to be a major impetus for 
future democratization. An explanation for why it would become non-significant in these later 
time periods is an avenue for future research. 
The final significant variable in this analysis is world system position. WSP has a 
negative and significant effect when the effects are constrained to be equal, however, when the 
piecewise equality constraints are introduced it is only significant for liberal democracy in 1977, 
1982, and 1987. Thus, it would appear as if the effect of world system position had a pretty 
significant impact on levels of liberal democracy in the years in this analysis before 1992. This 
makes sense when liberal democracy is examined by position within the world system. In 
additional analyses not presenting in chapter two, the countries in the core saw levels of liberal 
democracy increase greatly between 1972 and 1991. This group hand an average increase of 
about 25 points from 52 to 78. The semi-periphery only had increases of 9 points from 36 to 45. 
Approximately the same amount of increase was experienced in periphery countries up 9 points 
from 27 to 36. Since then there has been little growth in core countries and significant growth in 
semi- periphery and periphery countries. However, it must be pointed out that these countries are 
still at relatively low levels of liberal democracy today. 
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In summary, the use of piecewise equality constraints on the effects of predictors of 
liberal democracy yields additional insights into the nature of change in liberal democracy from 
1972 to 2013 that are not seen when the effect is assumed to be equal over time. Despite the 
predictors of liberal democracy occupying a prestigious place in the political science, sociology, 
and economics literature it has been stated that there is still a lot we do not know about what 
predicts liberal democracy (Geddes 2009). I argue that part of the reason for this situation stems 
from the methodologies that have been utilized to explain liberal democracy. As I uncovered in 
my analysis, some of the most prominent predictors in the literature have been found to not be 
robust when a more inclusive research strategy is undertaken that attempts to integrate predictors 
from several research traditions. In addition, my choice in methodology allowed for a more 
nuanced depiction of what is leading to change in liberal democracy. Not surprisingly, variables 
such as Communist, Muslim, the presence of Protestant missionaries, and world system position 
all are shown to be significant predictors of liberal democracy (even after accounting for prior 
levels of liberal democracy). However, what is surprising, but perhaps should not be, is that these 
variables have not had consistent and persistent effects throughout the entirety of the period from 
1972 to 2013. All of these explanations fail to predict liberal democracy since 2002. What are the 
larger implications of these findings for the literature? First, I would say that the theoretical 
traditions of modernization and industrialization, world systems theory, world polity, other 
global factors such as conversionary Protestantism, and our collection of predictors (Communist, 
Muslim, British colony, etc.) have very little to say about recent trends in liberal democracy. 
What then explains the stagnation of liberal democracy since the early 2000s? This is an open 
empirical question and one that should have us look for predictors outside the “usual suspects”.  
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Robustness Checks 
 After estimating my final empirical model with all predictors and equal effects over time 
I conducted several robustness checks to help identify outliers and influential cases as well as 
protect against any non-normality in my data. These procedures and findings will be discussed 
below. First, I utilized an option in Mplus to estimate values for Mahalanobis’ distance and 
Cook’s distance. Mahalanobis’ distance is a statistic that is useful at determining which units of 
analysis are potential multivariate outliers in the data. Cooks’ distance is also useful for 
identifying cases that have an undue amount of influence on the results. These values were 
computed in Mplus and then examined in Stata. One country, Equatorial Guinea, was found to be 
a multivariate outlier in this analysis. Three countries, Brazil, Kenya, and Malta were found to be 
influential cases with extremely high Cooks distance values. I re-ran all of the analyses with 
these four cases removed yielding a sample size of 183 down from 187. All of the results 
previously presented in this chapter are with this reduced sample although they differed very 
slightly to models with the full sample of 187. 
 In addition, a robust maximum likelihood estimator (MLR) was utilized with all analyses 
in Mplus which reports robust standard errors. These standard errors are computed by using a 
sandwich estimator and are robust to non-normality in the data (Muthén and Muthén 2010) and 
the point estimates remain the same. Thus, all of the models presented in this chapter were also 
estimated using the MLR estimator to help guard against any non-normality in the data affecting 
the results. This decision did damper the overall fit statistics noticeably in the models that have 
been presented above. In my opinion, presenting the robust results right from the beginning gave 
a more accurate depiction of the results and would allow for additional insights then estimating 
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some models one way and others another way and only giving cursory attention to the potential 
for problems.  
In addition to using the MLR estimator all variables were initially examined with 
descriptive statistics and variables that were found to be highly skewed were transformed by way 
of the natural log transformation. The following variables were transformed by way of the 
natural log before being included in any of the analyses in this chapter: GDP per capita, energy 
use per capita, the percent of the population that is Protestant, and net output for the non-
agricultural sector of the economy. 
 In addition, throughout the analysis attention was paid to the potential for 
multicollinearity in the analyses. Attempts were made to reduce this potential by a thorough 
examination of the correlation matrix of the variables prior to statistical analyses. However, this 
is only a preliminary step and would only alert to the potential if two variables were highly 
correlated. Correlation does not take into consideration the relationship among more than two 
variables at a time and as such, could not provide information on whether a linear dependency 
exists between three or more variables. The modeling strategy that I employed, estimating a 
baseline model and then estimating this baseline model with specific groups of predictors from 
the different theoretical perspectives also helped to identify when multicollinearity could be 
influencing the results. A variable exhibiting signs of unstable direction of effects such as the 
sign changing from negative to positive or vise-version could be an indicator of the presence of 
multicollinearity. This was the case with the INGO network score. I found that when this 
variable and the WSP indicator we utilized in the same model that the sign of the INGO network 
score was unstable. I also found that this variable had a strong and positive correlation with WSP 
that was increasing over time.  
175 
The final precaution that I took to guard against multicollinearity was to run pieces of the 
simultaneous equations in Stata and utilize the variance inflation factor post-estimation 
command.17 For example, with the above-mentioned variable, INGO network score, I also was 
able to identify it has having a high VIF for the regression of liberal democracy in 2012. I 
estimated a lagged dependent variable regression in Stata with all of the TICs included as well as 
the TVCs measured in 2007 and then ran the “estat vif” post-estimation command and it 
identified the INGO network score of having a VIF of 11.39. By any standard this helps to 
identify that the coefficient for INGO network score was inflated due to the presence of other 
predictors in my model.  
In the end, substantial efforts were made to help avoid the deleterious any effects of 
outlying observations, cases with undue influence, multicollinearity, and non-normality in my 
data and bias the results that are offered here. 
Conclusions 
Overall then there are several important conclusions that can be drawn from this chapter. 
I will first discuss some of the specific implications of these for each of the theoretical clusters of 
predictors that I used in the analysis. What follows are some broader implications of this study as 
well potential weaknesses of the study and avenues for future research. 
Assessing Industrialization 
In this paper, I utilized logged GDP per capita as my sole indicator of industrialization 
and found that it was not a significant predictor of liberal democracy after controlling lagged 
levels of liberal democracy. However, I also found evidence, via positive and substantial 
correlations of industrialization with liberal democracy in 1972, that industrialization is part of 
                                                     
17 Mplus does not offer the option to compute variance inflation factors. 
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the story. However, industrialization does not appear to play a starring role in predicting recent 
levels of liberal democracy. This finding appears consistent with findings by Wejnert (2014) who 
found that international factors were more impact than industrialization in recent trends. In 
addition, my findings are also consistent with Przeworksi and colleagues who find that 
industrialization may not bring about democratic transitions but may be more related to 
democratic stability.18  
Assessing World Systems/Dependency Theory 
As discussed above, it seems clear that there is influence of the world system being 
displayed through the world system position variable. While a country’s location in the semi-
periphery and periphery was found detrimental to a country’s liberal democracy in the 1970s and 
1980s, it appears is if the negative effects are no longer felt. This may be because the late 1970s 
and early 1980s were marked by the worldwide debt crisis causing high levels of dependency to 
have detrimental impacts on liberal democracy during this time period. Export concentration 
with a country’s largest trading partner was not found to be a statistically significant predictor 
however. This variable had only a weak correlation with WSP and throughout the 1980s and 
1990s this relationship was negative. Beyond this low correlation as an indication that this 
variable may be measuring something else beyond the structure of the world system and 
dependency I cannot explain this finding. Overall, there is partial support for world systems 
theory but no support that dependency is driving trends in liberal democracy from 1972 to 2013. 
As stated above in the last section, the more that the structure of the world polity begins 
to reflect and reproduce typical dependent relationships between the dependent semi-periphery 
and periphery and the exploitative core these factors may once again become an important 
                                                     
18 Several other studies including Arat (1988) and Gonick and Rosh (1988) have made similar conclusions about the 
importance of industrialization.  
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constraint on democratic growth. More is said below about the INGO network score and its 
similarity to WSP.  
Assessing Global Factors 
In Woodberry’s 2012 study which brought religious factors into the discussion on the 
determinants of democracy, he argued that these global factors were vital in shaping modernity 
of which liberal democracy is a key aspect. The aspect of religion that he found most important 
were those associated with Protestant missionaries because they were important for several 
modern innovations such as increased literacy and education for the masses, the spread of 
religious liberty, the missionary roots of liberal democracy. Consistent with his thesis that the 
presence of Protestant missionaries was of the utmost importance for future liberal democracy I 
initially brought three of variables that Woodberry used from his analysis of the average level of 
liberal democracy from 1950 to 1994 to this study. However due to concerns about 
multicollinearity I only examined the effect of the variable the percent of the population 
evangelized by 1900 and found that it was a robust predictor of liberal democracy in all models 
tested in this study. Thus, I was able to partially replicate Woodberry’s analysis here. Since 
Woodberry’s analysis did not include more recent time points than 1994 and that I found it was 
only significant in the first two sub-periods 1977-1987 and 1992-1997 it is unclear if these 
factors impact current levels of liberal democracy. Reasons as to why this may be the case are 
avenues for future research. 
Assessing World Polity Theory  
World polity theory indicates that the global diffusion of democracy should take place in 
countries that are more closely tied to the world system. The ties that are often thought to hold 
the most significance are those to IGOs and INGOs. Thus, it seems clear that world polity 
178 
theorists would predict that there would be expanding levels of liberal democracy around the 
world since the 1970s. In this analysis, I originally sought to use two variables to examine this 
effect of the world polity, Paxton et al.’s (2015) updated version of Hughes et al.’s (2009) INGO 
Network Country Score and variable of the percent of IGOs that a country was a member in a 
given year derived from the Pevenhouse and Nordstrom data from the COW project. As stated 
above, the IGO indicator was not statically significant in either of my two finial models. It did 
not appear to have any effect on liberal democracy during this time period and as such found no 
evidence of WPT.  
However, it should be mentioned that I was not able to include the INGO network score 
and the world system position score in the same model without introducing multicollinearity in a 
model. In fact, the INGO network score updated by Paxton (2015) has a surprising amount of 
correlation with world system position. This correlation ranges from .78 in 1972 to 0.88 in 2007 
and increases at each five-year wave. Thus, not only does the world polity seem to be 
reproducing the inequalities of the world system but it is also becoming more stratified. This is a 
common critique of the world polity literature (see Beckfield 2003). However, such a high 
degree of correlation and the fact that it is increasing may give pause to those that paint a more 
harmonious role of INGOs within the world polity. Cleary, the network of INGOs is more like 
other networks such as trade and colonialism and may be indicative that the diffusion mechanism 
used in INGOs is much less emulation and something closer to coercion. Critiques levied at 
WPT by Beckfield (2003) and others that the world polity reproduces inequalities in the world 
system should be taken seriously. In general, this indicator may be more useful as an indicator of 
world system or dependency than of world polity theory. 
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Broader Implications 
In this section I will discuss some broader implications of this current study. This chapter 
sought to investigate how well existing predictors from several key theoretical traditions in 
sociology predicted recent trends in liberal democracy. It did so realizing that liberal democracy 
worldwide has not shown linear increases but rather three different pieces of effects. Piecewise 
models, are one of several forms of growth that can be examined with a growth curve analysis 
but my model search in chapter two indicated that growth models did not fit the liberal 
democracy data very well. Instead, an autoregressive model with piecewise effects was found to 
fit the data extremely well. This insight lead to the idea that all predictors, not just lagged values 
of liberal democracy, could have piecewise effects. Regression based panel models are not 
suitable for this type analysis because they assume linear change and assume equal effects over 
time. Thus, the use of this approach was useful in offering a new interpretation of recent trends 
in liberal democracy. It is a useful reminder that methodological triangulation is important in 
social science research. 
By utilizing this approach, I was able to demonstrate that existing methods yield a 
somewhat incomplete and more general depiction of what predicts liberal democracy. In addition 
to showing that a variable such as WSP has a significant effect for the entire 40-year period, I 
was able to break this period into smaller sub-periods and give a more nuanced account and 
demonstrate that WSP only affected liberal democracy until. 1987. Beyond that time it was not a 
significant predictor of liberal democracy. This more nuanced account of liberal democracy 
yielded additional insights and may explain why different studies yield different results in this 
literature. Beyond the selection of what countries to include in an analysis it appears as if the 
time frame examined would also influence the results.  
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This study really demonstrates that there is still much to learn about the causes of liberal 
democracy. Many of the long-standing explanations appear to fall silent about recent trends in 
liberal democracy. Future research should seek to integrate additional predictors than ones from 
the theoretical traditions that I have included in my analysis that could help to account for the 
recent trend of democratic stagnation. 
Weaknesses and Future Research  
This analysis was a first step in determining what is driving current trends in liberal 
democracy. I have identified that from the early 2000s until today democracy is not increasing as 
it has in earlier decades. I have identified this period as one of democratic stagnation-not 
stability. However, this study is mostly silent on what predicts liberal democracy in this most 
recent period. I have identified that our existing predictors do not tell us much, if anything. 
Future studies should investigate what is driving these recent trends.  
As in any study, the decisions that made along the way by the researcher has the potential 
to influence the results. No study can include every conceivable predictor that may influence the 
outcome of interest. The choice of independent variables could be considered a weakness of this 
study. I examined the literature on the predictors of liberal democracy and sought to include in 
this study those that come from some key theoretical traditions in sociology. It is possible that 
other predictors from other theoretical traditions could be leveraged to help explain recent trends 
in liberal democracy. Missing from my analysis were variables that only consider spatial 
diffusion such as the average liberal democracy score of contiguous neighbors or average scores 
from a particular world region.  
Another choice that made was to examine all countries in the world instead of just a sub-
set of countries. I chose to build upon chapter two of this dissertation that examined worldwide 
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trends in liberal democracy from 1972 to 2013. It is possible, and likely, that some of the 
predictors could gain (or lose) statistical significance if they were only examined for a sub-set of 
countries. Often studies look at non-core countries or less-developed countries. The results 
presented here do not speak to any sub-set of countries directly.19  I plan to undertake a follow-
up study doing just that, complementing this present analysis with one that predict recent trends 
in liberal democracy in less-developed countries.   
After initially identifying what I considered to be three different periods of growth in the 
period from 1972 to 2013 in chapter two of this dissertation, I integrated this into my statistical 
modeling procedures. My identification of three different periods of growth is somewhat 
arbitrary. This is just my opinion and someone else could look at the same data and perhaps 
come up with a slightly different start or end date of a period or divide the entire period up a 
different way. Second, I chose 1972 as the first year in my analysis for a practical reason, data 
convenience. Bollen’s Liberal Democracy Series I Indicator is not available prior to 1972 
because it relies on Freedom House data for one of its several components. Freedom House data 
is not available prior to 1972. However, this beginning date can be defended because it 
approximately coincides with what Huntington calls the third wave of democratization. While I 
do not subscribe to his analogy, this is a highly influential thesis and these dates happen to 
correspond quite nicely to his identification of the beginning of this wave. The ending period of 
this analysis is also somewhat arbitrary and is a little dated. While several of the underlying 
sources of Bollen’s Liberal Democracy Series I Indicator are more current than 2013-not all of 
them are. The only reason why this analysis does continue to 2015 is that the Arthur Banks 
Cross-National Time Series (CNTS) databank has not updated three of its variables beyond 2013 
                                                     
19 In addition, regional analyses while not conducted in this study due to concerns over sample sizes might be carried out 
successfully in other studies. 
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(despite releasing new editions in 2015 and 2016 with these values missing). Specifically, the 
variables lacking are a measure of the competitiveness of the nominating process for chief 
executive, a measure of the selection process for legislatures, and a measure of the effectiveness 
of legislatures. I also plan for future research that can take advantage of the years beyond 2013.20  
Final Thoughts 
Overall, this analysis raises some important questions that need to be addressed in the 
literature on liberal democracy.  First, it should provide some caution that our usual predictors 
and theoretical explanations for liberal democracy seem to be inadequate for describing the 
current state of liberal democracy in the world today and recent trends. As discussed throughout 
this dissertation the world is witnessing democratic stagnation and even democratic decline in 
some regions and with some income group categories. This stagnation is happening at levels of 
liberal democracy that are far from ideal and essentially there are a growing number of regimes 
that are neither fully authoritarian nor fully democratic. If this is the new reality of the world 
today, then a better understanding of why this is the case seems of the utmost importance. Future 
research should attempt to determine what factors are aiding this recent trend. In addition, panel 
designs (and other longitudinal methods that assume that covariates have equal effects over time) 
gloss over some important details that are never brought out in analysis. Specifically, I found that 
some variables are becoming less important over time and that many of the usual predictors are 
silent on trends in the 2000s to today. Perhaps there should be more utilization of modeling 
strategies that can help to uncover these inconsistent effects. In essence, despite the prominent 
place of liberal democracy in the research agenda for political scientists, political sociologists, 
                                                     
20 I have projected scores for Bollen’s indicators beyond 2013 based upon the updated components available and an 
assumption about previous values of the variables from Banks data and they continue to show this stagnation if not clear 
decline in liberal democracy. In my opinion new data on liberal democracy will only strengthen and lend more credibility 
to the arguments and findings of this chapter.   
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and economists over the last 50 years there is still much to be learned about the contours of 
worldwide liberal democracy.  
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Chapter 4: Does Democracy Improve Health?: Testing the Direct and Indirect Effects of 
Liberal Democracy 
In this chapter I will turn my attention to the consequences of liberal democracy. Why 
does it matter if the world or a country is more democratic today than it was in previous years? 
Beyond the personal freedoms, the increased political liberty, the ability to practice free speech, 
and participate in the political system, what are the other more indirect consequences of liberal 
democracy?  The common assumption is that liberal democracy is a panacea to a country’s ills. 
Increased levels of liberal democracy are associated with greater economic prosperity, greater 
economic equality, and increased levels of population health and well-being. It enhances nation 
building and strengthens the state, and it promotes domestic and international peace, gender 
equality, respect for human rights, environmental protections, trust and social capital, and even 
individual happiness (Carbone 2009).  
This chapter cannot do a thorough evaluation of all of these outcomes, rather, the focus of 
this study is an examination of one of these areas: population health. Studies of population health 
can be as complex as they are interesting. Many factors, both internal and external, can impact a 
country’s population health, including, but not limited to, the economic and social characteristics 
of the country, the composition of the country’s population, and the country’s structural position 
within the world economy. This research focuses on the correlation between population health 
and a country’s political situation- specifically the level of liberal democracy within a country. 
Thus, my main task will be to examine and quantify the consequences of liberal democracy for 
population health. The specific indicator of population health employed in this study is a 
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country’s maternal mortality rate (MMR). While this indicator has not been utilized in research 
on the consequences of democracy much in the past, it is an excellent indicator to use, as detailed 
below. In addition, I will frame the issue of maternal mortality, detailing the problems associated 
with high MMRs and the efforts that have been made to reduce them.  
In the previous studies in this dissertation, the focus has been longitudinal in nature. The 
second chapter investigated trends in liberal democracy from 1972 until today. Chapter three 
predicted these trends, using predictors from several leading theoretical frameworks. This fourth 
chapter does not utilize a longitudinal method per se, however, a long-term perspective is still 
taken. This chapter focuses on the potential long-term impacts of liberal democracy on 
population health, and will test whether the cumulative effects of liberal democracy predict 
population health better than more contemporaneous effects. Attempting to examine cumulative 
effects within a panel framework would add extra complexity to the issue. Instead, the focus is 
squarely on the nature of the effects of liberal democracy on population health. In this context, 
emphasis also is placed on empirically testing if a country’s socio-health resources mediate the 
relationship between liberal democracy and population health, and taking the first steps toward 
modeling this in a cross-sectional analysis. 
The contributions of this study do not stop at the choice of dependent variable, but also 
follow from the method of analysis employed herein, structural equation modeling (SEM). This 
modeling framework is an excellent choice for examining the total effects of liberal democracy 
and population health because it can decompose the total effects into direct and indirect effects. 
Most of the theorized links are indirect in nature and in using SEM techniques, these mediating 
variables can be explicitly modeled. Another major contribution of this study is the evaluation of 
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the best operationalization of liberal democracy as either a contemporaneous or cumulative 
variable.  
Thus, this chapter will begin with an examination of the use of the MMR as an indicator 
to assess overall population health, and then discuss the problem of maternal mortality.  A 
review of existing research on liberal democracy and population health will highlight the 
theoretical reasoning as to why increases in liberal democracy should improve population health 
and evaluate the existing empirical evidence. Then, two frameworks from the demography 
literature are examined to better understand why maternal deaths occur and to point to ways in 
which liberal democracy could impact the MMR indirectly. I will then critique previous studies 
and point to a few key questions that this literature has yet to adequately answer. Following this, 
I will discuss my data and methodology for this empirical analysis. Finally, the results and 
overall conclusions of this research are summarized.  
The Case for Investigating Liberal Democracy and Maternal Mortality  
Previous studies have utilized a variety of indicators to examine the impact of liberal 
democracy on health outcomes, such as life expectancy or healthy life expectancy (Lena and 
London 1993; Shin 2002; Franco, Álvarez-Darde, and Ruiz 2004; Besley and Kudamatsu 2006; 
Navarro et al. 2006; Reidpath and Allotey 2006; Wickrama and Mulford 1996, Ghobarah, Huth, 
and Russett 2004a, 2004b; Iqbal 2006; Reidpath and Allotey 2006), the mortality rate (Zweifel 
and Navia 2000; Lake and Baum 2001; Navarro et al. 2003, Navia and Zweifel 2003; Pande 
2003; Franco, Álvarez-Darde, and Ruiz 2004; Li and Wen 2005, McGuire 2005, Geering, 
Thacker, and Alfaro 2006, Navarro et al. 2006, Ross 2006; Safaei 2006), infant and child 
mortality or under five mortality (Shandra, Nobles, London, and Williamson 2004, Shandra et al. 
2005, Wickrama and Mulford 1996, Moon and Dixon 1985, London and Williams 1990, Chaung 
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2013a, Chaung 2013b, Houweling, Kunst, Looman, and Mackenbach 2005), and child 
malnutrition and diarrhea (Burroway 2011). Despite the long list of population health indicators 
that have been utilized, all too often the theoretical justification for the choice of a specific 
indicator is not given. Below I give a justification for why I will use MMR as my indicator of 
population health.  
Existing literature is mostly silent on the potential impacts of liberal democracy on 
maternal mortality (see Andoh et al. 2006 for an exception). This silence is surprising 
considering that, since maternal mortality is not an easy thing to combat (Kristol and WuDunn 
2009), a country’s MMR is considered to be one of the best indicators of its overall health care 
system.  According to the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), 
“[m]aternal mortality is widely acknowledged as a general indicator of the overall health of a 
population, of the status of women in society, and of the functioning of the health system. High 
maternal mortality ratios are thus markers of wider problems of health status, gender inequalities, 
and health services in a country.” (USAID 2014).  Indeed, a leading expert and central figure in 
global health, anthropologist and physician Paul Farmer, is quoted as saying just this. “Looking 
at maternal mortality is a great way to look at a health system as a whole, because it requires you 
to do a great many things” (Paul Farmer quoted in Kristof and WuDunn 2009: 118). There is no 
one all-encompassing step that can be undertaken to protect against all of the numerous ways in 
which mothers can die in child birth, and it is precisely this quality that makes a country’s MMR 
a good overall indicator of population health. Simply training more doctors, midwives, or rural 
birth attendants is not sufficient to address the problem of maternal mortality. In addition to basic 
health services, emergency obstetric services also are integral to reducing maternal mortality. 
The unequal distribution of health professionals, their training, and general and specialist health 
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services useful to preventing maternal mortality are influenced by the inequities of 
macrostructural (e.g., social, political, and economic) forces.  
Beyond the word of experts in the field of international development and their practical 
experience in combating pre-mature death, maternal mortality can also be considered a good 
indicator of population health for theoretical reasons. As elaborated below, liberal democracy is 
a public good and it is thought to impact the poor through the improvement of socio-health 
resources. However, to be able to reliably assess if liberal democracy is good for the poor 
requires an indicator of population health that targets the vulnerable and poor. Infants, children 
and their mothers often are the poorest and most vulnerable segment of a society, and there are 
inequalities in their access to medicine and health supplies (UN 2012). Just as Wigley and 
Akkoyunlu-Wigley (2011) argue that the poorest part of any population is a country’s children, 
for many of the same reasons, pregnant mothers also serve as an excellent indicator of population 
health. Ross argues that using infant and child mortality indicators may be superior to other 
mortality indicators because it too is like maternal mortality, in that there is no one way to 
combat it. “[Infant and child mortality] is also a sensitive measure of many other conditions-
including access to clean water and sanitation, indoor air quality, female education and literacy, 
prenatal and neonatal health services, caloric intake, disease, and of course, income-that are hard 
to measure among the very poor” (2006:861). So, in this line of thinking, infant and child 
mortality share many of the characteristics that make maternal mortality a good indicator of 
population health. However, I argue that a country’s MMR is an even a better indicator of 
population health, and it may help us identify additional effects from liberal democracy that are 
mediated by gender equality. Clearly, there are reasons to suspect a strong positive correlation 
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between a country’s infant mortality ratio (IMR) and its MMR. In fact, for 2012, using World 
Bank data for 182 countries; this correlation is almost 0.9.    
In addition to the reasons above, there has also been interest in the impact of liberal 
democracy on maternal mortality rising from pressure within the demography and public health 
literature itself. This impetus comes from the fact that despite the considerable research focusing 
on the clinical factors of maternal mortality, it continues to be an important public health 
problem and occurs at alarming rates. Thus, it might be time to consider a more holistic account 
for the macro-structural conditions in which maternal deaths occur (Gil-Gonzalez et al. 2006).  
Thus, the case seems clear that there is an important direct benefit to investigate how 
political structures such as liberal democracy impact maternal mortality. Such investigations also 
may yield additional insights into liberal democracy’s impact on overall population health.  
The Problem of Maternal Mortality 
The problem of maternal mortality is vast despite considerable international effort to 
combat it. Every year approximately 210 million women worldwide become pregnant, and 25% 
of these pregnancies lead to life threatening complications. As a result of these complications, 
the World Health Organization estimates that, on average, about 800 women die daily (i.e. 
287,000 women die annually) from complications with pregnancy or childbirth, and that the 
majority of these deaths are preventable.  An estimated 99% of cases of maternal mortality occur 
in less-developed countries (WHO 2014). There is no single reason why women die in childbirth. 
The top five problems, accounting for 75% of maternal deaths, are hemorrhage, infections, 
unsafe abortion, high blood pressure during pregnancy (i.e., pre-eclampsia and eclampsia), and 
obstructed labor. Additional direct causes of maternal deaths include blood clots or embolism 
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and pre-existing conditions. There also are indirect causes of maternal mortality including 
poverty, fertility, rurality, etc.  
The fifth Millennium Development Goal was to reduce maternal mortality by 75% 
between 1990 and 2015 (UNDP 1990).  There was substantial progress toward meeting this goal, 
but this progress was uneven and indicative of the complexity of the problem, in that there may 
be social, economic, and political structural forces contributing to this form of mortality. 
Worldwide maternal deaths declined by an average of 2.6% per year, well below the 5.5% yearly 
reduction needed to achieve the goal by 2015, when the Millennium Development Goals expired. 
However, during this time some countries experienced deductions in excess of 5.5%, 
demonstrating the uneven nature of the improvements. As MDG 5 was left unfulfilled in 2015, 
combating maternal mortality is an integral part of Goal 3- “Good health and well-being” -of the 
UNDP’s new 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. “One target under Sustainable 
Development Goal 3 is to reduce the global maternal mortality ratio to less than 70 per 100,000 
births, with no country having a maternal mortality rate of more than twice the global average” 
(UNDP 2016). Unfortunately, there are still too many women dying from complications due to 
pregnancy and childbirth, especially in less-developed countries. There are great regional 
disparities in maternal mortality ratios (MMR). Two world regions, Sub-Saharan Africa and 
Southern Asia, account for 770 of these 800 deaths per day, 440 in Sub-Saharan Africa and 230 
in Southern Asia. As a partial consequence of the large number of children that women bear in 
developing countries, this equates to alarming lifetime risks of maternal mortality. Indeed, the 
lifetime risk of dying during childbirth is 25 times greater for women in the developing world 
compared to women in the developed world. There are health inequalities not only between 
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states but also variation within them. In rural areas with limited access to quality health care, 
birth attendants, and emergency services, more women are at risk of dying during childbirth. 
Although there have been some improvements in recent years, only half of the 
pregnancies in the developing world receive the appropriate level of maternal care recommended 
by international institutions (UNDP 2016). Despite an impressive reduction of 45% in maternal 
deaths between 1990 and 2015, progress toward meeting MGD 5 were the poorest of all MDGs 
(UNDP 2016). Simply throwing money at the problem was not the answer. Countries such as Sri 
Lanka have shown that fantastic reductions in maternal mortality can be achieved even in low 
income developing countries (WuDunn and Kristof 2009: 117-119). Nations that commit 
themselves to reducing maternal mortality through a variety of means can be successful if they 
are oriented on comprehensive plans.  
These social, political, and cultural factors potentially play an important role in women’s 
access to health services that also need to be addressed in order to minimize the risk of maternal 
mortality. “Socioeconomic risk factors … contribute to the intervening morbidity conditions 
between pregnancy and mortality. Consequently, maternal mortality explanations must take into 
account the socioeconomic factors such as income and literacy” (Pillai et al. 2013:1). To these 
factors it is clear that the political conditions, especially the level of democracy of a society, may 
be important as they have been shown to have important impacts on economics, development, 
and the distribution of social goods. 
Though there is a clear need for research on all aspects of maternal mortality, there is a 
lack of research specifically on how liberal democracy may impact MMRs.  First, an 
examination of the clinical and individual level explanations for maternal mortality should 
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provide a better understanding of the potential links between liberal democracy and maternal 
mortality rates. 
Causes of Maternal Mortality 
As stated previously, existing research on maternal mortality has mainly examined the 
clinical explanations. These are briefly summarized here, but the majority of this section 
examines two existing frameworks for individual level explanations to see where these may be 
limited or constrained by macro-structural features of society (such as political systems).  
Clinical Explanations for Maternal Mortality  
The clinical explanations for maternal mortality typically focus on the direct causes for 
death and account for approximately 75% of all maternal deaths. These direct causes include pre-
existing conditions that are made more severe by pregnancy (28%), severe bleeding (27%), 
pregnancy-induced high blood pressure (including pre-eclampsia and eclampsia) (14%), 
infections (11%), and complications during delivery (9%), unsafe abortions (8%), and blood 
clots or embolism (3%) (WHO 2016).  
Individual-Level Explanations for Maternal Mortality  
As we move away from the medical explanations there are differences at the individual 
level that account for why women die in childbirth. There are two frameworks that help us 
identify factors that lead to maternal mortality: (1) the three phases of delays framework and (2) 
the McCarthy and Maine framework.  
The three phases of delay framework “identifies obstacles to the provision and utilization of high 
quality, timely obstetric care” (Thaddeus and Maine 1994: 1092). They posit that increases in 
delays at any phase can have negative health consequences for pregnant women and increase 
maternal mortality. Below is a brief description of the three phases of delay framework.  
193 
Phase one delays are those delays on the part of an individual woman, her family, or her 
community that affect the amount of time that passes from awareness of a pregnancy 
complication to the decision to seek out medical care. Factors that influence this delay include 
the status of women, the perceived seriousness of the complication, distance and ability to travel 
to an appropriate health care facility and the perceived care that would be received. Low status of 
women, lack of recognition as to the seriousness of the complication, an inability to travel, a lack 
of resources to travel, negative past experiences with a facility and an overall low perception of 
the care to be received at a facility all can increase this phase one delay. It is likely that increases 
in the status of women and increases in the education of women can cut down on the length of 
time of this delay. As women have increased status they are likely to be seen by themselves, their 
family, and community as a valuable asset that need to be protected. Also, as women’s education 
increases it is likely that their general health-related knowledge will increase as well as her 
recognition as to the seriousness of any pregnancy-related complications she experiences.   
The second phase surrounds the actual delay in arriving at a facility after the decision has 
been made to access it. This delay is impacted by the physical distribution of qualified health 
centers, travel time and travel expenditures. Inadequate spacing of proper health facilities able to 
meet women’s obstetric needs, high costs of time and money for a journey can all increase this 
delay. Women from rural areas are likely to face longer phase two delays because distances to 
health facilities are much longer than in urban areas. It is also likely that increased provisions for 
public services in general such as roads, public transportation, and increases in provisions for 
health-related services will positively impact maternal mortality. As nations experience higher 
levels of provisions for public services, we would expect these phase two delays to be reduced.  
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Phase three delays are those realized once a woman has arrived at a health care facility. 
Many factors are in play here – is the health facility stocked with needed materials, drugs, does it 
have the proper equipment in working conditions, is it being properly staffed with qualified 
health professionals, and is the facility operating in a timely manner. Deficiencies in any of the 
above can increase the time that women have to wait at a facility to receive treatment. It is 
common in sub-Saharan African countries to find hospitals lacking proper equipment and 
medicine. Often, health facilities lack the needed drugs, and it is left to the family to travel to 
pharmacies to obtain them. It is even common for patients to leave hospitals and travel to private 
clinics for important tests (such as ultrasounds) and then travel back to the hospital to give the 
report to the doctors.  Here as well we can expect that as there are higher levels of provisions for 
public services including medications, doctors, stable supplies of electricity, etc. that we will see 
decreases in phase three delays and reductions in maternal mortality. 
We need to consider the broader social, economic, and political factors that influence 
these individual explanations of these delays. It is argued that democracies tend to spend more on 
health care and other public projects and this could influence phase two and three delays (Wigley 
and Akkoyunlu-Wigley 2011). Increased quality facilities and increased infrastructure to access 
these facilities could decrease phase two delays. In addition, if democracies spend more on 
health infrastructure than it is possible that this could influence the quantity and quality of 
facilities and the conditions at these facilities. In addition, greater emphasis on health 
expenditures is likely to lead to more quality doctors, nurses, and even the availability of needed 
drugs and supplies at health facilities. 
A second framework that guides this study is McCarthy and Maine’s framework of 
maternal mortality. McCarthy and Maine build upon existing frameworks for fertility (Bongaats 
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1978) and child survival (Mosley and Chen 1984). These existing frameworks “specify the 
biological and behavioral mechanisms through which social, economic, and cultural factors 
operate to produce a birth or the survival of a child to age five” (McCarthy and Maine 1992: 24). 
McCarthy and Maine’s framework of maternal mortality is geared toward identifying the 
mechanism of the maternal mortality in developing countries so programs can be applied in a 
more targeted manner with the hopes to aid in their effectiveness at preventing maternal deaths. 
The framework encompasses three general stages of the process of maternal mortality 
that orient it. The first and second stages operate more at the individual level, while the third 
stage brings in the larger social and economic environment into the explanations. The first stage 
consists of the proximate series of outcomes that lead to maternal death (or disability). 
According to McCarthy and Maine (1992) all efforts to curb maternal mortality have to operate 
through this sequence of three outcomes: (1) reduce the likelihood of pregnancy, (2) reduce the 
likelihood that a pregnant woman will have a complication, and (3) increase the likelihood of 
survival if a pregnant woman suffers a complication.  
The second stage of the framework consists of five sets of intermediate determinants: (1) 
women’s individual health status, (2) women’s reproductive status, (3) women’s access to health 
services, (4) women’s health care behavior, and (5) unknown or unspecified factors.  
Women’s individual health status refers to items such as a woman’s nutritional status, 
existing infections or diseases, existing chronic conditions, and personal history of prior 
complications with pregnancy. These factors all impact a woman’s ability to survive pregnancy 
complications. Women who have better nutrition, are without existing infections, diseases and/or 
chronic conditions, and have had no previous incidents of complications with pregnancy are less 
likely to have complications.  
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Women’s reproductive status consists of items such as age, parity, and marital status. 
Younger and older women are more likely to suffer complications along with those experiencing 
their first pregnancy or a large number of pregnancies. Married women in less developed 
countries are more likely to become pregnant and thus become at risk of mortality.  
The third intermediate determinate is a woman’s access to health services, such as health 
centers that offer family planning, prenatal care, primary care, emergency obstetric care and 
access to information about health services and quality of care. Women who have greater access 
and are closer in geographical proximity to health services are more likely to use them than those 
who lack access or where the ability to access them represents a major hurdle to overcome.  
Women’s health care behavior can include the use of family planning, prenatal care, 
modern birthing techniques, traditional birthing practices and abortions. Women who use some 
method of family planning are less likely to become pregnant and thus minimize their risk for 
maternal mortality. Women who practice modern versus traditional birthing techniques as well 
as those women who do not seek out illicit abortions are less likely to have complications. 
Lastly, are those unknown or factors not identified above that can lead to complications.  
Social Explanations of Maternal Mortality 
As we move to the third stage of McCarthy and Maine’s framework there is a shift in 
focus away from the individual behavioral explanations of maternal mortality to a focus on the 
larger social and economic environment. This third stage of the framework is the furthest 
removed from deaths and consists of the distant determinants of maternal mortality. These 
include socioeconomic and cultural factors of women, their families, and their communities. 
These factors play a direct role on a woman’s ability to make decisions regarding seeking care 
during pregnancy and child birth. Individual factors (such as level of education or personal 
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autonomy) are then constrained by the larger social environment in which the intermediate 
determinants and outcomes take place.  
Political democracy is likely to be an important predictor of the mechanisms specified in 
this framework. Starting at the third stage of the framework, it is likely to influence the 
socioeconomic status of women as well as other dimensions of gender equality. It is likely that 
political democracy will raise the social status of women and this will change how women view 
themselves and change how women are viewed by their family and society as a whole. 
Democracy is a likely positive predictor of women’s education, income, prestige, and personal 
autonomy. Political democracy also is a likely influence at the second stage of the framework as 
well. It is likely that political democracy will improve women’s individual and reproductive 
health as well as their health behavior through increases in women’s social status and women’s 
education. In addition, political democracy will improve public service provisions and this will 
increase the supply of health services and increase women’s access to these services.  
As stated above, there has been a greater call in the literature to search for additional 
explanations in the larger social environment, including a call to better consider how the political 
and cultural features of society can impact maternal mortality (Gil-Gonzalez et al. 2006; Pillai et 
al. 2013). This analysis addresses that by looking at how socio-health resources and gender 
equality are key mediators of the relationship between political democracy and maternal 
mortality. 
From the research into the proximate and distal outcomes of maternal mortality, it seems 
that there is clear reason to suspect that liberal democracy could have a plausible effect on a 
country’s MMR via its indirect effect due to factors such as socio-health resources and gender 
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equality. It is not yet evident whether or not there may be a direct impact of liberal democracy on 
a country’s MMR.   
Liberal Democracy and Population Health 
How does Liberal Democracy Impact Population Health? 
While the impact of political democracy on maternal mortality is a topic that has not 
received enough scholarly attention, there are a growing number of studies that have examined 
the impact of democracy on population health. In general, the thinking behind the potential link 
between democracy and health is that the principles upon which a democratic society is built 
(such as free and fair elections, universal suffrage, regular elections, and respect for rights and 
civil liberties) should be amenable to better health outcomes. Governments in societies that have 
more of these characteristics are likely to respond to its citizens’ needs and concerns more 
directly than less democratic governments (Ruger 2005; Besley and Kudamatsu 2006). 
Autocracies would not have incentives to invest in the human development of its people because 
it might mobilize citizens to push for greater rights and freedoms, in turn, jeopardizing the 
government’s hold on power (Ruger 2005).  
Theoretically, there appear to be several pathways in which enhanced democracy will 
lead to improvements in health. These include: (1) competitive elections, (2) political 
participation, (3) opposition parties (Frey and Al-Roumi 1999). These three pathways can be 
subsumed under the idea that liberal democracy has destructive effects (which are indirect in 
nature) on population. The first two mechanisms - competitive elections and political 
participation -appear to be the ones most often discussed in the theoretical literature and appear 
to be closely related to the third. Beyond these distributive effects there are also some 
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hypothesized non-distributive effects introduced by Wigley and Akkoyunlu-Wigley (2011); 
these will be addressed after the distributive mechanisms.  
The first mechanism of how liberal democracy may impact population health is through 
competitive elections. Competitive elections promote the accountability of political leaders to the 
population. Elections provide leaders with incentives to listen and cater to marginalized groups 
whose needs are identified and incorporated into plans of action. Often, some of the most 
important demands by the masses are increased provisions for public services including health 
care (Ruger 2005). This essentially is a very similar argument as to why liberal democracy 
should alleviate other social inequalities including income inequality (Lenski 1966, Lipset 1959, 
Muller 1995). However, this view of the relationship between liberal democracy and income 
inequality is not shared by everyone. Bollen and Jackman (1985, 1995) do not see income 
inequality as an issue requiring political action to resolve. In two studies, Bollen and Jackman 
clearly find that there is no relationship between liberal democracy and income inequality. 
Elections also allow for restrictions on elite powers that if left uncheck could be negative for 
quality of life. This echoes Besley and Kudamatsu 2006 that posit that since there is the 
transparent selection of leaders in a democracy, in order to get elected you must be seen as 
responsive to the demands of the citizens who have as a priority improved health care.  
Moon and Dixon (1985) argue that states differ on their propensity to improve the 
provision of public services and that in democracies the state responds to demands from groups 
and individuals that push for increased services and rights. “Thus arises what Hewitt (1977) calls 
the “simple democratic hypothesis,” namely that the existence of democratic institutions-
especially the enfranchisement of all citizens-virtually guarantees relatively egalitarian policies. 
Since the provision of basic needs will surely be high on the political agenda of the poor, their 
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ballot box power should be translated into state policies which enhance [infant mortality, life 
expectancy at age one, and basic literacy]” (Moon and Dixon 1985: 669).  
Despite this long-standing assumption there have been multiple studies that begin to 
question the link between liberal democracy and increased spending, and whether this translates 
into improved population health outside of high income countries (Filmer and Pritchett 1999; 
McGuire 2004). Indeed, the following quote drives home this point. “The stipulated mechanisms 
of the welfare state do not lead—at least not in any consistent fashion—to an improvement in 
social welfare as measured by mortality, literacy, and other human development outcomes…the 
case for democracy as a welfare-enhancing mechanism appears shaky. An age-old assumption 
faces serious challenge” (Gerring, Thacker, and Alfaro 2012:1-2). 
The second mechanism of how political democracy can impact health is through 
protections for political participation. Political participation allows for people to organize and 
make their needs known to others and the government leaders through individual and collective 
action. These needs often surround those for a better quality of life including provisions for 
public services. More autocratic governments are less responsive to the demands of the masses 
and more likely to neglect calls for greater gender equality and cut spending on social programs 
whereas democratic governments will respond to these needs.  Alvarez-Dardet and Franco-
Giraldo (2006) state that the increased institutional space in a democracy will allow people the 
opportunities to help themselves and others in terms of pushing for greater health provisions.  
Baum and Lake (2001) state that democracies invest more in the human capital of their citizens 
compared to non-democracies. Democracies are likely to be responsive to public opinion, 
movements, and interest groups that are concerned with health-related issues than non-
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democracies. Whereas, non-democratic governments are likely to be more responsive to 
transnational corporate interests that are not amenable to better health (Shandra et al. 2004).  
The third mechanism of how political democracy may impact health is through 
oppositional parties. Oppositional parties can help define problems and propose how they can be 
solved. They can also pressure the government to tend to the needs of the excluded. Although 
Frey and Al-Roumi (1999) state this as a separate mechanism, it can be seen as more 
supplemental to the first two, as it represents another check on the political power of the elites. In 
other words, the opposition is merely another tool the majority can invoke to help keep those in 
power in check if they fail to adequately address their main concerns.  
Ideas given by Baum and Lake (2001) focus more on the motives and goals of politicians 
but are compatible with this idea that liberal democracy promotes the distribution of goods and 
services. This explanation focuses on the goals of the politicians, the monopoly of power by the 
state, and the institutional environments in which politicians operate. Baum and Lake (2001) 
examine whether democratic governments provide greater public service provisions than 
autocracies. They put forth a theory about politicians that is applicable to politicians of all 
different stripes. That is, politicians will seek to use the monopoly of the state to garner benefits 
for themselves and for the state.  Since the goals of politicians are the same whether one is a 
democrat or autocrat, there must be a reason why democracies have higher public provisions 
than autocracies. This can be explained by the institutional contexts in which politicians operate. 
Baum and Lake (2001) state that in democracies there is high competition for political office and 
the costs of political participation are low. These factors inhibit politicians from extracting rents 
and cutting provisions for public services.  
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For autocracies, the costs of competing for public office are high and the cost for political 
participation is high as well. This creates a situation where leaders are not tied closely with their 
people in that they are not held accountable to them. In this situation, politicians use the 
monopoly of state power to extract higher rents for themselves and one way they do this is to cut 
provision for public services. Although this theory is more nuanced than other general theories 
about how democracies can impact health, it is certainly congruent with them and posits that 
democratic governments will be good for health. 
Thus far, this study has only discussed what can be considered the distributive effects of 
liberal democracy on population health. Namely, increased levels of liberal democracy are 
thought to lead to more allocation of resources for health expenditures, leading to an increase in 
socio-health provisions that, in turn, leads to improved population health. While these have been 
the dominant theoretical explanations that have tied liberal democracy to population health, they 
are not the only theoretical explanations. A recent paper by Wigley and Akkoyunlu-Wigley 
(2011) identifies four other potential pathways from liberal democracy to population health that 
are not based on this distributive effect. They term these effects as “non-distributive” and posit 
that liberal democracy can improve population health by increasing individual autonomy, 
increasing social capital, increasing the prospects for collection action, and increasing the 
diffusion of information. These theoretical ideas are more novel than most in the literature and 
represent an attempt to bring to this research question literature from neighboring fields such as 
demography, civil society, political sociology, social movements, and globalization.  These 
mechanisms are examined briefly here, and can be integrated with the ideas in the literatures 
mentioned above.   
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As Wigley and Akkoyunlu-Wigley describe, previous studies have demonstrated that a 
lack of individual autonomy may be detrimental to one’s health. They cite the impactful 
longitudinal cohort Whitehall studies of British civil servants in which the junior staff had 
mortality rates three times higher than the senior administrators (e.g., Marmot et al. 1997; van 
Rossum et al. 2000). Thus, those individuals that have more perceived control over their lives 
typically have better health. The main reason for this is that those who perceive they have more 
control over their lives typically have lower levels of chronic stress. “The standard biomedical 
explanation for the pro-health effect of autonomy is that it reduces exposure to chronic stress, for 
example, because the individual is less vulnerable to the arbitrary will of someone he or she is 
subordinate to or dependent upon” (Wigley and Akkoyunlu-Wigley 2011: 652).  
Democracies are thought to allow for public participation in the decision-making process 
and individual rights are more protected and, therefore, people living under democracies should 
be less chronically stressed than those living under non-democratic regimes. Living under a non-
democracy where those in charge (whether it be government officials, those in control of labor, 
etc.) act in a more arbitrary manner can create chronic stress. Indeed, this perspective is 
forwarded by Rose et al. (1997) in a discussion on what it was like for people living under 
communist regimes. “The procedures for allocating goods and services were opaque and 
sometimes unlawful, preventing rational cause-and-effect calculations and creating uncertainty; 
inefficiencies and uncertainties resulted in stress” (Rose et al. 1997:94). Thus, it appears as if 
increases in chronic stress can be brought about by non-democratic regimes However, there are 
also exceptions and not all non-democratic regimes are bad for the health of their populations. 
Cuba is a great example of a less developed country that is non-democratic and has an excellent 
public health system. “Cuba represents an important alternative example where modest 
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infrastructure investments combined with a well-developed public health strategy have generated 
health status measures comparable with those of industrialized countries” (Cooper, Kennelly, 
and Orduñez-Garcia 2006).  
A second mechanism as to how liberal democracy can lead to better population health is 
through its impact on increased levels of social capital. If higher levels of liberal democracy are 
associated with higher levels of social capital, than this, too, could offer positive benefits for 
health. However, for this theory to be valid, liberal democracy would have to be an antecedent to 
social capital, and most research has focused on the idea that social capital increases prospects 
for liberal democracy. This very idea that social capital enhances liberal democracy is expressed 
in the writings of political philosophers such as Montesquieu and Tocqueville. Despite the 
historical important idea that social capital is beneficial to liberal democracy, empirical research 
has found an interdependent relationship between liberal democracy and social capital. Indeed, 
Paxton (2003) conducted a cross-national quantitative analysis using a longitudinal SEM 
framework and was able to model these reciprocal effects between liberal democracy and social 
capital. Early levels of liberal democracy predict later levels of social capital and early levels of 
social capital predicted later levels of liberal democracy. Thus, it would appear as if social 
capital could be a mechanism for liberal democracy to improve population health.  
One important finding from Paxton’s study that would need to be accounted for in 
Wigley and Akkoyunlu-Wigley’s theory is that not all types of associations have beneficial 
effects on liberal democracy. Paxton (2003) found that associations that are more connected, as 
measured by members of associations being members in other organizations simultaneously, had 
a significant positive effect on liberal democracy. However, other types of associations that are 
identified as isolated, where members had few other memberships, had significant negative 
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effects on liberal democracy. Thus, treating all types of associations as if they hold positive 
benefits could bias any analysis that attempts to quantify this relationship.  
This qualifier as to whether an association is connected or isolated fits into the theory 
quite nicely. Being part of something larger than one’s self such as a group, political party, or 
campaign can give people an increased sense of confidence and a feeling that they are part of 
something larger. These connections are a resource that can be drawn upon in times of need and 
would seem to present multiple opportunities that could lead to improved health. “In theory 
social connectedness has a pro-health effect because it provides people with a basis for 
cooperation that is mutually advantageous, a source of aid or assistance, a means of staying well 
informed about health issues, and a source of self-esteem, among other things” (Wigley and 
Akkoyunlu-Wigley 2011: 653). Thus, members with more connections would imply more 
resources that could be garnered to improve one’s health. Also, in a non-democratic society, 
being associated with a group may involve a substantial amount of risk and therefore may 
actually increase chronic stress and, therefore, not be good for health outcomes including life 
expectancy. 
A third and closely-related mechanism is that liberal democracy could operate via 
collective action to improve population health. Democratic governments also allow for collective 
action in all realms of life. This collective action can be directed toward the government, as is 
described above as intimately tied to the distributive effects of liberal democracy on health. 
Alternatively, this collective action could be directed at other targets as well, such as employers. 
For instance, collective action aimed at an employer could help to ensure safer working 
conditions, more pay, more leave, better health care coverage, etc. Indeed, Przeworski, Alvarez, 
Cheibub, and Limongi (2000:168-170) find that workers earn more in democracies than under 
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non-democratic regimes. It would be easy then to draw a connection between many of these 
demands and improved population health. Thus, collective action is a tool of the many to 
influence the few. Even when it is applied outside of the government arena, it could be used as a 
tool for people to secure better health.  
The fourth mechanism of how liberal democracy can impact population health is through 
the diffusion of health-promoting information. This partially relies on a free media that is 
typically the norm in countries with greater levels of liberal democracy. A free media allows 
people to have more information about what the government is doing, about health policies, and 
about health promotion. Furthermore, the influence of the media can work in the opposite 
direction as well, informing the government about health practices and trends in poor, rural 
areas. These are instances in which the free media could lend toward the distributive effects of 
liberal democracy. However, the diffusion of health-promoting information can also have non-
distributive effects as well.  
In addition, to the upward and downward vertical transmission of information the media 
can increase the “horizontal transfer of health information” (Wigley and Akkoyunlu-Wigley 
2011:654). This facilitates the sharing of health information on a personal and organizational 
level. This could include information about diseases, birth control, and available health services 
and medicines. 
Frey and Al-Roumi 1999 also posit that another mechanism for how political democracy 
can impact health is enabled via a free press. This perspective seems to posit that there may be a 
role for liberal democracy to operate on population health that is independent of the public health 
expenditures and the socio-economic resources of a country. As there is a free press under 
democratic governments, the press can bring a focus to issues of quality of life that are important 
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to non-elites. The press can also serve as arbitrators between citizens and the government and put 
pressure on the government to respond to their needs. “This suggests that a free press can have a 
positive effect on health that is separate from its effect on government policymaking” (Wigley 
and Akkoyunlu-Wigley 2011:655). Although the ideas of Besley and Kudamatsu (2006) and 
Wigley and Akkoyunlu-Wigley (2011) seem quite compatible here, the former does not use the 
same language as the latter in terms of this being a non-distributive effect of liberal democracy. 
In summary, there appear to be two main classes of mechanisms describing how liberal 
democracy can impact population health: those that are mediated by the public health 
expenditures of a country and their socio-health resources (distributive effects), and those which 
are mediated by autonomy, social capital, collective action, and increased communication (non-
distributive effects).  The empirical work that will be discussed below by in large posit some sort 
of theoretical explanation (if any is given at all) which is congruent with distributive effects 
theory although it is rarely tested in this way properly. Most of the existing empirical work treats 
liberal democracy as a competing predictor of population health and does little more to uncover 
these complex relationships other than by controlling for these other factors (health expenditures 
and socio-health resources) in regression analyses.  
Empirical Research on Liberal Democracy and Population Health 
Before a discussion of the findings in empirical research on the effect of liberal 
democracy and population health, it is important to realize that early cross-national development 
research focusing on well-being examined the relationship between economic development and 
income inequality. It was thought that income inequality was a proxy measure for the social 
well-being within a country, and that as economic development increases income inequality 
would decrease. However, this relationship is contested by neoclassical economists. In addition, 
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in developing countries, it has been found that income inequality may not be a valid measure of 
social well-being (Wickrama and Mulford 1996). When other measures of well-being are used, 
studies have found that economic development only explained a small amount of the variation in 
the measures of social well-being (Todaro 1981, Shin 1975). In some developing countries, rapid 
economic growth led to negative effects from economic development on well-being (e.g. Brazil 
in the 1960s and 1970s had increases of infant mortality accompany economic growth) 
(Warnock 1987).  This is partially thought to be due to the impact of dependency on well-being. 
Studies of population health are an outgrowth of this literature on well-being, and could be 
thought as subsumed within this research tradition.   
Studies that find Liberal Democracy is Associated with Improved Health 
The bulk of the empirical research looking at the role of liberal democracy on population 
health is relatively recent, taking place from the 1990s until today. As discussed before, previous 
studies have utilized a variety of indicators to examine the impact of liberal democracy on health 
outcomes. While space does not permit the review every piece of scholarship, several prominent 
studies mentioned below exemplify this research tradition. A critique of those studies leads to 
several important unanswered questions that are addressed later in this chapter.  Some of the 
earliest studies examined the well-being of children as this is theorized to be a good indicator of 
overall population health as well as important on its own.   
Moon and Dixon (1985) examined infant mortality, life expectancy at age one, and 
education in a sample of 116 countries, and found that democracy has a positive relationship 
with the well-being indicators, regardless of the ideological norms of the state or the strength of 
the state. The measure of liberal democracy that they use in their analysis is the same as in Moon 
and Dixon’s study, Bollen’s index of political democracy. In summary, they conclude that 
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“democratic processes are unconditionally related to positive welfare outcomes” (Moon and 
Dixon 1985:690).   
London and Williams (1990) extend the analysis of Moon and Dixon by adding to the 
control variables used in Moon and Dixon’s analysis. They examine whether their findings will 
hold up once indicators of dependency and world system theory are added to the model. Their 
samples range in size from 40 to 110 countries and concludes unequivocally that democracy has 
a positive impact on the provision of basic needs. “Regardless of world-system position, the 
index of basic needs used, or the inclusion of the multinational penetration measure, level of 
democracy remains a significant positive indicator of basic needs” (London and Williams 1990: 
576). They further go on to say that “[d]emocratic institutions seemingly do make a dramatic 
difference in well-being of a nation’s populace, regardless of regime type, position in the world 
economy, or level of investment dependency” (London and Williams 1990: 579). Thus, this 
study mirrored the larger literature within political sociology that was combining international 
with domestic factors to explain development or the lack of development.  
Wickrama and Mulford (1996), using a sampling of 82 developing countries, examine the 
effects of political democracy, economic development and disarticulation, defined as “weak or 
missing links between economic sectors” (378) brought about by dependency on social well-
being.  As is common in this literature they utilize multiple dependent variables, although the 
general practice is to enter only one in the model at a time. Thus, they present four final linear 
regression models, one for each of their dependent variables in the study: life expectancy, infant 
mortality, primary education, and the human development index (HDI). They find that political 
democracy is a significant positive predictor of life expectancy, primary education, and the HDI 
while it is a significant negative predictor of infant mortality as expected. They also find that 
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political democracy moderates the negative effects of disarticulation. They use Bollen’s measure 
of liberal democracy in 1965 as their indicator for democracy. Not only do they find that political 
democracy has an independent effect on well-being from level of economic development and 
disarticulation, but, in highly democratic countries, political democracy buffers against the 
harmful effects of disarticulation. This does not happen at low and moderate levels of political 
democracy.  They also disagree with studies that have argued that any relationship between 
political democracy and well-being is spurious, at least in terms of economic development and 
disarticulation.   
In an interesting analysis, Zweifel and Navia (2000) examine the relationship between 
regime type and infant mortality for 138 countries from 1950-1990. Their key independent 
variable is dichotomous (democracy or dictatorship), not a continuous indicator as used in all 
previous analyses mentioned to this point. As a result, they find that most of the countries in their 
data were either rich and democratic or poor and dictatorships. Thus, there were very few 
countries that were in the other groups (rich and dictatorship and poor and democracy). To 
correct for this bias in the observed data, they utilize the Heckman Two-Step method. In essence, 
they include counterfactuals into the data that correct for the bias in the observed data. Although 
their analysis is unique compared to previous analyses, their findings are consistent in that IMR 
is higher regardless of national income when a country is a dictatorship as compared to a 
democracy. 
Two studies by Shandra, Nobles, London, and Williamson (2004 and 2005) extended the 
previous research cited above and examined a mix of intranational and international factors on 
cross-national variation in infant and child mortality rates. In the first study, they undertook a 
panel regression analysis with a lagged dependent variable measured at the same time as their 
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other key predictors.  They restrict their sample to non-core countries, yielding a final sample 
size of 59. As in most of the studies that have been discussed previously, they utilized an index 
of political democracy designed by Bollen in 1983.  The indicator of dependency upon which 
they were focused in these studies was multinational corporate penetration.  A key finding was 
that democracy had an independent effect on IMR as well as an interactive effect with 
dependency on IMR. Thus, a major contribution of this paper is its examination of the way that 
dependency and political democracy interact with each other.  
However, in a subsequent study in 2005, Shandra et al. found mixed evidence for a main 
effect of democracy on child mortality, but again found in some models that an interactive effect 
of democracy with multinational corporate penetration was present. Multinational penetration 
hurt health at lower levels of democracy than at higher levels of democracy. The methods were 
the same as in the 2004 study described above, and the final sample size was also 59. 
Two more recent studies by Chuang 2013a, 2013b have made the contribution that the 
political and economic structures perhaps moderate the relationship between health services and 
infant and child mortality. These studies used lagged dependent variable regression models on 
relatively small samples (46) of less developed countries. They utilize factor analysis to create an 
index of health services consisting of four variables that are extremely close to the latent factor 
that I will create named “socio-health resources”. These four variables are the number of 
physicians per 1,000 population, the percent of births attended by a skilled health professional, 
the percent of the population with access to clean water, and the immunization coverage (the 
percent of children 12-23 months that have had basic immunizations). These two papers found 
that there was a moderating effect of democracy and health services, and that there was no direct 
effect for democracy once a small number of other explanatory/control variables were fit to the 
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model. The existence of other potential indirect pathways for liberal democracy was not 
investigated. In essence, this paper helped to solidify the contribution that others have found that 
liberal democracy may impact population health through its distributive nature. However, neither 
of these papers framed their literature review in this way, and did not link it to existing literature 
about the theoretical reasons why liberal democracy would have an impact on population health. 
However, the structural position within in the world economy is an enduring position for most 
countries in the world. It may not merely moderate the relationship between socio-health 
resources and health outcomes as Chuang 2013a and 2013b argue, but actually create the 
environment where these effects can take place. Thus, in my opinion, political democracy is not 
a moderator but rather socio-health resources mediate the relationship between liberal democracy 
and population health. This matches better with existing literature on how liberal democracy may 
influence population health. 
Wullert and Williamson (2016) examine infant mortality in a sample of 47 Sub-Saharan 
African countries. They utilize lagged cross-section models (10-year lag) whose dependent 
variable was measured in 2010 and independent variables were measured in 2000, following the 
same method that was used in Shandra et al. 2004 and 2005. Their key independent variable is 
Polity2’s variable that ranges from -10 to +10 (21-point scale); hybrid regimes are those that 
have values from -5 to +5. Interestingly, they find that a quadratic model explains cross-national 
variation in infant mortality rates better than a linear model. That means at higher and lower 
levels of democracies, countries had lower infant mortality than at middling levels. This is 
because hybrid regimes are thought to be the most unstable. However, I have three issues with 
this new study. First, in their argument about hybrid regimes they appear to conflate the idea of 
democracy with regime stability. It has been clearly determined by Bollen that liberal democracy 
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and regime stability are two analytically distinct concepts. Further, and perhaps more 
importantly, they do not reference the work by Iqbal (2006) who found that the squared term of 
the polity2 variable is not a statistically significant predictor of healthy life expectancy (HALE). 
In that study, although it is true that the polity2 variable does appear to have a quadratic 
relationship with HALE, once an income variable was entered into the analysis this curvilinear 
relationship disappears. Third, this only heightens the long-standing problem or observation that 
the Polity’s polity2 democracy variable is bimodal with clusters of countries on each end of their 
combined autocracy/democracy spectrum. To drive this point home, consider the problem from 
the Polity dataset’s creators - Jaggers and Gurr’s 1995 article presenting the new Polity III 
dataset. In that dataset 42% of countries for the years 1946 to 1994 are identified as coherent 
autocracies with scores from -10 to -7 and 32% are considered coherent democracies with scores 
+7 to +10 during the same period. Thus, even the creators of this dataset acknowledge this issue. 
This is an artifact of the way that the data is created, and caution should be used when utilizing 
the combined autocracy/democracy variable from Polity. Examining histograms of Bollen’s 
Liberal Democracy Series I does not indicate a bimodal nature to the data.  
The larger point made by Wullert and Williamson about hybrid regimes being bad for 
population health should be addressed. There is realization in the literature on democratization 
that there are a growing number of hybrid regimes or regimes that linger in gray zones for an 
extended period of time and this could be really detrimental to population health. 
“These regimes have often been perceived as democratizing, suggesting one need 
only wait for the process to be complete to see health improvements. As seen in 
Sub-Saharan Africa, however, some countries do not transition, but instead 
become unstable anocracies. Years of instability can have detrimental effects on 
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social welfare as attention and resources are diverted away from health, 
evidenced here in the higher infant mortality among Sub-Saharan Africa’s hybrid 
regimes” (Wullert and Williamson 2016:10).  
In the end, they question the linear nature between liberal democracy and IMR. The study 
controlled for GDP per capita, access to an improved water source, health expenditures, 
education, and women’s status, which were all found to be statistically significant predictors of 
IMR and that all had a negative relationship with IMR. However, ethnic fractionalization, 
income inequality, and HIV prevalence were not statistically significant predictors of IMR. 
Briefly, beyond the outcomes of infant and child mortality, life expectancy and healthy 
life expectancy have also been examined frequently in empirical work examining the impact of 
liberal democracy on population health. As has been stated previously, many studies include 
multiple dependent variables in their analysis (although not simultaneously), so I will not repeat 
any of the studies that have been previously discussed in this section.  
Lena and London (1993) examine a sample of noncore countries and find that countries 
that have high levels of democracy and strong left-wing political regimes enjoy better health 
outcomes than countries that are strong right-wring political regimes. This was one of the first 
studies to find that the political system had an effect on population health and well-being, net of 
domestic and international economic forces. 
Shin (2002), uses an indicator of democracy from Polity II dataset on a sample of 88 
countries to investigate the impact of democracy on life expectancy. However, instead of the 
sample consisting of only low income or non-core countries, they represented a diverse set of 
countries. Shin found that democracy predicted better population health. Levels of democracy 
had a positive and statistically significant effect on life expectancy. Income inequality was 
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shown to have a negative effect on life expectancy. “[I]t is interesting to note that the effect of 
democracy was at least twice as strong as that of income inequality measured in absolute terms 
in all estimated models” (Shin 2002:12). However, there was no relationship between income 
inequality and liberal democracy. These findings also lend support to Bollen and Jackman’s 
(1985, 1995) claims that income inequality and liberal democracy are not related once 
industrialization and other determinants are controlled.  
Franco, Álvarez-Darde, and Ruiz 2004 examined life expectancy, infant mortality, and 
maternal mortality and examined the impact of Freedom House’s freedom ratings on these 
measures of population health. Thus, they utilized a three-category independent variable (free, 
partially free, and not free) from Freedom House as their indicator of liberal democracy. They 
found that with all three dependent variables, higher freedom ratings indicated better health 
outcomes. This effect of democracy was independent of industrialization (GNP), income 
inequality (Gini), and total government expenditures. Their sample included 170 countries, 
representing 98% of the world’s population (although the sample size varied with the outcome 
examined from 140 to 162, with the smallest sample for maternal mortality and the largest for 
infant mortality). It was a cross-sectional design. “The underlying mechanisms for the 
association between democracy and health are still unknown” (Franco, Álvarez-Darde, and Ruiz 
2004:1423). However, their study did not include other variables thought to impact health such 
as education, civil war, and even the age structure of the population. 
Studies that Question the Liberal Democracy and Population Health Link 
As stated earlier, not all studies have found a relationship between liberal democracy and 
population health. It has been argued that any relationship between political democracy and well-
being is spurious. The developmental literature views democracy and social well-being as 
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consequences of economic development. Dependency theorists also hypothesize that any 
relationship between political democracy and well-being is spurious too. They argue that what 
matters most is the dependency status of a country. Weede (1993) found that democracy does not 
have an effect on quality of life, income inequality, or economic growth rates. According to 
some, dependency status predicts both political democracy and well-being (Wickrama and 
Mulford 1996).  As previously discussed, Shandra et al. (2005) did not find an independent effect 
of liberal democracy on child mortality. The effect of liberal democracy was only present in the 
interaction effect with multinational corporate penetration.  
Iqbal (2006) uses Polity IV polity2 scores -10 to +10 and an additional squared polity2 
variable to test for a curvilinear relationship between democracy and HALE. Healthy life 
expectancy is the dependent variable of interest. Cross sectional analysis uses “a GEE model 
with a first-order autoregressive temporal covariance structure” (Iqbal 2006:640). The 
independent variables are all lagged. There is no effect of democracy on health. Also, the 
squared democracy term is also not significant. While there does appear to be a curvilinear 
relationship between liberal democracy and health, this effect goes away after a measure of 
wealth is entered into the model. 
Burroway 2011 conducted a study examining the causes of child malnutrition and 
diarrhea in 52 developing countries, and concludes that predictors of development (GDP pc and 
household wealth) and gender equality appear to make a positive impact. She used multilevel 
modeling to investigate the country level effects of democracy on health, holding constant 
variation within a country in the household and individual level maternal characteristics. In 
addition, Burroway uses multiple measures of democracy to investigate whether there are 
different findings depending on the indicator of democracy uses. However, she was unable to 
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find that democracy had a statistically significant effect on child health. As Burroway discusses, 
the finding from studies on mortality and life expectancy have not been investigated for very 
many other health outcomes. Her investigation was carried out in 84 multivariate models in 
which there were only two instances where democracy was a statistically significant predictor at 
the 0.05 level. Instead, development and gender equality exhibited a robust relationship across 
the models.  
In one of the few studies that explicitly examines maternal health and mortality, Wejnert, 
Parrot and Djumabaeva (2008) investigate the unintended consequences of transitions to 
democracy for former Soviet states. They do not deny that democratization in the former Soviet 
Union brought many positive changes to people’s lives, such as political freedoms, the ability to 
vote in elections, the end of state censorship, greater economic opportunities, and better access to 
a larger selection of goods and services. They do question, however, if there were negative 
unintended consequences of this democratization on the lives of women. In essence they 
experienced a cultural backlash. The authors posit that the transition to democracy in Poland and 
Kyrgyzstan had negative effects on gender politics and health policies for women. In fact, there 
was a return to traditional roles of women s (managing the household and raising children), that 
was a significant change from the roles that women were asked to fulfill during the communist 
period - in other words, a transition from “professionally working mother” to “mother-
homemaker” (Wejnert, Parrot, and Djumabaeva (2008:281).  
These studies that conclude that there may not be an effect of liberal democracy on 
population health are useful in helping to critically question why previous studies have 
overwhelming found a positive effect of liberal democracy on health. One area where this has 
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caused some renewed thinking is how to best operationalize the effect of liberal democracy. Is it 
contemporaneous or cumulative in nature?  
How to Operationalize Liberal Democracy: Contemporaneous or Cumulative? 
One of the major debates taking place in the literature on liberal democracy and 
population health is over the best way to operationalize liberal democracy. Building on the 
finding that not all studies have found a relationship between liberal democracy and population 
health, there is a line of thinking that perhaps it is not contemporaneous liberal democracy that 
matters most, but rather the cumulative liberal democracy over a lengthy period. Three recent 
studies find that the cumulative operationalization is favored.  
Perhaps the best expression as to why there may be a cumulative effect of liberal 
democracy on health is expressed by Gerring, Thacker, and Alfaro (2012). They make 
compelling arguments that liberal democracy is a historical variable with effects that are best 
captured when liberal democracy is operationalized as a stock variable. They utilize Polity IV’s 
polity2 variable principally because it has such a lengthy time scope that it allows aggregation 
from 1900 to the observation year for democracy’s stock operationalization.  
“We surmise, however, that if a democratic form of government is maintained 
over a longer period of time the net effect of that regime type will be positive for 
the welfare of its citizens… We contend, therefore, that the effects of political 
institutions are likely to unfold over time-sometimes a great deal of time-and that 
these temporal effects are cumulative” (Gerring et al. 2012:2). 
Their analysis runs from 1960 to 2000, they have sample sizes ranging from 149 to 192 
countries, and they use as their primary indicator of human development the infant mortality rate.  
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They find that both the contemporaneous and the cumulative operationalization of liberal 
democracy are statistically significant in their full models. However, when both are entered into 
the model simultaneously, the contemporaneous level of democracy operationalization becomes 
non-significant. This is their primary evidence supporting the theory that democracy is best 
thought of as a historical variable.  
 The finding by Gerring et al. (2012) is also consistent with Besley and Kudamatsu’s 
(2006) finding that democracy is a statistically significant predictor of life expectancy, infant 
mortality, sanitation, clean water, immunization and health spending, utilizing a panel model 
with outcomes at five year intervals from 1962 to 2002. They too use Polity data and take as 
their contemporaneous indicator of liberal democracy (the average value of liberal democracy in 
the preceding four years). Their long-term indicator is the proportion of years a country was 
democratic since 1956 to the current year. They find that there is a positive and statistically 
significant effect of democracy on controlling for income and income squared. However, when 
they add in the long-term indicator the contemporaneous effect of liberal democracy disappears, 
leaving only the long-term effect. These results also are robust when countries’ fixed effects are 
included in the model. 
 The third study, Wigley and Akkoyunlu-Wigley (2011), appears so convinced of the 
arguments made by Gerring et al (2012) that the only indicator of liberal democracy included in 
their analysis was a cumulative one reflecting the stock of democracy over a long period of time 
(since 1960).  Thus, the largest amount of accumulation for any country is 40 years, since the 
dependent variable is measured in 2000. They conclude that the stock of liberal democracy is a 
statistically significant predictor of health after adding in all key distribution variables and the 
other control variables.  
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However, their results do not provide the best test as to the nature of the distributive 
effect, since the way they are entered into their model is as if they are controlling for these facts. 
The authors seemingly acknowledge this possibility when they state “[s]till, given the possibility 
that the distributive variables do not adequately capture the distributive channel, the results are 
best interpreted as evidence for, rather than confirmation of, the nondistributive channel” (667). 
One way to test for these distributive channels would be to utilize SEM so that the theorized 
mediating pathways could be modeled explicitly; thus, the question is an empirical one that can 
be tested. Then, quantification of the effects (or lack of effects) could be achieved in a straight-
forward manner 
Critique of Previous Studies 
The following quote from Moon and Dixon (1985) helps us to explain that, while it has 
been found that democracy has a positive impact on health and quality of life, the exact causal 
mechanisms at work are not known. “Interesting too, is the finding that democratic processes are 
unconditionally related to positive welfare outcomes, though the causal mechanism at work is 
much less transparent than in the case of ideological commitment” (Moon and Dixon 1985: 690). 
Although there are a lot of general explanations as to how democracies improve health, there is a 
consistent lack of the specification of the mechanisms in prior research. The following quote is 
from an ecological study on democracy’s impact on life expectancy, maternal mortality, and 
infant mortality, and illustrates this lack of specification of the mechanisms by which democracy 
impacts health. “The underlying mechanisms for the association between democracy and health 
are still unknown” (Franco, Alvarez-Dardet, and Ruiz. 2004:1423). Thus, after almost 30 years 
of study, little more about these mechanisms is known. 
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Since democracy most likely does not have a direct effect on reducing maternal mortality, 
if it does have any effect, it must be mediated by some intervening variable(s). To try to model 
these mediating variables, I looked to prior demographic literature to find the key potential 
mediating concepts mentioned in the frameworks by McCarthy and Maine (1992) and Thaddeus 
and Maine (1994), as well other theorizations regarding public health services and female 
empowerment. In addition, I also examined the political economy, political sociology, and 
political science literature to identify potentially mediating variables from these studies.  This 
study will bring the focus on the mechanisms by which democracy impacts (or fails to impact) 
health by positing that socio-health resources and gender equality serve as two key mediators of 
the relationship between liberal democracy and maternal mortality. 
The Mediating Effect of Public Health Resources  
Referring back to Thaddeus and Maine’s framework, phase two delays involve the actual 
delay in arriving at a facility after the decision has been made to access it. As detailed earlier, 
this delay is impacted by the physical distribution of qualified health centers, as well as travel 
time and expenditures.  It is likely that increased provisions for public services in general (such 
as roads and public transportation) and increases in provisions for health-related services will 
positively impact maternal mortality. As nations experience higher levels of provisions for public 
services, we would expect these phase two delays to be reduced.  
Phase three delays are those realized once a woman has arrived at a health care facility. 
Here as well we can expect that higher levels of provisions for public services including 
medications, trained personnel, stable supplies of electricity, etc., will result in decreases in 
phase three delays and reductions in maternal mortality. It has been shown that democracies tend 
to spend more on health care and other public projects, and this could influence phase two and 
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three delays. Increased quality facilities and increased infrastructure to access these facilities 
could decrease phase two delays. In addition, if democracies spend more on health infrastructure, 
than it is possible that this could influence the quantity and quality of facilities and the conditions 
at these facilities. In addition, greater emphasis on health expenditures is likely to lead to higher 
quality personnel, and the availability of needed drugs and supplies at health facilities. 
Building on Chuang et al. 2013a, 2013b I will construct a latent variable consisting of 
four indicators: the number of physicians per 1,000 population, the births attended by a skilled 
health professional, the percent of the population with access to clean water, and the gross 
enrollment ratio of secondary education. Preliminary analysis that I have undertaken helped me 
identify that this latent variable can be conceived as having these four variables as effect 
indicators. These effect indicators are realizations of the underlying latent variable socio-health 
resources. “The effect indicators of the same latent variable have conceptual unity in that they all 
correspond to the same dimension of a concept” (Bollen and Bauldry 2011:259). Beyond my 
theorization of the relationship between the socio-health resources latent variable and its effect 
indicators, a vanishing tetrads test yielded evidence consistent with effect indicators (Bollen and 
Ting 2000).21 
The Mediating Effect of Gender Equality  
As mentioned above, even if there are adequate provisions for public services by a 
government, it is unlikely that women will benefit to the full potential if the social environment 
is highly unequal. Phase one delays are inextricably linked to issues of the status of women. 
Findings by Singh et al. (2013) conclude “Thus there is potential for the promotion of gender 
                                                     
21 If my latent variable had causal indicators, then it would mean that any increases in any of the causal indicators would 
increase the values of my latent variable. Effect and causal indicators portray a different understanding of the 
relationship between the latent variable and the manifest variables and are not equivalent.  
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equality to improve maternal and child health by increasing the ability of a woman to access 
services for herself and her children” (10). “Thus the significance of the gender measures after 
controlling for these key inputs implies that a focus on gender equality, in addition to a focus on 
education and poverty reduction, can do more to improve maternal and child health than a focus 
on education and poverty reduction alone” (10). Women who have more education are likely to 
more accurately perceive the seriousness of complications, and make better decision about 
seeking help from health facilities and have the ability to travel to an appropriate health care 
facility. Low status of women, lack of recognition as to the seriousness of the complication, an 
inability to travel, a lack of resources to travel, negative past experiences with a facility and an 
overall low perception of the care to be received at a facility all can increase this phase one 
delay. It is likely that increases in the status of women and increases in the education of women 
can cut down on the length of time of this delay. As women have increased status they are likely 
to be seen by themselves, their family, and community as a valuable asset that need to be 
protected. Also, as women’s education increases it is likely that their general health-related 
knowledge will increase as well as her recognition as to the seriousness of pregnancy-related 
complications she experiences.  As greater gender equality is hypothesized to lead to decreased 
delays in phase one of the model, we will expect that increases in democracy will lead to 
decreases in phase one delays and ultimately in less maternal deaths. In addition, increased 
economic status and education typically has been shown to accompany democracy, and is likely 
to decrease phase one delays by raising the socioeconomic status of women, their families, and 
their communities. 
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This study employs the fertility rate as a measure of gender equality, as it has been shown 
to be highly correlated with other measures of gender equality. In this paper, fertility is the best 
indicator of gender equality that it most closely tied to the MMR.  
Unanswered Questions 
 There are several unanswered questions in the literature regarding the link between 
liberal democracy and health that this paper will seek to address; however, the focus is on three 
key issues.  First, liberal democracy is widely theorized to have a distributive effect on health 
because it is mediated by public spending on health and socio-health resources. Yet the modeling 
techniques chosen in previous research have not led to a clear understanding of this distributive 
effect. Second, there is debate in the literature regarding the conceptualization of the impact of 
liberal democracy on health, i.e., is it a contemporaneous or cumulative effect. Third, are there 
non-distributive effects of liberal democracy? There has been some recent theorization on the 
possibility of additional effects of liberal democracy on population health via non-distributive 
effects, but early work has not adequately answered this question. (Again, the methodology 
utilized did not lend itself to fully answering this question.) Other unanswered questions - such 
as if liberal democracy can impact health via indirect effects mediated by gender equality - are 
closely related to the above questions, but still represent important research topics. Further, due 
to data and methodological limitations, most studies utilize inconsistent sample sizes and/or 
listwise deletion. Also, MMR appears to be, theoretically and practically speaking, a good 
indicator to assess overall population health, yet it has been underutilized in development and 
political economy studies. At the same time, there are calls from inside (those that study 
maternal mortality explicitly) to search for additional ways to address the problem. The broader 
225 
economic, social, and political environment in which these maternal deaths occur has been 
identified as a place to look for potential solutions. 
My first major contribution focuses on explicitly modeling the highly theorized 
distributive effect of liberal democracy on health. This is one area of scholarship where a testable 
theory exists, yet no one has taken these insights and modeled it. As stated above, most existing 
scholarship has assumed that liberal democracy impacts health through its distributive (i.e., non-
direct) effects. Liberal democracy is thought to lead to greater spending on health, and this in 
turn is thought to lead to better socio-health resources such as improved water, more births 
attended by a skilled health profession, more doctors, better education, and so forth. It is through 
these mediating conditions that liberal democracy is thought to have a positive impact on health 
outcomes. Yet, despite this hypothesized indirect effect, most existing studies merely do some 
sort of cross-sectional or panel regression analysis, and do not incorporate these ideas into their 
empirical model. These studies mainly control for measures such as public expenditures on 
health and socio-health resources and then point to the smaller effect of liberal democracy on 
health after the inclusion of these variables as evidence that these mediating effects exist. Despite 
these hypothesized pathways, they are neither tested nor empirically assessed. This study places 
these distributive effects at the forefront of the analysis by explicitly modeling these mediating 
factors and by empirically uncovering these indirect effects. The use of structural equation 
models (SEMs) allows these questions to be directly addressed. 
Second, as stated above, recent studies are questioning how to conceptualize the impact 
of liberal democracy on health. While Gerring et al. (2012) is not the first study to examine the 
cumulative effects of liberal democracy on health, it certainly has provided the best theoretical 
justification for this long-term effect. In that study, they claim that liberal democracy’s effect on 
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health is historical in nature and that it develops over a significantly long period of time. This 
assessment paints a rather grim picture of prospects for increased health via the effects of liberal 
democracy, especially in a recent climate of democratic stagnation. This analysis will examine if 
liberal democracy has contemporaneous and/or cumulative effects. In addition, it will explore 
whether or not the time frame is as long as theorized and investigate cumulative effects present 
since the early 1970s. Perhaps prospects of improved health due to liberal democracy do not take 
as long as previously theorized. 
Third, beyond the distributive effects of liberal democracy on health, recent studies have 
posited that there are also non-distributive or direct effects. These effects are said to be present if 
there is still a significant effect of democracy after controlling for the variables that are thought 
to comprise the distributive effect. Thus, this study also assesses whether there is a direct effect 
of liberal democracy on maternal mortality after accounting for the indirect pathways outlined 
above. Granted, this is a crude test in that it does not specifically model these non-distributive 
effects through mediating mechanisms such as autonomy, social capital, collective action, or 
media diffusion (Wigley and Akkoyunlu-Wigley 2011). However, the first step to uncovering the 
existence of non-distributive effects would be to examine if there are any additional direct effects 
of liberal democracy on the MMR once the distributive effects and any indirect effects via 
gender equality have been taken into account. If so, then future research can explicitly model 
these relationships.  
Fourth, previous research has not addressed the impact of liberal democracy on gender 
equality and its impact on population health. Yet, insights from the two frameworks that account 
for maternal mortality in the demography literature indicate that increased levels of gender 
equality could be a particularly useful way to help diminish the number of maternal deaths. I 
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include in my analysis an indicator of gender equality (fertility). Admittedly this is a crude 
indicator of gender equality, yet, there is good reason to suspect that this indicator will be useful 
at identifying if there are indirect effects of liberal democracy mediated by gender equality 
(Wickrama and Lorenz 2002). Elaborating this relationship in future studies would be a logical 
next step for future analyses as it could hold some real insight into tangible ways that maternal 
deaths could be prevented.  
Previous studies have utilized a variety of indicators to examine the impact of liberal 
democracy on health outcomes, such as life expectancy or healthy life expectancy, the infant or 
child mortality rate, and child malnutrition and diarrhea rates. The literature is mostly silent on 
the potential impacts of liberal democracy on maternal mortality. This silence is surprising 
considering that the MMR is thought to be one of the best indicators of the overall health care 
system (Farmer quoted in WuDunn and Kristol 2009). Beyond this justification for utilizing the 
MMR as a proxy for population health, maternal mortality is a huge problem across the world 
and one that appears to persist despite notable international attention and resources directed at 
improving the chances of survival for pregnant mothers. Great reductions have been made, yet 
development goals were not achieved in the desired time in this area. Clearly, new explanations 
and new strategies for preventing maternal deaths are needed. This analysis then may make a 
contribution to the study of population health more generally and also specifically to the study of 
maternal mortality.  
In addition to the theoretical issues discussed above, this paper will also seek to make 
empirical contributions as well. Inconsistent results have been blamed on analyses that utilize 
small sample sizes and listwise deletion methods. First, because many health-related statistics 
often are not available for a large sample of countries, the generalization of their results can be 
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precarious.  This study relies on MMR data with good coverage since the 1990s (especially when 
compared to other health indicators) and does not require any sort of interpolation of the data for 
years of missing observations. In addition, employing SEMs allows the utilization of the direct 
maximum likelihood estimator. Instead of performing listwise deletion in order to carry out 
analyses, this study utilizes all available information. While SEMs are relatively unused in this 
research question, this is not the first to use these methods. However, previous attempts at using 
this methodology produced more questions than they answered (see Klomp and de Haan 2009), 
perhaps due to an apparent confusion over the proper use of the method. Several issues can lead 
to this confusion, such as the failure of the researchers to identify a model that adequately 
reproduces the variances and covariances in the data, an inaccurate and misleading path diagram 
representing the relationship amongst the variables, or miscalculations in the way that the authors 
discuss the empirical fit of the model. In essence, this casts suspicion on all of the results and 
conclusions drawn from that analysis. This paper attempts to correct these misconceptions by 
properly utilizing SEMs. 
In summary, providing answers to these questions regarding the explicit modeling of a 
distributive effect of liberal democracy on population health, examining if these cumulative 
effects really necessitate a lengthy historical perspective , explicitly and empirically assessing 
indirect effects, determining if there are direct effects in addition to indirect effects, exploring if 
gender equality is another pathway from choice of the dependent variable, and avoiding critiques 
of many previous studies by utilizing an estimator (direct ML) that can deal successfully with 
missing data and prevent small sample sizes are all contributions that this analysis will make to 
the literature.   
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In addition to these main analyses, this study includes some subsequent analyses to guard 
against potential problems. First, in order to ensure that the choice of dependent variable, MMR, 
is not driving my results, analyses were also run using the most popular indicator of population 
health in existing research, life expectancy. Similar results would add confidence regarding the 
use of either variable – MMR or life expectancy.  In addition, other studies use different 
indicators of liberal democracy and these results may be questioned if they are due to something 
unique to Bollen’s Indicator of Liberal Democracy Series I. Therefore, all analyses were rerun 
using an indicator of liberal democracy from the Polity IV dataset. In addition, this study also 
examines outlying observations and influential cases to make sure that a small number of cases 
does not have undue influence on the results.  
Methods 
Sample 
In a manner consistent with the previous chapters, this study focuses on all the countries 
in the world for which there is available data. Thus, this study utilizes a sample of all 181 
countries in the world for which there is data available on the dependent variable – specifically, 
non-missing observations for the MMR in 2012.22  
Analytic Strategy 
In this chapter, I employ structural equation modeling (SEM) to assess the relationships 
between liberal democracy, maternal mortality, and a latent variable of socio-health resources 
consisting of multiple effect indicators including percent of the population with access to clean 
                                                     
22 In addition, I will also re-examine these analyses in a set of countries which excludes high-income countries.  One 
argument for excluding high-income countries is that they represent a tiny share of the burden of maternal mortality. 
Thus, this secondary sample will include 125 low-income countries for which there is non-missing values for the 
dependent variable in this study, maternal mortality. This consists of a substantially larger sample than in many previous 
studies that have only examined countries that had complete case data, such as Chuang et al.  2013a, 2013b. 
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water, the number of births attended by a skilled health care worker, the number of doctors, and 
secondary schooling. I posit that these four indicators represent a coherent latent variable 
indicating the socio-health resources in a country. To carry out these analyses I rely on two 
statistical software packages: IBM SPSS Amos version 21 and Mplus version 6.12.23 My 
research design utilizes a time-ordered dependent variable, where the dependent variable is 
measured in time after the independent variables. This is a common strategy used in cross-
sectional macro-comparative research in order to help adhere to conditions of causality, where 
causes must precede effects in time (e.g. Austin and McKinney 2012; Burroway 2010, 2012; 
Shandra et al. 2004, 2005, Shircliff and Shandra 2011). In this study, I measure MMR for the 
year 2012 and all independent variables are measured for the year 2007, since I would expect the 
influence of the explanatory variables on a country’s MMR to be fairly immediate. Whether or 
not the influence of liberal democracy is more contemporaneous or cumulative in nature is an 
empirical question addressed in this study. As stated above, the focus is still squarely focused on 
the potential long-term impacts of liberal democracy on population health, as one of my main 
contributions will be to test whether cumulative effects of liberal democracy predict population 
health better than more contemporaneous effects. Thus, although, strictly speaking, this is a 
cross-sectional analysis, there is a long-term time element incorporated into the research design. 
SEMs can be viewed as a more general and flexible framework for modeling 
relationships between variables than multiple regression (e.g. Bollen 1989), and there are several 
benefits in using SEMs to model rates of maternal mortality.  Two main issues drive the choice 
of SEMs as the most appropriate method of analysis. First, one of the key variables in the 
                                                     
23 I find the use of two software packages beneficial as each has unique strengths and weaknesses. For example, while 
there is a sort of ease and simplicity associated with the GUI in Amos, it is unable to calculate the standard errors of the 
indirect effects. In addition, when specified, Mplus will give an assessment of specific indirect effects via a particular 
pathway, which is information not available in Amos.   
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analysis that facilitates quantifying the distributive nature of liberal democracy is socio-health 
resources, a latent variable, and all of the indicators of this latent variable contain a non-
negligible amount of measurement error.  In addition, the analysis utilizes multiple dependent 
variables in a simultaneous equation, and I am interested in not just the direct effects but also the 
indirect effects of these variables. SEM is a methodology that addresses these issues, whereas 
regression based methods do not.   
SEM is a superior empirical tool for teasing out the interconnections between variables 
and the direct and indirect effects of one variable on another. Perhaps one of the best reasons for 
the superiority of SEM is that it explicitly allows the researcher to build into the model the 
theoretical advancements that have been made in the field. In this instance, I am able to integrate 
into my model the long-standing observation that countries with a higher percent of Muslims 
typically have higher fertility. This relationship would be omitted from mainstream regression 
techniques because these two variables would be entered into the model as competing predictors, 
disregarding important information about the inter-relationship between these two variables.  
Mainstream regression procedures only openly yield the direct effect of one variable on 
another, holding all other variables constant. They have several limitations: they do not reveal 
the mechanisms by which one variable impacts another, they do not utilize theory and posit 
interconnections between variables in the model, they do not lend themselves in an efficient and 
straight-forward manner to recover the direct, specific indirect, and total indirect effects, they do 
not have standard errors for the direct, specific indirect, and total indirect effects, they do not 
have overall fit statistics that can help us adjudge between two or more feasible and nested 
models that are equally plausible based on the extent of current knowledge, and they do not 
implicitly or easily deal with missing data in an effective manner. For all of these reasons, SEM 
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is a superior choice for examining the total impact of liberal democracy on rates of maternal 
mortality and should provide new insights into the link between liberal democracy and 
population health. 
Variables Used in the Analysis 
 Descriptive statistics for the variables used in this analysis are presented in Table 11 
(means and standard deviations). In addition, Table 11 also presents a correlation matrix of these 
variables. Notice that there is a high degree of correlation between access to an improved water 
source, the number of births attended by a skilled health worker, the number of doctors, and 
gross enrollment in secondary schooling. This might be a preliminary indication of 
multicollinearity in this model. However, multicollinearity between effect indicators of the latent 
variable is not unexpected. As effect indicators are multiple, imperfect measures of the same 
underlying concept, a high degree of correlation between these indicators is the expected result. 
Conversely, a low degree of correlation may indicate that they are not measures of the same 
underlying concept.  
Outcome (Dependent Variable) 
Maternal mortality ratio (MMR) - This is the number of women who die from direct and 
indirect causes attributed to pregnancy and childbirth within 42 days after pregnancy each year 
per 100,000 live births. In 2010, this variable had a world average of 210 (i.e. 210 women died in 
pregnancy per 100,000 live births in 2010). In developed regions of the world the MMR is 16, 
while in the developing world the MMR is 240. This study uses the 2012 value of this variable 
for the key dependent variable.  
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Covariates 
All of the other variables used in this analysis (covariates) are measured in 2007 to allow 
a five-year lag to impact MMR. Intervening variables are also measured in 2007, but given the 
relative stable nature of the completely exogenous variables (the rural population percent, the 
percent of Muslims in a population, a country’s GDP, and a country’s level or accumulation of 
liberal democracy), I did not further lag these completely exogenous variables.  
Contemporaneous Liberal Democracy. This variable is Bollen’s Liberal Democracy 
Series I Indicator. This is a continuous variable that has a range from 0 to 100. I suspect that 
liberal democracy will impact only public health expenditures directly. Whether or not there is a 
direct effect to a country’s MMR is an open empirical question. There is reason to believe that 
there could be non-distributive effects on population health, yet there are also reasons to suspect 
this may not be the case. I utilize the measure of skewness and a histogram to determine that this 
variable was not originally skewed. 
Cumulative Liberal Democracy. This variable is derived from Bollen’s Liberal 
Democracy Series I Indicator. The value for a given year is the cumulative score that the country 
received in all previous years beginning in 1972. Thus, the value for this variable in 2007 is the 
sum total of a country’s liberal democracy score from 1972 to 2006 and this variable ranges from 
0 to 3494. I assume that this variable will have the same pattern of effects as contemporaneous 
liberal democracy because the major theorized manner in which liberal democracy can influence 
population health is via its distributive effect. I utilize the measure of skewness and a histogram 
to determine that this variable was not originally skewed. 
Socio-Health Resources. The following four variables are used to construct the latent 
variable Socio-Health Resources. Number of Doctors captures the number of formally trained 
234 
physicians, nurses, and midwives in a nation per 100,000 people (World Bank 2013). Properly 
trained medical personnel are absolutely necessary to properly treat and prevent infectious 
disease, and therefore represent an important health resource measure included in the analysis. 
Percent of births attended represents the percentage of the total deliveries under the supervision 
and care of skilled health staff. This includes guidance to pregnant women at all stages of 
pregnancy, including pre-labor, labor, and the postpartum period. Percent Access to Clean Water 
refers to the percentage of the population using an improved drinking water source. Improved 
drinking water sources include piped water located inside the user’s dwelling, plot, or yard, and 
other improved drinking water sources, such as public taps or standpipes, tube wells or 
boreholes, protected dug wells, protected springs, and rainwater collection. This variable is used 
as the latent variable’s scaling indicator. The secondary school enrollment measure represents a 
gross enrollment ratio that calculates the ratio of total enrollment, regardless of age, to the 
population age group that officially corresponds to secondary level education for the year 2007. 
It is hypothesized that increased levels of Socio-Health Resources will lead to decreases in a 
country’s fertility level as well as its MMR. I determined that none of these four variables were 
skewed by use of the measure of skewness and a histogram.  
The fertility rate is an estimate of the number of children an average woman would have 
if current age-specific fertility rates remained constant during her reproductive years. This is an 
important control variable in that lower levels of fertility will be associated with lower levels of 
MMR, since a non-pregnant woman cannot have complications leading to MMR. In addition, 
this variable serves as a crude indicator of female empowerment in this study. Assessing the best 
way to measure female empowerment or gender equality is beyond the scope of this study and is 
subject to debate. It has long been accepted that, in general, women with more say in the 
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Table 10: Countries in the Analysis and Maternal Mortality Ratio (MMR) in 2012 (N=181) 
Country MMR 2012 
Afghanistan  496 
Albania   30 
Algeria   145 
Angola   526 
Argentina  55 
Armenia   30 
Australia  6 
Austria   4 
Azerbaijan  25 
Bahamas  82 
Bahrain   16 
Bangladesh  214 
Barbados  29 
Belarus   4 
Belgium   7 
Belize   32 
Benin   429 
Bhutan   177 
Bolivia   230 
Bosnia-Herzegovina 12 
Botswana  153 
Brazil   60 
Brunei   25 
Bulgaria   10 
Burkina Faso  398 
Burundi   780 
Cambodia  178 
Cameroon  632 
Canada   8 
Cape Verde  48 
CAR   876 
Chad   931 
Chile   24 
China   31 
Colombia  66 
Comoros  365 
Congo-DR  771 
Congo-Rep.  483 
Costa Rica  27 
Côte d’Ivoire  715 
Croatia   9 
Cuba   41 
Cyprus   7 
Czech Rep.  4 
Denmark  7 
Djibouti   257 
Dominican Republic 62  
Ecuador   74  
Egypt   37 
El Salvador  57 
Equatorial Guinea 361 
Eritrea   540 
Estonia   9  
Country MMR 2012 
Ethiopia   447 
Fiji   33 
Finland   3 
France   9 
Gabon   314  
Gambia   741 
Georgia   39 
Germany  7 
Ghana   324 
Greece   3 
Grenada   27 
Guatemala  105 
Guinea   695 
Guinea-Bissau  553 
Guyana   239 
Haiti   372 
Honduras  141 
Hungary   16 
Iceland   3 
India   197 
Indonesia  148 
Iran   26 
Iraq   51 
Ireland   8 
Israel   5 
Italy   4 
Jamaica   92 
Japan   6 
Jordan   59 
Kazakhstan  15 
Kenya   562 
Kiribati   101 
Kyrgyzstan  81 
Kuwait   4 
Laos   250 
Latvia   18 
Lebanon   17 
Lesotho   549 
Liberia   787 
Libya   9 
Lithuania  10 
Luxembourg  11 
Macedonia  8 
Madagascar  402 
Malawi   624 
Malaysia  45  
Maldives  76 
Mali   617 
Malta   11 
Mauritania  682 
Mauritius  54 
Mexico   42 
Micronesia, Fed. St. 107  
Country MMR 2012 
Moldova  26 
Mongolia  53 
Montenegro  8 
Morocco  137 
Mozambique  563 
Myanmar  195 
Namibia   299 
Nepal   308 
Netherlands  7 
New Zealand  12 
Nicaragua  164 
Niger   619 
Nigeria   819 
North Korea  91 
Norway   5 
Oman   18 
Pakistan   197 
Panama   101 
Papua New Guinea 227 
Paraguay  139 
Peru   75 
Philippines  126 
Poland   3 
Portugal   11 
Qatar   14 
Romania  30 
Russia   26 
Rwanda   336 
Saint Lucia  50 
Saint Vincent  47 
Samoa   59 
Sao Tome & Principe 162 
Saudi Arabia  13 
Senegal   351 
Sierra Leone  1510 
Singapore  12 
Slovakia   6  
Slovenia   8  
Solomon Islands  126 
Somalia   791 
South Africa  152 
South Korea  13 
South Sudan  857 
Spain   5 
Sri Lanka  32 
Sudan   330 
Suriname  155 
Swaziland  400 
Sweden   4 
Switzerland  6 
Syria   56 
Tajikistan  34 
Tanzania  464  
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Country MMR 2012 
Thailand 22 
Timor-Leste 267 
Togo 391 
Tonga  135 
Trinidad & Tobago 63 
Tunisia  64 
Turkey  19 
Turkmenistan 45 
Country MMR 2012 
UAE 6 
Uganda  395 
Ukraine  25 
United Kingdom 10 
United States 14 
Uruguay  16 
Uzbekistan 38 
Vanuatu  87 
Country MMR 2012 
Venezuela 98 
Vietnam  56 
Yemen 410 
Yugoslavia 16 
Zambia 243 
Zimbabwe 379
household typically have less children. Thus, I suspect that countries with higher fertility rates 
(where women have less female empowerment) will have a higher MMR compared to countries 
with less fertility (and where women have more female empowerment). In addition, one could 
also argue that high levels of fertility and high MMRs are a consequence of poor health 
conditions. The decision to have more children may be a survival strategy on the part of the 
parents. Having more children increases the chance that the parents will have someone to help 
support and care for them in their old age and may be a strategic decision spurred on by a 
country’s poor socio-health resources. High fertility rates and high rates of maternal mortality (in 
addition to high rates of infant mortality) all seem to be higher in countries with poor health 
conditions. I utilize the measure of skewness and a histogram to determine that this variable was 
not originally skewed. 
Percent Rural. This variable measures the percentage of the national population living in 
rural areas. Previous studies have shown that rural populations are associated with increased 
levels of MMR due to the lack of health care provisions in rural areas. In addition, it is 
reasonable to assume that countries that have a larger percent of their population living in rural 
areas will have lower socio-health resources compared to countries with a smaller percent of its 
population inhabiting rural areas. It is widely acknowledged that on average there are less socio-
health resources in rural areas compared to urban regions. In addition, because of the lack of 
opportunities for professionals in rural areas, it would not be surprising to see an additional effect 
237 
T
a
b
le
 1
1
: 
C
o
rr
el
a
ti
o
n
 M
a
tr
ix
, 
M
ea
n
s,
 a
n
d
 S
ta
n
d
a
rd
 D
ev
ia
ti
o
n
s 
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
(7
)
(8
)
(9
)
(1
0
) 
(1
1
)
(1
)
M
M
R
1
 
(2
)
%
 R
u
ra
l
0
.5
3
 
1
 
(3
)
%
 M
u
sl
im
0
.1
7
 
0
.0
6
 
1
 
(4
)
G
D
P
 p
c 
(l
o
g
g
ed
)
-0
.6
9
-0
.7
2
-0
.2
4
1
 
(5
)
C
u
m
u
la
ti
v
e 
L
ib
er
al
 D
em
o
cr
ac
y
-0
.4
5
-0
.3
8
-0
.5
1
0
.5
8
 
1
 
(6
)
P
u
b
li
c 
H
ea
lt
h
 E
x
p
. 
(l
o
g
g
ed
)
-0
.3
7
-0
.3
4
-0
.3
8
0
.4
7
 
0
.5
3
 
1
 
(7
)
F
er
ti
li
ty
0
.8
4
0
.5
8
0
.2
9
-0
.7
5
-0
.5
1
-0
.3
9
1
 
(8
)
W
at
er
-0
.7
5
-0
.6
1
-0
.2
3
0
.7
5
0
.5
3
0
.4
8
-0
.8
1
1
 
(9
)
B
ir
th
s 
A
tt
.
-0
.7
5
-0
.5
9
-0
.1
3
0
.7
7
0
.3
1
0
.4
2
-0
.7
9
0
.7
9
 
1
 
(1
0
)
D
o
ct
o
rs
-0
.6
-0
.6
4
-0
.2
1
0
.6
7
0
.4
6
0
.3
9
-0
.7
1
0
.6
1
 
0
.6
3
 
1
 
(1
1
)
S
ec
o
n
d
ar
y
 S
ch
o
o
li
n
g
-0
.8
5
-0
.6
5
-0
.3
2
0
.8
0
.6
0
.4
7
-0
.8
5
0
.8
3
 
0
.8
4
 
0
.7
1
 
1
 
M
ea
n
 
1
8
7
.1
 
5
4
.4
 
2
3
 
8
.2
 
1
7
3
5
.4
 
1
.1
 
3
.1
 
8
5
.4
 
7
7
.9
 
1
.6
 
7
5
.6
 
S
.D
.
2
5
3
 
2
3
.7
 
3
5
.7
 
1
.7
 
1
1
3
2
.6
 
0
.7
 
1
.6
 
1
6
.8
 
2
6
.2
 
1
.5
 
3
1
.4
 
238 
of percent rural on the availability of doctors. The brain drain operates both internationally and 
domestically in less-developed countries. Percent rural did not appear to be skewed when I 
examine its histogram and its measure of skewness. 
Percent Muslim. This variable measures the proportion of a country’s total national 
population that is Muslim. I would expect that countries that have greater percent of their 
population Muslim will have a higher fertility rate compared to countries that have a smaller 
percentage of its population. Muslim are said to have higher fertility due to their strong 
patriarchal system that favors larger families and their lower levels of contraception use 
(Caldwell 1986). In addition, Razzak found that Muslim majority countries spend less on public 
health, although the reasons behind this finding were unclear (Razzak et al. 2011).  Caldwell 
argues that Muslim countries have lower public spending on education due to the lack of 
importance of women to be educated (Caldwell 2006). This may be an avenue for future 
research. This variable did not appear to be skewed based upon its measure of skewness and with 
a visual inspection of a histogram. 
Gross Domestic Product per capita (logged). This is the total annual output of a 
country’s economy, per person, measured in thousands. Previous research suggests that countries 
with higher levels of GDP may spend more on public health expenditures and that these 
countries may have better health than those with lower levels of GDP. In addition, higher levels 
of GDP may yield higher levels of socio-health resources. I utilize the measure of skewness and 
a histogram to determine that this variable was originally skewed. Thus, I performed a natural 
log transformation to correct for this skew and to better approximate linearity in the parameters 
and reduce the influence of extreme outliers 
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Public Health Expenditures (logged). The percent of GDP that is spent on health from 
government budgets, borrowed funds, grants from external sources, and social health insurance 
funds. Based on previous research there is good reason to believe that a country’s level of liberal 
democracy is related to the amount of public health expenditures (Ross 2006, Tsai 2006). In 
addition, I would suspect that countries with higher spending on public health expenditure will 
have increased socio-health resources. I also found that this variable was initially skewed. I 
therefore performed a natural log transformation to correct for this skew and to better 
approximate linearity in the parameters and reduce the influence of extreme outliers 
Results 
Before explicitly addressing the results, I would like to orient the readers to the path 
diagrams of the SEMs (Figure 20 and Figure 21). Notice that the diagram is made up of 
rectangles, ovals, single and double-headed arrows, and coefficients flagged for statistical 
significance. The rectangles represent exogenous variables that are measured in the dataset. The 
four rectangles on the left of the diagram represent the four completely exogenous variables in 
the analysis (i.e., the causes are not included in the model). These four variables are correlated as 
represented by the set of double-headed arrows that connect them. Note the single-headed arrows 
that originate from them (and other variables in the model) and indicate a direct path to other 
variables. These represent the effect of the originating variable on the terminal one, and the 
numerical values flagged for statistical significance on these paths are standardized coefficients. 
Any variable represented by an oval is a latent variable, meaning that it is not directly measured 
in the dataset. The one latent variable in the model named “socio-health resources” is not directly 
measured but is said to have its presence reflected in the four variables that are contained in 
rectangles (water, births attended, doctors, and secondary schooling). These four indicators are 
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not completely determined, so there is also a single-headed arrow that terminates in them 
seemingly from nowhere. These arrows and others like it in the model are the effects from 
unobserved errors. I have chosen to not explicitly show them in the model for the sake of clarity. 
Notice the outcome of interest is only impacted directly by socio-health resources and fertility. 
That indicates that all other variables in the model which impact MMR do so indirectly. Thus, 
for instance, the percentage population that is Muslim in a country has no direct effect on its 
MMR but has three indirect paths by which it can impact MMR. First, by impacting fertility and 
then fertility impacting MMR. Second, through its effect on public health expenditures, which in 
turn effects socio-health resources, which in turn effects MMR. Finally, by impacting public 
health expenditures, which impacts socio-health resources, which then impacts fertility, and then 
fertility impacts MMR. 
Each of these three indirect paths are specific indirect paths and combined they constitute 
the total indirect effect of percentage Muslim on MMR. Standardized and unstandardized 
indirect effects can be recovered directly from the path diagram by multiplying each path 
coefficient along the way from the originating variable to the terminating variable.  The path 
diagrams display standardized coefficients. While this information is accurate for the point 
estimates (not considering rounding), it does not indicate what the standard errors are. These 
have to be calculated by the software, namely Mplus. In this case, because there is no direct 
effect of percentage Muslim on MMR, its total indirect effect is its total effect. More generally, 
the total effect of a variable on another in the model is the sum of the total indirect effects and 
direct effects.  
For the analysis of the contemporaneous effect of liberal democracy on MMR, Figure 20 
is the path diagram, Table 12 displays the direct, total indirect, and total effects, and Table 14 
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displays all of the direct pathways shown in the path diagram. For each table, I have displayed 
the unstandardized coefficient flagged for statistical significance, the standard error of the 
unstandardized coefficient, and the standardized coefficient. For the empirical analysis that 
focuses on cumulative effect of liberal democracy on MMR, see Figure 21, Table 13, and Table 
15. 
Table 12: Direct, Indirect, and Total Effects of the Predictors of Maternal Mortality Ratio (MMR) 
with Contemporaneous Effects of Liberal Democracy 
Predictor MMR 
 Direct Indirect Total 
Contemporaneous Liberal Democracy --
 -.223* -.223* 
 -- (.113) (.113) 
 -- - .027 - .027 
% Rural --
 1.041+ 1.041+ 
 -- (.579) (.579) 
 -- .096 .096 
% Muslim --
 .325* .325* 
 -- (.136) (.136) 
 -- 0.047 0.047 
GDP pc (logged) --
 -96.457*** -96.457*** 
 -- (9.443) (9.443) 
 -- -.632 -.632 
Socio-Health Resources -8.04
*** -6.061** -14.065*** 
 (1.696) (1.476) (.905) 
 -.478 -.362 -.84 
Public Health Exp. (logged) --
 -39.210* -39.210* 
 -- (15.487) (15.487) 
 -- -.106 -.106 
Fertility 64.303
*** -- 64.303*** 
 (15.351) -- (15.351) 
  .409 -- .409 
Notes: *** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05 (two-tailed directional tests); standardized coefficients flagged for 
statistical significance; standard errors reported in parentheses; unstandardized coefficients reported in 
italics. 
 
The first finding focuses on explicitly modeling the highly theorized distributive effect of 
contemporaneous liberal democracy on health. The results indicate that liberal democracy leads 
to greater spending on public health. There is a positive and statistically significant 
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unstandardized effect of 0.006. For each one unit increase in liberal democracy, there is a 0.006 
increase in logged public health expenditures as a percent of GDP.  If we exponentiate this effect 
to ease in interpretation, a score of liberal democracy 1 point higher would equate to a 1.00624 
percent increase in the public health expenditures as a percent of GDP. Remember that liberal 
democracy is scored 0 to 100. The range of public spending on health, in the original metric as a 
percent of GDP had a range from .2 to 18.1. Thus, a 1.006 percent increase would represent a 
notable shift in the percent of GDP that goes towards public health expenditures. Therefore, it 
would appear as if a distributive effect is possible.  
Public health expenditures (logged) also has a positive and significant effect on socio-
health resources and socio-health resources has a strong negative impact effect on MMR (-.48) 
which is highly significant. Thus, the indirect effect of liberal democracy mediated by public 
health expenditures and socio-health resources (what has been termed the distributive effect) is -
.015 and is statistically significant at the 0.1 level. This seems to be evidence in favor of the 
distributive effect of liberal democracy.  
However, in order to determine the extent to which liberal democracy impact MMRs I 
will quantify its effect. The total unstandardized effect of liberal democracy on MMR is -.223. 
There are two indirect pathways by which this effect operates. The first is through the following 
chain of effects: liberal democracy to public expenditures on health to socio-health resources to 
MMR. This specific indirect effect is -.127.  The second chain of effects is: liberal democracy to 
public expenditures on health to socio-health resources to fertility to MMR. This second pathway 
has a specific indirect effect of -.096. Again, remember that liberal democracy is scaled 0 to 100. 
Further, MMR is the number of maternal deaths per 100,000 and has a range in the dataset from 
                                                     
24 e.006=1.006  
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3 to 1510 with an average of 184. Thus, for each one unit increase in liberal democracy there is a 
corresponding decrease in MMR via the distributive effect of -.127, and also a corresponding 
decrease in MMR via gender equality of -.096, which is also quite small. A country making the 
maximum movement from 0 to 100 on the liberal democracy scale could see an associated 
decrease in MMR of approximately 22. Thus, while a statistically significant effect of liberal 
democracy on MMR does exist, the impact of liberal democracy on health is really quite small.  
Table 13: Direct, Indirect, and Total Effects of the Predictors of Maternal Mortality Ratio 
(MMR) with Cumulative Effects of Liberal Democracy 
Predictor MMR 
 Direct Indirect Total 
Cumulative Liberal Democracy --
 -.006+ -.006+ 
 -- (.334) (.334) 
 -- - .026 - .026 
% Rural --
 1.057+ 1.057+ 
 -- (.583) (.583) 
 -- .098 .098 
% Muslim --
 .366** .366** 
 -- (.139) (.139) 
 -- 0.053 0.053 
GDP pc (logged) --
 -95.3*** -95.3*** 
 -- (9.575) (9.575) 
 -- -.623 -.623 
Socio-Health Resources -8.03
*** -6.033** -14.063*** 
 (1.695) (1.472) (.905) 
 -.48 -.36 -.84 
Public Health Exp. (logged) --
 -38.955* -38.955* 
 -- (15.607) (15.607) 
 -- -.105 -.105 
Fertility 64.113
*** -- 64.113*** 
 (15.339) -- (15.339) 
  .408 -- .408 
Notes: *** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05 (two-tailed directional tests); standardized coefficients flagged 
for statistical significance; standard errors reported in parentheses; unstandardized coefficients reported 
in italics. 
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I also investigated the chance that there may be additional effects of liberal democracy on 
population health not captured in either of these two indirect pathways. To test this I added an 
additional path from liberal democracy to MMR. This is my crude test of Wigley and 
Akkoyunlu-Wigley’s (2011) hypothesis that autonomy, social capital, collective action, and 
media diffusion may be other mediators of liberal democracy’s effect on health. I found no 
evidence of this. The path was not statistically significant and the presence of the path did not 
appear to greatly affect model fit. The overall fit indicators hardly moved and the using 
guidelines provided in Raftery (1995) for his formulation of the Bayesian Information Criterion 
(BIC’) it did not indicate the superiority of one model over the other. Therefore, for the sake of 
parsimony, I left this path out of the final model and path diagram.  
In summary, I have identified two indirect pathways via which liberal democracy impacts 
population health as measured by MMR. First, I found evidence in favor of the much-theorized 
distributive effects of liberal democracy. I also found evidence in favor of a not previously 
mentioned indirect pathway via gender equality as measured by fertility. Thus, this represents the 
first quantification of a non-distributive effect of liberal democracy on population health. This 
insight was made based upon the integration of the frameworks from the demography literature 
that describes the distal causes of maternal deaths. However, the size of the effect of liberal 
democracy in the end is quite small. As stated a maximum change in political democracy from 0 
to 100 would only save about 22 women per each 100,000 pregnancies. While saving any 
number of lives is important, increasing democracy may not be the most efficient way to 
decrease maternal mortality. In addition, I did not find evidence of any remaining effects as 
indicated by the non-significant direct pathway from liberal democracy to MMR.  
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The second research question that I attempted to answer was the best way to 
conceptualize the impact of liberal democracy on health. While Gerring et al. (2012) is not the 
first study to examine the cumulative effects of liberal democracy on health, it certainly has 
given the best theoretical justification for this long-term effect. I was convinced by Gerring et 
al.’s argument so I too included a cumulative specification of liberal democracy. However, 
because the Bollen Liberal Democracy Series I Indicator is only available back to 1972, I have 
an accumulation period of 35 years. In previous research the accumulation period was similar in 
Wigley and Akkoyunlu-Wigley (2011) but much shorter than that used by Gerring et al. (2012) 
that went back to 1900. Thus, in addition to testing for a cumulative effect, I may also be testing 
to see if the period of accumulation is truly as historical in nature as indicated by Gerring et al. 
(2012). 
Table 14: Regression Estimates for SEM Equations Predicting Maternal Mortality Ratio (MMR) in 
2012 (Contemporaneous Effects) 
Regression Path Coefficient 𝐒𝐄 
Standardized 
Coefficient 
% Rural → Socio-Health Resources -.074+ .041 -.115 
% Muslim → Fertility .003* .002 .074 
% Muslim → Public Health Exp. (logged) -.003* .001 -.158 
Socio-Health Resources → MMR -8.004*** 1.696 -.478 
GDP pc (logged) → Socio-Health Resources 6.41*** .682 .703 
GDP pc (logged) → Public Health Exp. (logged) .161*** .027 .388 
Cont. Liberal Democracy → Public Health Exp. (logged) .006** .027 .25 
Public Health Exp. (logged)→ Socio-Health Resources 2.788** 1.102 .127 
Socio-Health Resources → Fertility -.094*** .005 -.884 
Fertility → MMR 64.303*** 15.351 .409 
Socio-Health Resources → Water 1 ---- .881 
Socio-Health Resources → Births Att. 1.646*** .098 .909 
Socio-Health Resources → Doctors .058*** .008 .591 
Socio-Health Resources → Female Sec. Sch. 1.938*** .098 .946 
% Rural → Doctors -0.015** .005 -.239 
Notes: *** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05 (one-tail directional t-tests); unstandardized coefficients flagged 
for statistical significance; # fixed parameter providing the scale for a latent variable 
 
The results of this analysis were surprising in that they differed very little from the results 
from the contemporaneous model in terms of the standardized effects. These results are seen in 
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Figure 21, Tables 11 and 13. Notice that there are hardly any differences in the cumulative 
results compared to the contemporaneous results. The standardized total effect of liberal 
democracy on MMR is only slightly smaller at -.026 and are significant only at the 0.1 level. The 
unstandardized effect is only -.006 compared to the contemporaneous effect of liberal democracy 
at -.223. In order for the cumulative effect of liberal democracy to be roughly the same as the 
contemporaneous effect, the increase would need to be sustained for the entire 35-year period. In 
essence, a 10-unit change in cumulative liberal democracy sustained for the entire 35-year period 
would roughly have the same effect on MMR in 2012 that a 10-unit change would have on a 
contemporaneous liberal democracy. In the end, there appears to be no accumulation in the 
benefit of liberal democracy. 
Table 15: Regression Estimates for SEM Equations Predicting Maternal Mortality Ratio (MMR) in 
2012 (Cumulative Effects) 
Regression Path Coefficient 𝐒𝐄 
Standardized 
Coefficient 
% Rural → Socio-Health Resources   -.075+ .042 -.116 
% Muslim → Fertility   .004* .002 .08 
% Muslim → Public Health Exp. (logged)   -.004* .001 -.194 
Socio-Health Resources → MMR   -8.030*** 1.695 -.48 
GDP pc (logged) → Socio-Health Resources   6.401*** .688 .7 
GDP pc (logged) → Public Health Exp. (logged)   .135*** .033 .327 
Cumulative Liberal Democracy → Public Health Exp. 
(logged) 
  .015* .006 .249 
Public Health Exp. (logged)→ Socio-Health Resources   2.77* 1.111 .125 
Socio-Health Resources → Fertility   -.094*** .005 -.882 
Fertility → MMR   64.113*** 15.339 .408 
Socio-Health Resources → Water       1 ---- .88 
Socio-Health Resources → Births Att.  1.646*** .098 .91 
Socio-Health Resources → Doctors   .058*** .008 .591 
Socio-Health Resources → Female Sec. Sch.   1.939*** .098 .946 
% Rural → Doctors -0.015** .005 -.239 
Notes: *** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05 (one-tail directional t-tests); unstandardized coefficients 
flagged for statistical significance; # fixed parameter providing the scale for a latent variable 
 
My expectation was that these effects would be stronger than the contemporaneous 
effects. These surprising results prompted me to ask some additional questions, two which will 
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be addressed here and some others that will be addressed in the subsequent section “Robustness 
Check”. I estimated the contemporaneous and cumulative effects of Bollen’s Liberal Democracy 
indicator in other cross-section models where the dependent variable was measured in 2007, 
2002, and 1997. The results shown in Table 16 indicate that for 2007 the effects of 
contemporaneous liberal democracy were statistically significant and slightly larger (-.041), and 
in 2002 even larger (-.048) and statistically significant. The effect in 1997 was -.013 but not 
significant. The cumulative effects were also significant in 2007 although the size of the 
coefficient was much smaller than the contemporaneous coefficient in that year. However, in 
2002 and 1997 the cumulative effects were not significant. Thus, it appears as if 
contemporaneous liberal democracy may be a good predictor of population health, especially 
maternal mortality which has a pretty short time lag. Women are only pregnant for 9 months and 
can only die and have it classified as a maternal death up to 42 days after child birth. Given that 
many young women have babies in the developing world where MMR is higher, it would make 
sense that the historical experience of liberal democracy may not be a beneficial way to view its 
impact on all indicators of population health. Another argument may be that culture changes 
slowly and the operationalization of liberal democracy as having a cumulative effect could be a 
good indicator of the cultural changes that democracy engenders.  
Thus, I examined whether or not the time frame is as long as theorized and investigate 
cumulative effects are present since the early 1970s. As discussed below, I find very little 
difference in the results comparing to my shorter operationalization of cumulative liberal 
democracy to longer ones. Thus, this may be encouraging news for countries that are struggling 
at low levels of liberal democracy. It does not take long for liberal democracy to impact 
population health. Countries do not need to be discouraged by authoritarian pasts or past troubles 
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with democratization. Third, beyond the distributive effects of liberal democracy on health, 
recent studies have posited that there are also non-distributive or direct effects. I was able to 
offer the first evidence as to a plausible indirect path that was not wholly distributive in nature, 
namely that increased gender equality can also lead to improvements in population health.  
Robustness Check 
Choice of Indicator of Liberal Democracy 
In order to make an assessment on the robustness of these results I undertook several 
additional analyses. My goal was to make sure that my results were not easily explained away by 
my choice of the indicator of liberal democracy or my choice of the dependent variable. First, 
although I have made a clear argument for the use of Bollen’s Liberal Democracy Series I 
Indicator and the fact that numerous studies cited utilized an earlier version of this indicator, 
many studies evaluating the effect of liberal democracy on health use Polity IV’s polity 2 
indicator.  
In analyses where I substituted Bollen’s Liberal Democracy Series I Indicator with the 
Polity IV’s polity2 variable, I first recoded the polity2 indicator from -10 to +10 to 1-21, 
following several authors including Gerring et al. (2012) in order to facilitate the interpretation 
of any effect from this variable to MMR. In addition, I also operationalized the long term, 
cumulative effect of polity2 by the procedures outlined by Gerring et al.’s (2012) online 
appendix to the article. Although in my analyses I examined the cumulative effect of liberal 
democracy, I was somewhat limited in the number of years in which I could accumulate data 
because Bollen’s indicator only begins in 1972. Some research such as Wigley & Wigley (2011) 
accumulated the stock of liberal democracy from 1960 forward for making predictions of health 
outcomes in 2000. Thus, I initially felt confident that accumulating the stock of liberal 
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democracy using Bollen’s Series I Indicator would be appropriate for predicting MMR in 2012 
despite the first year of the indictor being 1972. Thus, it seemed as if there was an equivalent 40-
year accumulation. However, other research, chiefly Gerring et al. (2012), discusses the stock of 
liberal democracy as if it is more historical in nature. They posit that the changes brought about 
by liberal democracy may take a substantial period of time to develop. Thus, if the incubation 
period of the positive effects of the stock of liberal democracy is longer than the 40 years of 
accumulation used by Wigley and Wigley (2011) and I in this analysis, then I would essentially 
be silent on the issue.  
Table 16: Comparison of Bollen’s Liberal Democracy 
Series I Indicator to Polity IV’s polity2 indicator for 
Life Expectancy 
Year 
Cumulative Liberal 
Democracy (Bollen) 
Cumulative Liberal 
Democracy (Polity) 
2012 -0.026+ -0.023+ 
2007 -0.029+ -0.015 
2002 -0.007 0.04 
1997 0.002 -0.001 
Year 
Cont. Liberal 
Democracy (Bollen) 
Cont. Liberal 
Democracy (Polity) 
2012 -0.027* -0.032* 
2007 -0.041* -0.032* 
2002 -0.048** -0.029+ 
1997 -0.013 -0.008 
Note: All values are standardized indirect (total) effects of 
liberal democracy on MMR in the given year 
 
We see that with both indicators, the contemporaneous effects are statistically significant 
for 2012, 2007, and 2002. In 1997 the contemporaneous effects are not significant for either 
indicator. For the cumulative effects, only the years 2012 and 2007 are significant for Bollen’s 
indicator while only 2012 is significant for Polity IV’s indicator. I thus conclude that it does not 
make a difference which indicator of liberal democracy is used for this study. While there are 
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slight differences in the size of the standardized effects, the results paint a consistent story. 
Surprisingly, the contemporaneous effects appear to be a better predictor of MMR when 
considering multiple years. As this was an initial analysis and thus utilized a repeated cross-
sectional design to compare the results over time, it does appear clear that the cumulative effects 
of liberal democracy are not significant in all years examined here.  
What is also apparent is that the length of the accumulation does not seem to matter as 
much as I initially feared. While Bollen’s indicator is accumulated only from 1972, this 
difference in the length of accumulation does not seem to be driving the lack of statistical 
significance in my results. In fact, the cumulative indicator from Polity IV is only a statistically 
significant predictor of MMR in 2012 and not for previous cross-sections. Thus, this paints a 
somewhat optimistic picture. It does not appear as if the effect of democracy on population 
health as measured by the MMR takes an extraordinary period of time. Liberal democracy seems 
to be good for maternal health contemporaneously as well as in the long term for MMR in 2007 
and 2012.  
In both the contemporaneous and cumulative effects models, I found little difference in 
the results of the models that used the polity2 variable in place of Bollen’s Liberal Democracy 
Series I Indicator. The table below compares the results from the predictions of MMR in 1997, 
2002, 2007, and 2012 using Bollen’s Liberal Democracy Series I Indicator and Polity IV’s 
polity2 variable for both contemporaneous and cumulative effects.   
Choice of Dependent Variable 
The second set of robustness checks that I undertook concerned my choice of MMR as an 
indicator of population health instead of other potential indicators.  From my literature review, 
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life expectancy was the most popular indicator of population health used in previous studies. 
Thus, I reran all analyses with life expectancy as the dependent variable instead of MMR.  
 
Table 17: Comparison of Bollen’s Liberal Democracy 
Series I Indicator to Polity IV’s polity2 indicator for 
Life Expectancy  
Year 
Cumulative Liberal 
Democracy (Bollen) 
Cumulative Liberal 
Democracy (Polity) 
2012 0.027+ 0.024+ 
2007 0.029+ 0.015 
2002 0.007 -0.003 
1997 -0.001 0.001 
Year 
Cont. Liberal 
Democracy (Bollen) 
Cont. Liberal 
Democracy (Polity) 
2012 0.027* 0.034* 
2007 0.039* 0.031* 
2002 0.047* 0.029+ 
1997 0.005 0.008 
Note: All values are standardized indirect (total) effects of 
liberal democracy on MMR in the given year 
 
 As can been seen in Table 17 and with the comparison of it to Table 16, the choice 
between these two indicators of population health makes little difference in the size of the effect 
or the significant patterns of any of the coefficients. The one big difference is that now that the 
dependent variable is life expectancy, the statistically significant coefficients are all positive 
instead of negative, as expected. Due to the consistency in the results across all sets of models 
there are some conclusions that follow. First, the choice of population health indicator did not 
drive my analyses. Second, the cumulative nature of the effects of liberal democracy on 
population health needs to be re-examined as the matter is not settled. My evidence, while 
consistent across numerous models, is in direct contradiction to the evidence presented by 
Wigley and Wigley (2011) and Gerring et al. (2012). It is possible that my results differ due to 
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the more precise way in which the distributive effects of liberal democracy were modeled and 
explicitly tested. Perhaps the inclusion of the non-distributive effect mediated by fertility could 
cause some of these differences. Regardless, more research is needed in this area.  
Logging MMR and Fertility 
In further robustness checks I also investigated using a natural log transformed value for 
MMR and fertility. With visual and empirical checks, it is possible that these variables may be 
skewed in analyses with all countries in the world (although some indicators of skew did not 
demonstrate this). Thus, analyses for 2012 were re-analyzed with the logged version of these 
variables in the statistical analyses and the contemporary operationalization of liberal democracy. 
Although it did make slightly worse the overall model fit (chi-square 86.043(34), p-value 
=0.000, CFI=.969, TLI=0.940, IFI=0.969, 1-RMSEA=.908, BIC’=-90.7) the coefficient 
estimates and the statistical significant of these parameter estimates did not change in any 
meaningful way. Thus, I find that my results were not driven by skewness in neither the outcome 
of interest nor a key mediating variable, fertility.  
Outliers and Influential Cases 
 In addition to the above robustness checks, I also searched for outliers and influential 
cases in my analysis. I did find one country, Sierra Leone, which was considered an outlier and 
influential case based upon an examination of the standardized residuals and Cook’s distance. I 
therefore reran the analysis with this country omitted from the analysis and found very similar 
findings. Therefore, I feel confident that my results were not driven by outliers or influential 
cases.  
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Table 18: Variables Used in the Analysis and Robustness Checks 
Indicator Brief Description Data Source 
MMR  The number of women who die from direct and indirect causes 
attributed to pregnancy, childbirth and the 42 days after pregnancy each 
year per 100,000 live births. 
World Bank 
GDP pc (logged) Total annual output of a country’s economy, in purchasing power 
parity international dollars, per person, measured in thousands.  
World Bank  
Cont. Liberal 
Democracy 
This variable is operationalized as a weighted composite of a subset of 
indicators that measure both dimensions of liberal democracy 
(democratic rule and political liberties). It has a range of 0 to 100. It is 
measured for the current year. 
Bollen 
Cumulative 
Liberal Democracy  
This variable is operationalized as the cumulative value of liberal 
democracy from 1972 to the current year.  
Bollen 
Doctors This is the number of formally trained physicians, nurses, and 
midwives in a nation per 100,000 people 
World Bank 
Births Att. This represents the percentage of the total deliveries under the 
supervision and care of skilled health staff. This includes guidance to 
pregnant women at all stages of pregnancy, including pre-labor, labor, 
and the postpartum period 
World Bank 
Water The percentage of the population using an improved drinking water 
source. Improved drinking water sources include piped water located 
inside the user’s dwelling, plot, or yard, and other improved drinking 
water sources, such as public taps or standpipes, tube wells or 
boreholes, protected dug wells, protected springs, and rainwater 
collection. 
World Bank 
Sec. Schooling The total secondary school enrollment, regardless of age, expressed as 
a percentage of the total secondary school-aged population. 
World Bank  
% Rural  The percent of a country’s total national population that resides in rural 
areas 
World Bank 
Fertility  An estimate of the number of children an average woman would have 
if current age-specific fertility rates remained constant during her 
reproductive years 
World Bank 
% Muslim  The percent of a country’s total national population that is Muslim World Bank 
Public Health 
Exp. (logged) 
The percent of GDP that is spent on health from government budgets, 
borrowed funds and grants from external sources, and social health 
insurance funds.   
World Bank 
Life Exp.  The average number of years that a newborn would live if the patterns 
of mortality at birth were held consistent throughout its life.  
World Bank 
Cont. Polity Polity IV’s polity2 indictor of autocracy and democracy. Originally 
coded -10 to +10 is recoded 1-21.  
Polity IV 
Cumulative Polity Following procedures outlined in Gerring et al. (2012), this variable is 
operationalized as the cumulative value of liberal democracy from 
1900 to the current year.  
Polity IV 
 
Conclusions  
 There are several conclusions that follow from this study. First, although liberal 
democracy is widely theorized to have a distributive effect on population health because it is 
mediated by public spending on health and socio-health resources, this has not been empirically 
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tested. The present study represents an attempt to do just that by leveraging one of the strengths 
of SEM to include the theorized links between political democracy and population health. My 
results reveal that there is a distributive effect of liberal democracy on maternal mortality that 
holds when life expectancy is used as the outcome of interest. In addition, I have also identified 
an additional pathway through which liberal democracy impacts population health via gender 
equality as measured by fertility. Although this is a crude indicator and one of only many that 
could be used as an indicator of gender equality, it does provide preliminary evidence of another 
way in which liberal democracy can influence health. Future studies could utilize a latent 
variable for gender equality and further test this linkage. Regardless of the statistically significant 
effect, as demonstrated above, in the end the effect is quite small. This hints that although liberal 
democracy does seem to indirectly improve a country’s MMR it might not be the most efficient 
way to lead to meaningful improvements, as the size of the effect is small. As noted above, for 
each one unit increase in liberal democracy there is a reduction of only .223 maternal deaths.  
 Second, I conclude that the contemporaneous indicator of liberal democracy did a better 
job at predicting population health compared to the cumulative indicator of liberal democracy. 
While the cumulative operationalization did also produce comparable standardized results for 
MMR in 2012 the size of the unstandardized effect was quite small (-.006). Thus, it would take a 
sustained 10-point increase of liberal democracy for 35 years to roughly equal the benefit on 
liberal democracy that a 10-point change would have in the contemporaneous indicator. In the 
end, there just does not appear to be any additional benefit for a country’s MMR in the 
accumulation of liberal democracy. This finding was verified with two dependent variables as 
well as two different indicators of liberal democracy (Bollen’s Liberal Democracy Series I 
Indicator and Polity). Thus, more work is needed to identify if cumulative liberal democracy 
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perhaps operates differently than the contemporaneous indicator of liberal democracy. In 
addition, I found no evidence that a long historical perspective is needed to make the link 
between liberal democracy and population health. Differences in the accumulation period did not 
produce different results. Perhaps there are diminishing returns with the benefit of liberal 
democracy over the long term? Perhaps the message here is a hopeful one in countries that are 
struggling to make gains in liberal democracy. Apparently, population health can benefit from 
liberal democracy in the short-term, although by a somewhat small degree. 
 Third, I conclude that there are not any additional effects of liberal democracy not 
accounted for by either the distributive effects or the effects mediated by fertility. Thus, recent 
work by Wigley and Wigley (2011), that points to other potential mechanisms through which a 
liberal democracy could have a non-distributive effect need to be further investigated. I provided 
a crude test, essentially equivalent to any others that have been done before, but it is possible that 
autonomy, social capital, collective action, and media diffusion could be found to influence 
population health if the model were better specified.   
 I also found, consistent with prior theorizations and empirical studies that higher levels of 
liberal democracy tend to be accompanied by higher public spending on health expenditures.  
This was the first mediating variable of all the effects of liberal democracy on population health. 
I did not examine other sources of health expenditures (such as private donations), as I could not 
make a direct theoretical link between liberal democracies and these private resources. However, 
future research could examine the role that private resources as well as foreign aid play in 
increasing population health. While this was beyond my narrow empirical question regarding the 
theorized distributive effect of liberal democracy, these other factors could be part of a larger 
picture.  
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 Another key innovation of this paper was to bring to an old question a different modeling 
technique that had the potential to help uncover more about how liberal democracy impacts 
health while avoiding pitfalls of other modeling techniques such as small sample size, lack of 
measures of overall model fit, dealing with missing data, and allowing better integration of 
previous theoretical insights. I think the case was clearly made and the analytical technique aided 
in the contributions of this study.  
 Some may question the lack of inclusion of other variables that have been found to 
impact population health in the past. One example is that of dependency. However, I took the 
strategy of streamlining my analysis so that I could isolate the distributive effect of liberal 
democracy. While these other variables may be predictive of some things in the model, in my 
opinion they would not influence the key relationship of interest here.  
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSIONS 
This dissertation aimed at making three broad contributions to our knowledge of liberal 
democracy. Chapter two examined recent trends in liberal democracy and uncovered several 
interesting aspects of these trends- not just at the worldwide level but also for disaggregated units 
such as regions and income groups. This disaggregated analysis also engaged recent debates in 
the literature on whether these trends indicate that democracy is stable, stagnating, or declining. 
After describing recent trends, the third chapter set out to predict these trends using important 
theoretical perspectives from the field of sociology and assess how well these current theories do 
at explaining the trends identified in chapter two. The fourth chapter followed a logical 
progression and asked the so what question. What are the potential consequences of liberal 
democracy? This fourth chapter investigated the short and long term consequences of liberal 
democracy on population health as well as explicitly modeling the indirect pathways through 
which it affects health. 
The reminder of this conclusion is structured as followed. First the contributions and key 
findings from each of the empirical chapters will be outlined in turn. Then the implications of 
these findings for our understanding of the trends, causes, and consequences of liberal 
democracy will be discussed. Finally, this conclusion will discuss some of the limitations of this 
research and avenues for future research. 
Contributions 
Chapter two focused attention on a description of recent trends in liberal democracy from 
1972 to 2013. Two initial contributions were made in this chapter by bringing up to date Bollen’s 
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Liberal Democracy Series I Indicator and an underlying variable, suffrage score, which is 
utilized in the creation of the liberal democracy indicator. An initial suffrage update from 2000 to 
2006 was done under guidance of Dr. Bollen by myself and another graduate student. The 
updates from 2006 to 2015 were done by myself as part of this dissertation. This updated 
consisting of transforming qualitative descriptions of the suffrage situation in a country into a 
quantitative score for each year ranging from 0 to 100 following a set of coding rules developed 
by Paxton et al. (2003). Also in previous work done under the guidance of Dr. Bollen the liberal 
democracy score was brought current from 1988 to 2006 by myself. The updates from 2007 to 
2013 were done as part of this dissertation. As a result of this work the suffrage score is now 
available from 1950 to 2015 and the Liberal Democracy Series I Indicator is now available from 
1972 to 2013. These updated variables are important and can be used in the future to help 
increase what we know about liberal democracy and suffrage. Bollen’s Liberal Democracy 
Series I Indicator is highly respected in the literature but has been underutilized due to the fact 
that only the values from 1972 to 1988 have previously been publicly released. Thus, it is likely 
that when the updated indicator is publicly released it will become utilized more in academic 
research. The suffrage score has yet to make the same impact that Bollen’s indicator of liberal 
democracy has made in the political sociology literature and beyond but it is important and the 
release of these updated scores could also lead to more scholarly research.   
Beyond these data contributions chapter two also made additional contributions as well. 
One of the key contributions is made by engaging the current literature on the most recent trends 
of liberal democracy. Many observers including academics and journalists have noted that it 
appears as if there is a current crisis with liberal democracy in the world today; that we are now 
witnessing democratic backsliding. However, this is not the perspective taken by all. 
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Specifically, Levitsky and Way (2015) recently argue that the idea of a democratic backslide is 
just an illusion. They contend that unrealistic hype and enthusiasm about the prospects for liberal 
democracy brought about by the lofty gains of the 1990s are hard to reproduce in ensuring years. 
They state that democracy is stable in the world rather than recessing (2015:46). My analyses 
uncovered that Levitsky and Way were only telling part of the story. By disaggregating 
worldwide trends by world region and income group I uncovered multiple instances of 
democratic decline that is at odds with an overall picture of stability. In high income countries 
values of liberal democracy are lower in 2013 than they were in 2007. Europe and Central Asia 
are also showing clear democratic decline in recent years. Further, I argue that it is misleading to 
characterize democratic trends as stable if they have flat lined at low or middle levels of liberal 
democracy. Thus, I find multiple pieces of evidence when the worldwide trends are 
disaggregated that liberal democracy is indeed on the decline in many places in the world 
including Europe and Central Asia, in high income countries, and in low income countries. Even 
preliminary evidence for 2014 and 2015 by Freedom House suggests that worldwide this decline 
is continuing. A more realistic picture of liberal democracy around the world is given in the 
analysis in chapter two. My study does not imply that continued decreases in democracy are 
inevitable but it does suggest that we should seriously think about replacing the word “stability” 
with “stagnation” or “decline” when evaluating the current state of liberal democracy around the 
world.  
Another contribution of the second chapter is to demonstrate that the period from 1972 to 
2013 does not appear to be exhibit wave like characteristics and in fact, cannot be considered a 
coherent period of change at all. Instead, this period is best described as constituting three 
distinct sub-periods of growth 1972 to 1989; 1989 to 1995; and 1995 to 2013. For the 17 years in 
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the first sub-period, there was moderate growth in liberal democracy. The world-wide average 
was about 36 in 1972 and 46 in 1989, growing about 10 points. The second sub-period, 1989-
1995, is characterized by a steep increase in liberal democracy worldwide, raising the measure 
from 46 to 64, an approximate 18-point increase in just six years. This indicates growth several 
times faster than in the first moderate growth sub-period. Finally, from 1995 to 2013 it appears 
as if the growth rate has been very slow, even less than in the first sub-period. This measure of 
worldwide liberal democracy increased by about 5 points in these 18 years. If we are to look 
even closer within this final sub-period, we see that since 2008 democracy has only gained 
slightly by 0.4 points, reflecting minimal yearly gains for these five years. The complicated 
growth pattern during this entire period is not well-explained by Huntington’s (1991) wave 
analogy. 
Building on the insights that the trend in liberal democracy from 1972 to 2013 actually 
exhibits three distinct sub-periods of growth allows a methodological contribution to be made in 
chapter two as well. After a fairly exhaustive search for the best-fitting unconditional model to 
characterize change in liberal democracy during this period, an autoregressive model where the 
coefficients are constrained to be equal in a piecewise manner was adjudged to be the best-fitting 
model. This model has not been previously utilized in describing liberal democracy or extended 
to incorporate predictors. The impetus for constraining the autoregressive coefficients came 
directly from my interpretation of the initial time series graph of liberal democracy and insights 
gained from the modeling process. One preliminary model considered was a piecewise latent 
growth curve model (LGCM). This model had superior fit to the other variants of the LGCMs 
that were previously examined although still left room for improvement. I integrated the 
piecewise effect constraints from that model into the autoregressive model and that model had 
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superior model fit. In essence, it makes little sense to force the trajectory of liberal democracy 
from 1972 to 2013 to fit into a linear model if change over this period does not increase in a 
consistent linear manner. 
Overall, this second chapter makes unique contributions when careful attention is paid to 
the details. Identifying the lack of consistent, linear growth during this entire period arose from a 
careful attention to the details. In addition, disaggregating the worldwide trend into an analysis of 
group trends presents evidence in direct contradiction to arguments made about democratic 
stability or the lack of democratic recession. While these insights were previously discussed by 
journalists, academics, and advocacy groups they had not been previously quantified and 
integrated into an empirical model. 
Chapter three builds directly on the insights of the previous chapter and integrates these 
findings into a statistical model predicting democratic trends from 1972 to 2013. Predictors from 
several theoretical perspectives were integrated into the autoregressive model uncovered in 
chapter two. In a preliminary model the effects of each of the predictors were constrained to be 
equal over the entire 40-year period. This allowed an evaluation of which theoretical 
perspectives had the most relevance for predicting liberal democracy over the entire period. 
Beyond the lagged dependent variable, I found that whether or not a country was ever 
communist, the percent of the country’s population that is Muslim, the percent of the population 
that was evangelized by 1900, and a country’s world system position were all significant 
predictors of liberal democracy. I did not find any evidence that industrialization, whether a 
country is a former British colony, export concentration with the largest single trade partner, or 
the percent of memberships in IGOs had any predictive power during this period at all on liberal 
democracy. Thus, no support for modernization theory, world polity theory, or dependency 
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theory was found in this study. Global factors, such as those of Protestant missionaries, and 
world systems theory are useful to help predict democracy during this entire period. However, 
this is only part of the story. 
When the piecewise equality constraints are applied to the predictors as well as the 
lagged values of liberal democracy a more refined picture develops on the causes of change in 
levels of liberal democracy. I find that all of these previously identified significant predictors had 
effects that differed over the course of the entire period. Two of the predictors, the communist 
indicator variable and the world system position indicator were only found to have significant 
effects during the first sub-period and no significant effects beyond that. The remaining two 
predictors, the percent Muslim and the indicator of Protestant missionaries, remained statistically 
significant over the first two sub-periods, although the size of the effect differed. The effect for 
Protestant missionaries is slightly larger than the second sub-period than for the first and the size 
of the effect for the percent Muslim approximately doubled in magnitude. Interestingly, none of 
the predictors in the model could tell us anything about the trajectory of liberal democracy from 
2002 to 2012.  
Beyond these insights being interesting and more refined than in previous studies they 
illuminate an important point. Many of our most important theories of democratic change seem 
to be unable to predict the type of change that is occurring in the world today. That is, our 
explanations are silent about the forces leading to stagnation in liberal democracy since the early 
2000s to today. I interpret these findings as the search needs to continue. Renewed efforts should 
be made to go beyond our usual predictors of liberal democracy and search for relevant factors in 
today’s world. In essence, the piecewise equality model brings to our attention that there should 
be a search for factors that are leading to democratic stagnation and decline around the world. 
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Despite this research agenda searching for over 50 years on the causes of liberal democracy it 
appears as if there is still more to be learned. 
Chapter four asked the so what question. Why does liberal democracy matter? I chose to 
examine one specific outcome that increases in liberal democracy has been shown to improve, 
population health. I utilized as my key indicator of population health maternal mortality. The 
first two contribution made to this literature on the outcomes of democracy is to integrate into 
this literature an outcome that has garnered little attention previously, despite being a really good 
indicator of population health, and a methodology that has yet to be fully applied to this area of 
research, SEMs. The combination of these two help to bring about the contributions the other 
contributions that follow. 
Utilizing the maternal mortality ratio (MMR) as the key indicator of population health 
was important for this study. Since there is much worldwide attention on the problem of maternal 
health and there have been many efforts to improve it in recent decades with uneven results, this 
problem is in desperate need of new solutions and much has been written about its causes. This 
allowed for a careful analysis about how liberal democracy could improve maternal mortality. I 
was able to test a new linkage that had previously not been described in the literature that came 
directly from the literature on the causes of maternal mortality. This is the possible indirect effect 
that liberal democracy may have on health mediated by fertility. More will be discussed on this 
point below.   
Many previous studies of the effect of liberal democracy on health have very thin 
theoretical explanations for how this effect really happens. It is almost as if these studies make 
the assumption that greater liberal democracy leads to all good things and thus population health 
should improve. Many attempts at modeling health outcomes have treated liberal democracy 
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essentially as a control variable. It is added to a model with a short paragraph stating that liberal 
democracy is good for health. The linkages, even when theorized are not explicitly tested. The 
effect of liberal democracy has not been theorized to be a direct effect but rather an indirect one 
via improvements in a country’s socio-health resources. This indirect effect has been termed a 
distributive effect. That is, countries that are democratic are thought to spend more on public 
health leading to greater socio-health resources, such as doctors, birth attendants, clear water, 
and improved education and this leads to better population health. The methodology employed 
here allowed me to model socio-health resources as a latent variable so that these socio-health 
resources could all be in the model simultaneously and their effects would not be confounded 
with multicollinearity. Thus, I explicitly modeled these linkages and was able to confirm that the 
main way that liberal democracy improves health is by this distributive effect.  
In addition, I was able to uncover a related indirect effect but one that is also distinct that 
had yet to be integrated into the literature. This indirect effect operates through fertility. That is, 
liberal democracy operates through increased public expenditures and socio-health resources to 
improve fertility and this leads to improved maternal health. In robustness checks I also tested 
this indirect linkage for another key indicator of population health, life expectancy, and also 
found the effect there as well. Thus, because this study was grounded in not just the political 
economy literature but also the demography and public health literature on maternal mortality 
this key mediating variable, fertility, was identified and found to be important for another 
indicator of health as well.  
Another key debate in this literature is whether liberal democracy has a contemporaneous 
effect on population health or if liberal democracy is best conceptualized as a stock variable and 
thus has cumulative effects. I was able to examine this in my models and I concluded that liberal 
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democracy has a more contemporaneous effect. While both conceptualizations of liberal 
democracy had effects on maternal mortality in 2012, the contemporaneous effect was found in 
multiple other cross-sections of data. Thus, in robustness checks I was able to find this 
contemporaneous effect for multiple prior waves of data while the cumulative effect was not 
found. It was only identified for 2012 even when longer periods of accumulation and different 
indicators of liberal democracy were utilized. Thus, I interpret this as a hopeful finding in that 
improvements in democracy can be translated into improvement for health in a relatively short 
time. It does not appear as if a long period of accumulation needed for liberal democracy to 
improve population health. However, caution should be used with these findings on the 
beneficial effects of liberal democracy on population health. Although these effects are 
statistically significant they turn out to be quite small in reality and therefore may not be the 
most efficient way to improve population health. This finding may have policy implications for 
those looking for efficient and effective ways of improving population health. 
Limitations and Future Research 
 This dissertation reveals several avenues for future research that could not be adequately 
addressed here. Chapter one identified and demonstrated that there is significant variation in 
liberal democracy when examined for sub-groups (i.e., regions and income groups), yet no 
attempts were made to model these differences. Small sample sizes present problems for many 
methodological approaches including SEMs. Cross-national research already deals with a sample 
size problem in that there are a limited number of countries in the world that can be examined. 
There is only so much that can be done with 196 countries can be included in any analysis. Thus, 
the sample size is a problem for all cross-national research and especially for SEMs and makes 
sub-group analyses with a small number of cases quite challenging.  
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A related problem is that all countries are not uniform in their characteristics. For 
example, while the level of liberal democracy in 2013 is 88 for Brazil for the entire country, it is 
unlikely that all citizens in all areas of the country experience liberal democracy at that level. 
There are rural and urban differences, differences due to wealth, and racial differences that all 
can affect peoples’ experience with liberal democracy. Thus, inequalities across a number of 
dimensions within a country could affect how liberal democracy is experienced within a country.  
 My first chapter relied in large part on descriptive analyses of the worldwide and sub-
group trends in liberal democracy that required interpretation. Some may find fault with my 
interpretation of trends for the world or for a particular sub-group. I based my findings on my 
knowledge and my impressions. I am not a regional specialist for all regions of the world nor is 
my interpretation of trends the only interpretation that could be given. In addition, some may 
find fault with the way that I arbitrarily divided the world. Despite using World Bank regional 
and income groupings in my analyses these groupings could still be questioned. If Latin America 
was examined as a region in itself without considering “the Caribbean” would the results differ? 
These are all valid criticism that could be examined in more detail.  
 In chapter three, I included many predictors of liberal democracy but not all that have 
ever been addressed in the literature. As stated, concern over liberal democracy has occupied a 
prominent place in research spanning several disciplines over the last 50 to 60 years. Concerns 
over what leads to democracy has occupied the minds of some of the world’s greatest thinkers 
throughout history. Clearly not every single factor that has been discussed could be included 
here. My strategy was to look for prominent theories of global change that appear in the 
sociology literature to see what predictors to include in the models. In addition, I also 
supplemented these with additional predictors that have been utilized frequently. Future work 
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could try to incorporate other predictors such as spatial factors including the average liberal 
democracy score for contiguous neighbors.  
 Chapter four also could be criticized on the lack of explanatory variables include in the 
analysis or the way that I modeled relations between my exogenous variables. I made no attempt 
to predict liberal democracy in this analysis and only correlated it with other variables. In 
addition, some may question why some variables are not included in the analysis. My goal was 
to focus attention on the mechanisms by which liberal democracy affects population health and 
whether a contemporaneous or cumulative perspective should be taken in these analyses. That 
drove my inclusion of variables for this analysis. As with any study there are always questions 
about omitted variables and while I have tried to minimize that in all of the analyses these 
questions may still exist. 
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APPENDIX 1: CHAPTER 2 COUNTRY CLASSIFICATIONS25 
Regional Country Classification 
East Asia and the Pacific 
Australia, Brunei, Cambodia, China PR, Federated States of Micronesia, Fiji, Indonesia, Japan, 
Kiribati, Laos, Malaysia, Marshall Islands, Mongolia, Myanmar (Burma), Nauru, New Zealand, 
North Korea, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Samoa, Singapore, Solomon Islands, South 
Korea, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu, Vietnam 
Europe and Central Asia 
Albania, Andorra, Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, East Germany, Estonia, 
Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Kazakhstan, 
Kosovo, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Macedonia, Moldova, 
Monaco, Montenegro, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russian Federation, 
San Marino, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Tajikistan, Turkey, 
Turkmenistan, Ukraine, United Kingdom, Uzbekistan, West Germany, Yugoslavia 
Latin America and the Caribbean 
Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, 
Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, 
Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Saint Kitts and 
Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, 
Venezuela 
Middle East and North Africa 
Algeria, Bahrain, Djibouti, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Malta, 
Morocco, North Yemen, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, South Yemen, Syria, Tunisia, United Arab 
Emirates, Yemen Republic 
North America 
Canada, United States 
South Asia 
Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka 
Sub-Saharan Africa 
Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African 
Republic, Chad, Comoros, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Republic of the Congo, Cote 
d'Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, 
25 The regional groupings and the income classification of countries follows that of the World Bank in 2016. 
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Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mozambique, 
Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, 
Somalia, South Africa, South Sudan, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zambia, 
Zimbabwe 
Income Group Country Classification26 
High Income OECD: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Czech Republic, Denmark, 
Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, 
Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, 
South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States, West Germany 
 
High Income non-OECD: Andorra, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Bahamas, Bahrain, 
Barbados, Brunei, Croatia, Cyprus, Equatorial Guinea, Kuwait, Latvia 
Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Malta, Monaco, Oman, Qatar, Russian Federation, Saint Kitts and 
Nevis, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Seychelles, Singapore, Trinidad and Tobago, United Arab 
Emirates, Uruguay, Venezuela 
 
Upper Middle Income: Albania, Algeria, Angola, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Belize, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, China (People's Republic), Colombia 
Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Fiji, Gabon, Grenada, Iran, Iraq, 
Jamaica, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Lebanon, Libya, Macedonia, Malaysia, Maldives, Marshall 
Islands, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Montenegro, Namibia, Palau, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, 
Romania, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, South Africa, Suriname, Thailand, 
Tonga, Tunisia, Turkey 
Turkmenistan, Tuvalu, Yugoslavia  
 
Lower Middle Income: Armenia, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Bolivia, Cameroon 
Cape Verde, Cote d'Ivoire, Djibouti, Egypt, El Salvador, Federated States of Micronesia, 
Georgia 
Ghana, Guatemala, Guyana, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Kenya, Kiribati, Kosovo, Kyrgyzstan, 
Laos, Lesotho, Mauritania, Moldova, Morocco, Myanmar (Burma), Nicaragua, Nigeria, North 
Yemen, Pakistan 
Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Republic of Congo, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, 
Solomon Islands, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Swaziland, Syria, Tajikistan, Timor-Leste, Ukraine, 
Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Vietnam, Zambia 
 
Low Income: Afghanistan, Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Central African Republic, 
Chad, Comoros, Democratic Republic of Congo, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-
Bissau, Haiti, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Nepal, Niger, North Korea, 
Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Sudan, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zimbabwe
                                                     
26 In analyses with only developed and less-developed countries high income countries are considered developed and all 
other (all middle and low income) countries are considered less-developed following the World Bank’s classifications. 
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APPENDIX 2: CHAPTER 3 ANALYSES 
Countries used in Chapter 3 analysis (N=183) 
Afghanistan 
Albania 
Algeria 
Andorra 
Angola 
Antigua and Barbuda 
Argentina 
Armenia 
Australia 
Austria 
Azerbaijan 
Bahamas 
Bahrain 
Bangladesh 
Barbados 
Belarus 
Belgium 
Belize 
Benin 
Bhutan 
Bolivia 
Botswana 
Brunei 
Bulgaria 
Burkina Faso 
Burundi 
Cambodia 
Cameroon 
Canada 
Cape Verde 
Central African 
Republic 
Chad 
Chile 
China PR 
Colombia 
Comoros 
Costa Rica 
Cote d'Ivoire 
Croatia 
Cuba 
Czech Republic 
DR Congo 
Denmark 
Djibouti 
Dominica 
Dominican Republic 
Ecuador 
Egypt 
El Salvador 
Eritrea 
Estonia 
Ethiopia 
Fed. States of 
Micronesia 
Fiji 
Finland 
France 
Gabon 
Gambia 
Georgia 
Germany 
Ghana 
Greece 
Grenada 
Guatemala 
Guinea 
Guinea-Bissau 
Guyana 
Haiti 
Honduras 
Hungary 
Iceland 
India 
Indonesia 
Iran 
Iraq 
Ireland 
Israel 
Italy 
Jamaica 
Japan 
Jordan 
Kazakhstan 
Kiribati 
Kuwait 
Kyrgyzstan 
Laos 
Latvia 
Lebanon 
Lesotho 
Liberia 
Libya 
Liechtenstein 
Lithuania 
Luxembourg 
Macedonia 
Madagascar 
Malawi 
Malaysia 
Maldives 
Mali 
Marshall Islands 
Mauritania 
Mauritius 
Mexico 
Moldova 
Monaco 
Mongolia 
Montenegro 
Morocco 
Mozambique 
Myanmar (Burma) 
Namibia 
Nauru 
Nepal 
Netherlands 
New Zealand 
Nicaragua 
Niger 
Nigeria 
North Korea 
Norway 
Oman 
Pakistan 
Palau 
Panama 
Papua New Guinea 
Paraguay 
Peru 
Philippines 
Poland 
Portugal 
Qatar 
Republic of Congo 
Romania 
Russian Federation 
Rwanda 
Saint Kitts and Nevis 
Saint Lucia 
Saint Vincent and the 
Grenadines 
Samoa 
San Marino 
Sao Tome and 
Principe 
Saudi Arabia 
Senegal 
Seychelles 
Sierra Leone 
Singapore 
Slovak Republic 
Slovenia 
Solomon Islands 
Somalia 
South Africa 
South Korea 
Spain 
Sri Lanka 
Sudan 
Suriname 
Swaziland 
Sweden 
Switzerland 
Syria 
Tajikistan 
Tanzania 
Thailand 
Timor-Leste 
Togo 
Trinidad and Tobago 
Tunisia 
Turkey 
Turkmenistan 
Tuvalu 
Uganda 
Ukraine 
United Arab Emirates 
United Kingdom 
United States 
Uruguay 
Uzbekistan 
Venezuela 
Vietnam 
Yemen Republic 
Zambia 
Zimbabwe
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